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In today’s globalised world with much easier and more ubiquitous cross-border 
movement, physical state borders are becoming more ‘invisible’. States confront 
increasing threats, which are no longer delimited by borders. While states’ enforcement 
jurisdiction is essentially territorial, in order to combat transnational crime and 
eliminate security threats, they have to expand their national interests across borders by 
resorting to international judicial cooperation.  
 
Extradition is a formal legal process by which states could bring the accused or 
convicted criminals who have fled abroad back to justice. Nevertheless, extradition is 
subjected to a range of impediments among which the death penalty has been a 
controversial one that seems not to be reconciled. This thesis argues that by absolutely 




Rights is actually exporting a non-universal abolitionist value. However, the legal basis 
for this standard is not tenable, nor the current approach of seeking assurances. In fact, 
the standard is even not fully shared by its own States Parties. 
 
This thesis offers a critical correction and reaffirmation on the lawfulness of the death 
penalty in international law and proposes a different relationship between extradition 
and the death penalty within the European Convention on Human Rights. This means, 
its Contracting Parties should be conferred a margin of appreciation under Article 2 to 
respond to the death penalty—extradition dilemma, where at present it does not seem 
to apply. If the margin of appreciation is allowed, extradition would be permitted to 
retentionist states in cases where the death penalty is ‘lawfully carried out’ and the test 
of proportionality is met. The underlying cause of the suggested approach is that there 
needs to be greater international cooperation against transnational criminality. In certain 
cases, the repression of transnational crime on behalf of many outweighs the rights of 
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We live in challenging times for international criminal justice. The greater international 
cooperation is especially needed in this new global context, which is characterised by 
the great availability of cross-border movement, the globalised criminality and states’ 
expanding interests in responding to transnational crime and safeguarding the public 
security and national interests. Extradition is a formal legal process by which a 
‘person’1 is surrendered by one state to another to either stand a trial or serve a sentence. 
Generally speaking, when the ‘human rights—extradition nexus’ is concerned, it refers 
to the issue of whether extraditing a person to the requesting state would be consistent 
with the extraditee’s human rights or namely, for the requested state, whether granting 
the extradition complies with its human rights obligations.2 Although it is required to 
pursue a reconciled or balanced relation between these two aspects,3 it is a fact that 
 
1  According to the definition of extradition, the person subjected to an extradition request formally refers to 
‘extraditee’, who is either charged with committing a crime or a convicted criminal that falls within the jurisdiction 
of the requesting state. In this thesis, such difference is relevant in cases when the extraditee is charged with or 
convicted of a capital crime and the requested state is assessing whether impose him to the risk of the death penalty 
is legitimate, necessary and proportionate. That is to say, those two kinds of extraditee would suffer a different level 
of risk of the death penalty upon being extradited. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 4.3.5 in detail. In addition, 
its relevance is also expressed in the use of assurances against the death penalty. The applicability and effectiveness 
of the assurance are slightly different in cases involving two types of extraditees, which will be further explained in 
Chapter 4.1.4. 
2 In fact, human rights concerns trigger from as early as the extradition treaty is negotiated until the requested 
person’s return. However, the due process and the extraditee’s potential treatment upon the return to the requesting 
state is particularly concentrated here.  
3 John Dugard and Christine Van Den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’ (1998) 92 American 




extradition is not getting proper attention at this stage, especially when those 
fundamental human rights are concerned. In other words, it is fair to say that in some 
cases, the ‘overemphasis’ on the human rights of extraditees has made extradition less 
effective. 
 
This thesis is going to recalibrate the relationship between extradition and human rights, 
with a particular focus on the death penalty and its obstructive status in extradition. It 
argues for a more flexible approach to facilitate the international criminal cooperation, 
inter alia, extradition in combating transnational crimes by finding a way in which the 
discrepancy between abolitionist states and retentionist states could be dealt with. By 
examining the lawfulness of the death penalty in international law, it comes to the 
reality that there is not a universal treaty that legally binding states to prohibit the death 
penalty. Furthermore, it is premature to say that the prohibition of the death penalty 
does or would attest to be a rule of customary international law. Admittedly, the use of 
the death penalty is regulated and restricted to a large extent.  
 
For these reasons, on the one hand, it is arguable to say the European standard of the 
absolute prohibition of extraditing people to retentionist states to face the death penalty 
is actually exporting the non-universal abolitionist values. On the other hand, it is 
imperative to find out a defendable approach which could help to circumvent the 
conundrum to ‘extradite to retentionist states’.4 In other words, to make it possible and 
 
4 It is not just about extraditing people to retentionist states, but sending people to retentionist states where the 




easier for European states to extradite to states that retain the death penalty—China in 
particular. The difficulties for China to succeed extradition are illustrated by the long-
running saga of the suspected murderer Kyung Yup Kim. At the time this thesis was 
submitted, Kim was continuing to reside in New Zealand after a court, for the second 
time, quashed the extradition order against him on the basis that China retains the death 
penalty. We shall return to this example in the next chapter. In order to achieve the aims 
set out above, this thesis is attempting to reconsider the application of the ‘margin of 
appreciation doctrine’5 under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and then, arguing to recognise its role in extradition cases involving the death penalty, 
where at present it does not apply. That is to say, in certain especially serious cases, 
there should be a test of proportionality which would be able to allow extradition to 
places where the death penalty is ‘lawfully carried out’6. 
 
The main focus in this thesis will be placed on the European standard/values and via 
the general practice of the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which is for the following concerns. The European Court of Human Rights 
conducts the highest standard against the death penalty; it has robust case law in relation 
to extradition (to face the death penalty); and it established and develops the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, which is the significant ‘vehicle’ to arrive at the purpose of this 
 
retentionist states’ for brevity, which will implicate the issue of extradition to state that could impose the death 
penalty for the crime in question or enforce the death sentence upon the extraditee. 
5 This concept is outlined below in Section 1.3 and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
6 The lawful application of the death penalty refers to the death penalty that is carried out in keeping with a set of 
substantive and procedural safeguards as will be examined in Chapter 3.4, especially those are guaranteed in 




thesis. Nevertheless, it is not saying that the contribution from other international and 
regional systems to the argument in this thesis is negligible, particularly considering the 
revolutionary mechanism of the European Arrest Warrant,7 and while identifying the 
lawfulness of the death penalty in international law. Furthermore, the output from the 
Human Rights Committee and other UN-based bodies is also indispensable. 
 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The remainder of this introductory chapter 
(Chapter 1) will set out the problems that the thesis is designed to address and briefly 
outline the main arguments in favour of making the change to afford states with a certain 
degree of flexibility, via the margin of appreciation, in response to the death penalty—
extradition dilemma. After that, the second chapter sets up a general context of 
extradition law by mainly focusing on its various legal basis and substantial 
requirements. In the meanwhile, Chapter 2 also expounds the reasons that extradition 
is impeded, particularly on human rights grounds. Chapter 3 provides a detailed 
analysis with respect to the death penalty. It will be looking at the prevalence of the 
death penalty in state practice, as a component of the enquiry into its international 
lawfulness. In this regard, particular attention will be paid on the question of whether 
customary international law expressly prohibits the death penalty. In addition to the 
death penalty per se, an important concomitant topic concerned is that to what extent 
the death penalty is regulated and restricted substantively and procedurally. Based on 
 
7 The European Arrest Warrant cannot be completely detached from the ECHR, while the latter serves as the bottom 
line of the operation of the former. The EAW could not authorise an ‘extradition’ that would go against the ECHR. 




the conclusion from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will demonstrate how the existing legal 
framework could be recalibrated to achieve the purpose of the repression of 
transnational crimes. This chapter attempts to reconsider the European standard on 
dealing with the extradition request from retentionist states, followed by the argument 
to introduce the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which is arguably applied to the 
cases where the abolitionist states could assess whether to extradite people to 
retentionist states on their own, based on the test of proportionality. In the end, Chapter 
5 aims to summarise the whole thesis.   
 
1.1 Extradition in states’ response to transnational criminality 
 
‘Extradition is the means by which states cooperate in the prevention, control, and 
suppression of domestic and international criminality. In the age of globalization, in which 
individuals cross territorial boundaries or conduct business in multiple states at 
unprecedented rates, the obligation to extradite or prosecute has gained greater importance 
and acceptance.’8 
 
It is asserted that ‘the law of extradition is related to the law of jurisdiction in criminal 
matters.’9 In general, jurisdiction has established its relationship to extradition from 
two perspectives. For one thing, the primary concern with respect to extradition may 
fall into the relevance of the requested state’s jurisdiction over the crime that the wanted 
 
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (6th edn, OUP 2014) 2. 




fugitive commits.10 When a person committed a crime and fled to another state, it 
seems self-evident that the state, which has sufficient and appropriate competence to 
him or his perpetration,11 has legitimate interests to bring that person to justice before 
its national courts. Furthermore, the requesting state’s alleged criminal jurisdiction must 
be recognised by the requested state before considering further conditions and 
requirements.12  
 
For another, what underpins extradition is the fact that both in theory of international 
law and practice, states’ enforcement jurisdiction is essentially and strictly territorial, 
with few exceptions of extraterritoriality.13 The direct effect of this characteristic is 
much more salient than ever in the context of globalised criminality. As the late Cherif 
Bassiouni prescribed, state borders play a multifaceted role in the international legal 
order and are interpreted differently in various regimes of international law. In today’s 
globalised world with much easier and more ubiquitous cross-border movement, the 
physical state borders are becoming much more ‘invisible’. It is reputed that states are 
confronted with increasingly severe internal and external security threats from various 
aspects,14 which are no longer delimited by state borders and challenges would arise 
when the perpetrator or the crime is of a transnational nature.15 What is more, criminals 
 
10 Alan Jones and Anand Doobay, Jones and Doobay on Extradition and Mutual Assistance (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2005) 36-7. 
11  Matthew Henning, ‘Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead to International 
Incidents Notes’ (1999) 22 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 350. 
12  Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and Other Mechanisms 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 86; Geoff Gilbert, Responding to International Crime (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 75-6. 
13 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2019) 462. 
14 Christopher Michaelsen, ‘The Cross-Border Transfer of Dangerous Persons, the Risk of Torture and Diplomatic 
Assurances’ in Saskia Hufnagel and Others (eds), Cross-border Law Enforcement: Regional Law Enforcement 
Cooperation--European, Australian and Asia Pacific Perspectives (Routledge 2013) 212-8. 




are offered much more opportunities than before to escape from justice by getting to 
other countries. This is the fact that Neil Boister describes as ‘for criminals engaging in 
trans-national crime in the unembellished sense of cross-border crime, borders are part 
of their business.’16 Against this background, states increasingly recognise that crimes 
with transnational nature and effect call for a transnational solution to respond in a high-
efficiency, straightforward and universally applicable manner. The necessity of 
combating transnational crime, promoting justice as well as eliminating the security 
threats and safeguarding the national interests has propelled states to embark on 
bilateral and multilateral judicial cooperation in various forms. 
 
As has been extensively discussed in the literature, state cooperation is a broad concept 
involving various measures. It plays an indispensable role in every stage of international 
criminal justice. 17  It can be divided into vertical cooperation and horizontal 
cooperation.18 The former primarily refers to states’ cooperation with international 
institutions, particularly international criminal courts and tribunals.19 Extradition, as an 
important approach in horizontal cooperation operated between two sovereign states, is 
‘expected to gain in prominence as transnational criminality spreads with increased 
opportunities of international exchange and commerce.’20 Such kind of cooperation 
equips states to overcome the difficulties of the oversea enforcement of criminal law so 
 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concept, Activities and Responses (Routledge 2001) 13. 
16 Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2018) 3. 
17 Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (CUP 2019) 230. 
18 See ibid, 230-8; Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (4th edn, Hart Publishing 2010) 366-82. 
19 This issue, although not being discussed in this thesis, is very important in the field of international criminal 
cooperation. 




as to fight against the criminality of transnational nature.21 The examination of the 
importance and the value of extradition is to be continued in Chapter 2.1.  
 
It has to admit that extradition has never been a perfect method,22 which is often 
criticised for its complicated process 23  and also political-motivated application. 24 
States that facilitate negotiation and conclusion of extradition treaties is often treated as 
a trade-off for diplomatic, business and economic benefits.25 Nevertheless, its role in 
international criminal cooperation to combating transnational crime should by no 
means be underestimated. Simply put, extradition is seen as a win-win choice for both 
participating states. Extradition provides a formal channel whereby the fugitive 
criminal can be legitimately brought to the state enforcing its criminal jurisdiction. For 
this reason, extradition serves as a useful tool in fighting against impunity, and then, the 
objectives of the suppression of crime and the guarantee of criminal jurisdiction of the 
commitment state can be largely realised. To a large extent, extradition itself also plays 
 
21  Kimberly Prost, ‘No Hiding Place: How Justice Need not be Blinded by Borders’ in Steven Brown (eds.) 
Combating International Crime: The Longer Arm of the Law (Routledge 2008) 124. 
22 For example, see, Boister (n 16) 12, 389. 
23 It oversteps the scope of this thesis to discuss the procedure of extradition in different regimes, bilateral or 
multilateral treaties and domestic legislation. For discussion on this point, see Ivor Stanbrook and Clive Stanbrook, 
Extradition: Law and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2000); Edward Grange and Rebecca Niblock, Extradition Law: A 
practitioner’s Guide (2nd edn, Legal Action Group 2015); David Sadoff, Bringing International Fugitives to Justice: 
Extradition and its Alternatives (CUP 2016) 153-66; Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 818-999; Extradition 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000 (Extradition Law of China), Articles 7-51; Official Journal of the 
European Union, Handbook on How to Issue and Execute a European Arrest Warrant, Official Journal of European 
Union (2017). 
24 Boister (n 16) 389, ‘the key to resolving many of the problems with extradition is primarily political, and only 
secondarily legal; similar opinion can also be found in Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of 
International Law (2nd edn, CUP 2015) 162, ‘most problems with international cooperation relate to variable 
degrees of political will to cooperate.’ See also Stahn (n 17) 231. ‘The success of cooperation depends largely on the 
national and international political commitments in the respective context.’Sadoff (n 23) 24. Extradition law is ‘so 
deeply suffused with politics…and the law itself at times can be difficult to isolate as an independent variable.’ 
25 Sabrina Choo, ‘Circumventing the China Extradition Conundrum: Relying on Deportation to Return Chinese 
Fugitives Notes’ (2017) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1379-80; Asif Efrat and 
Marcello Tomasina, ‘Value-Free Extradition? Human Rights and the Dilemma of Surrendering Wanted Persons to 




the role of controlling and deterring the international movement of criminals. In the 
meantime, granting extradition is for more than reciprocal interests. There are a number 
of reasons motivating the host state to remove the person from its territory. On the one 
hand, as the then Home Secretary of the UK Theresa May reflected on Öthman (Abu 
Qatada) case, ‘the right place for a foreign terrorist is a foreign prison cell far from 
Britain.’26 In fact, the confrontation of global security threats makes the host state more 
favourable to remove those unwelcome individuals who reside in its territory threaten 
its national security.27 On the other hand, states are unwilling to be labelled as the ‘safe 
haven’28 for criminals or provide the refuge for fugitive criminals, either of which 
would not only destroy the international reputation on the suppression of transnational 
crime, but also attract more criminals to arrive.29 For these reasons, the host state per 
se has desirability to expel the fugitives in whatever methods. 
 
Extradition is one of the oldest methods of international criminal cooperation, 30 
virtually all aspects of it have been researched by various government authorities, legal 
scholars and commenters. Extradition law has considerably evolved in the past decades, 
especially since the 9/11 attack, and many signs of progress have been made to 
 
26 House of Commons, ‘House of Commons Debate 07 February 2012’ <https://publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/debtext/120207-0001.htm#12020774000003> accessed 20 March 2019. 
27 The host state’s desire to remove the fugitives for other related concerns will be revealed in Chapter 2.1. 
28 For the definition of ‘safe haven’, see Sadoff (n 23) 20. 
29 For example, see Reuters, ‘Western Countries have Promised not to be Haven for Corrupt Chinese Fugitives, Says 
Beijing’ 2016 <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2039843/western-countries-have-
promised-not-be-haven-corrupt> accessed 4 April 2019; Xinsheng Qiao, ‘China’s Hunting for Corrupt Fugitives is 
Justifiable’ (China Daily, 2016) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-12/01/content_27533392.htm> 
accessed 23 March 2018.  
30 For a historical background of extradition law, see Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 2-7; Stanbrook and 




streamline its procedure and strengthen its application.31 In recent years, a serious of 
controversial high-profile extradition cases, such as Edward Snowden case, Julian 
Assange case, El Chapo case and the case of Meng Wanzhou,32  have once again 
brought extradition into the spotlight of international attention. 33  In essence, 
extradition is a kind of approach to help to get the suspected or convicted fugitive back 
to justice. It might sound abstract to say uphold justice and the rule of law in 
international criminal cooperation, but in every extradition case, bringing fugitive back 
is indeed the first step to bring the justice back. After that, it is equally important that 
the extraditee would face a fair trial or a proper punishment. 
 
In such circumstances, it seems necessary to reexamine some unsettled issues in relation 
to extradition law in the new global context, in particular on why extradition has not 
played effectively in achieving what it was set out to do. Although extradition is 
considered as one of ‘the most legally and politically preferred’ approach of inter-state 
cooperation on fugitives transferring,34 the universality of its application is still a big 
concern. For example, the establishment and existence of extradition treaties do not 
necessarily result in the successful operation of extradition. In practice, many factors 
weaken its potential effectiveness. The situation has been exacerbated by the limited 
legal basis of extradition and also numerous refusal grounds. The increasing 
prominence and scope of human rights law are chief amongst those impediments that 
 
31 Sadoff (n 23) 174-83. 
32 Meng is the CFO of the Chinese technology company Huawei. 
33 For the reference to more notable extradition cases, see Stefano Maffei, Extradition Law and Practice: Concept 
and Famous Cases (Europa Law Publishing 2019). 




constrain states’ effort to combating transnational crime.   
 
1.2 Human rights barriers to extradition: sketching the problems 
Gary McKinnon, 35  a British computer hacker, broke into the US government’s 
confidential computer system between 1999 and 2002, alleging that he did it to search 
for the UFO information. McKinnon was sought for extradition by the US government, 
and the struggle had been running for over ten years before the Home Secretary of the 
UK eventually objected the extradition request due to the considerations of McKinnon’s 
medical conditions36 and his potential human rights treatment in the US. To be more 
precise, according to the medical assessment from the appointed psychiatrist, Gary 
McKinnon was diagnosed as a patient of Asperger’s syndrome. Granting his extradition 
would put him into serious and depressive suffering, which may probably make him 
commit suicide after the surrender. The UK’s decision not to extradite was mainly on 
account of human rights protection of the individuals, namely, the physical and mental 
conditions of McKinnon would make his extradition unjust and his future treatment 
upon return oppressive.37 For this reason, human rights advocators appraised the result 
as a triumph of the ‘rights, freedoms and justice in the United Kingdom’,38 despite the 
strong dissenting opinions of the politicians and lawyers from both the UK and the 
 
35 See Theresa May, Statement by Home Secretary Theresa May on extradition made on 16 October 2012 (Home 
Office 2012); BBC News, ‘Gary McKinnon Extradition to US Blocked by Theresa May’ 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19957138> accessed 3 April 2017. 
36 Considerations on the extraditee’s physical and mental conditions in extradition trial is traced to Sections 25 and 
91 of Extradition Act 2003 of the United Kingdom (Extradition Act 2003). 
37 ibid, Sec 91. See also, House of Lords, Selected Committee on Extradition Law, 2nd Report of Session 2014-15, 
‘Extradition: UK Law and Practice’ (2015). 
38 See Liberty, ‘Liberty Welcomes Home Secretary’s Decision not Extradite Gary McKinnon to US’  <htt
ps://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/news/press-releases/liberty-welcomes-home-secretary’s-decision-not-extradit






Gary McKinnon case is only one of the cases involving the impact of human rights law 
on extradition. Human rights, over the past decades, especially after the Second World 
War, have gradually been prescribed as an essential principle of international law, and 
today, the protection of individuals’ human rights has become one of the common 
pursuance of the civilised society.40 This transformation influences and collides almost 
all aspects of human life and meanwhile, reaches different parts of international law. 
How to deal with the conflicts between states’ human rights obligation with other 
aspects of international legal obligation is a bone of contention. 41  Under such 
circumstances, while the judicial cooperation was bringing about complex human rights 
issues, extradition is not a self-governed and impervious doctrine without any limitation 
in practical application. Nowadays, it is not difficult to find an extraditions case that 
litigates human rights concerns or impeded by the potential violation of the extraditee’s 
human rights. In fact, extradition might not be granted due to a variety of reasons, 
among which international human rights concerns are of particular public focus with 
quite a lot of controversies.42 For example, the operation of extradition is becoming 
much more complicated because, in addition to its function in the area of criminal 
justice, extradition law per se also provides the extraditees with a variety of substantive 
 
39 BBC News, ‘Gary McKinnon Extradition to US Blocked by Theresa May; Alan Travis and Owen Bowcott, ‘Gary 
McKinnon Will not be Extradited to US, Theresa May Announces’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/16/gary-mckinnon-not-extradited-may> accessed 3 April 2017. 
40 Lin Feng, The Human Rights Review of Chinese Citizens (Economic Daily Press 1998) 2. 
41 Erika De Wet and Jure Vidmar, Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012). 
42 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Undesirable but Unreturnable: Extradition and Other Forms of Rendition’ (2017) 15 Journal of 




and procedural safeguards, which in return, suspend or block the extradition.  
 
There is an argument that extradition has been attached a dual function in operation that 
is supposed to be proportionately reconciled. As Helen Duffy asserts, ‘[a] state’s 
obligations in respect of extradition must therefore be understood not only by reference 
to extradition treaties, but also to other provisions of international law, including human 
rights law.’43 This is backed by Sharon William, who agrees that ‘extradition law 
performs the function of protecting a fugitive, through legal safeguards, from being 
returned to the extradited state.’44 In reality, the extradition process may frequently 
contradict and compromise various factors relevant to international human rights law.45 
The fugitive’s human rights conditions upon return to the requesting state have 
increasingly been focused as an important consideration before the extradition decision 
is made. Helen Duffy claims that ‘the sending state’s responsibility for the rights of the 
person continued after extradition, by virtue of the act of expulsion.’ 46  Some 
commentators allege that a potential or de facto risk of violation of the requested 
individual’s human rights would definitely be a legitimate ground for denying the 
extradition request.47  
 
 
43 Duffy (n 24) 161-2. 
44  Sharon Williams, ‘Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty’ (1991) 28 Canadian Yearbook of 
international Law 117. 
45  For the purpose of this thesis, only the post-extradition human rights treatments by the receiving state are 
considered, although it should be noted that the human rights protection of extraditees runs through the whole 
extradition proceedings, including those pre-extradition rights and guarantees in the requested state. 
46 Duffy (n 24) 168. 
47 Christine Van Den Wyngaert, ‘Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening 




Although there has not been a specific human rights treaty regarding extradition until 
now, provisions concerning the human rights of the extraditee have been indispensable 
parts in virtually every bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties. To be more precise, 
a template is often set up as the mandatory and discretionary human rights grounds for 
states to refuse the extradition request. For example, in the UN Model Treaty on 
Extradition, mandatory grounds refusal and optional grounds for refusal are embodied 
in Article 3 and 4 respectively, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 2.2.2.2. The 
Extradition Law of China imposes the basis to reject the request if ‘the person sought 
has been or probably be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or humiliating 
treatment or punishment in the Requesting State’.48 The UK’s Extradition Act 2003 
contains provisions related to the human rights bar to extradition.49 Apart from being 
written in extradition treaties and domestic legislation, human rights’ restrictive impact 
on states’ extradition is more clearly manifested in case law, particularly the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee. Although both the 
understanding of human rights and the level of human rights protection vary in different 
countries and regions, it is acknowledged to be important to reconcile extradition with 
human rights or namely,50 at least to seriously take the protection of human rights into 
consideration of extradition and combating transnational crime.51  
 
 
48 Extradition Law of China, Art 8(7). 
49 Extradition Act 2003, Sec 21. 
50 The development of ‘extraditions with assurances’ is one of the most common approaches in this regard. See 
Duffy (n 24) 165-8. ‘States may seek to reconcile their commitment and obligations in respect of cooperation with 
human rights protection in various ways.’ See also, Dugard and Van Den Wyngaert (n 3).   





Concerns on the extraditee’s human rights protection run through the whole extradition 
process, involving rights in both two participating states before and after the transfer. 
This thesis only focuses on the extraditee’s potential risk of the death penalty in the 
requesting state. Within the broad sphere of human rights—extradition nexus, the right 
to life that is exemplified by the death penalty has gained significant concerns. The 
division between abolitionist states and retentionist states is not only one of the most 
distinct penological differences, but also considered as an ‘almost insurmountable’52 
impediment to the international extradition regime. Namely, many abolitionist states 
are prohibited to extradite individuals to retentionist states where there is a serious risk 
of being subjected to the death penalty. In many cases, abolitionist states are even not 
willing to negotiate a permanent extradition treaty with retentionist states. 53  As 
Rosalyn Higgins points out, a problem that both the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Committee face is that ‘the legality under their respective human 
rights instruments of the extradition of a person from a State Party (which had abolished 
the death penalty) to a non-party State which retained the death penalty.’54  
 
It is not unusual that extradition is refused based on the possibility of the extraditee’s 
confrontation of the death penalty upon return unless sufficient assurances are provided, 
guaranteeing the death penalty would either not be imposed or if imposed, would not 
be carried out. Under such circumstances, what matters in relation to the paradox 
 
52 Boister (n 16) 376. 
53 For example, the decision to sign or ratify an extradition treaty with China has aroused huge controversies in 
countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States.  





between human rights and extradition usually is not the human rights violation itself, 
but whether the requested state’s approval to extradite will put the extraditee in a real 
risk of the death penalty. William Schabas believes that ‘developments in international 
extradition practices reveal that capital punishment is incompatible with effective 
international cooperation in criminal law matters.’ 55  Admittedly, the continual 
movement of the death penalty abolition unquestionably punches extradition. The 
foreseeable risk of the death penalty upon extradition has developed into an essential 
concern by which the abolitionist state denies the extradition request. Simply put, 
‘extradition or execution’ seems not to be a confusing problem today, and many 
academics and government officials have taken the death penalty exception for granted. 
However, the inherent problems, especially the dilemma those retentionist states face 
in the context of combating transnational crime, have not been appropriately resolved. 
 
When sketching the problems regarding extradition and fundamental human rights, 
inter alia, the death penalty, it has to admit that there are limitations of the core 
argument this thesis argues. On the one hand, the main problem that this chapter 
observes is that human rights law is presented as being obstructive in facilitating 
extradition requests from abolitionist states to retentionist states. It is acknowledged 
that in any development of the law on this area, including the changes this thesis 
suggests, there should be recognition of the need for movement by both abolitionist 
states and retentionist states so as to resolve the death penalty—extradition dilemma. 
 
55 William Schabas, ‘Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment’s Role in Extradition Law and Practice’ (2003) 25 




This thesis does not attempt to argue that only the abolitionist states need to 
compromise by ‘lowering’ their standard while retentionist states are waived from any 
responsibility. In contrast, the latter is under the universally recognised obligations to 
guarantee the lawful use of the death penalty substantively and procedurally. For 
example, suspending the death penalty for those non-violent crimes or crimes do not 
meet the ‘most serious crime’ standard, which would circumvent the death penalty—
extradition dilemma to a large extent, particularly involving economic crime in the anti-
corruption campaign. Under current circumstances, this might be the biggest step for 
the administration of the death penalty that could be realised. Having said that, as will 
be explained in Chapters 2.1 and 4.3.5, the argument for changes and flexibilities is 
more convincing in extradition cases involving terrorism and other serious transnational 
crimes where the refusal of extradition would pose foreseeable security threats to the 
requested state.  
 
On the other hand, both the subject of the death penalty and its relevance to extradition 
are ongoing topics. Rosalyn Higgins describes that ‘the law in this area will clearly 
continue to develop and to be refined.’56 It has to admit that the arguments raised in 
this thesis are only based on the current status, with respect to the lawfulness of the 
death penalty in particular, which does not indicate any evolution in the future. 
Furthermore, within the current legal framework, it might be really hard for the 
retentionists to persuade the abolitionists completely. However, it is not reasonable to 
 




say that the retentionist states have no legal ground for remaining it or the death penalty 
should or could be totally abolished.  
 
1.3 The arguments in favour of making the change 
The increasingly serious transnational criminality is indeed an incontestable fact, which 
is also a challenge that most of countries have to respond to. Judge Kimberly Prost 
concedes that ‘almost no part of the world is left untouched by the rise of the 
transnational component of crime, though its manifestations may vary widely.’57 As 
will be outlined in Chapter 2.2.1.2, a number of international conventions aiming at 
combating transnational crimes have gained universal recognition and ratification,58 
which to a certain degree reflects the common interests and the shared value of the 
international community. This also indicates that the increasingly severe threat from 
those transnational crimes has attracted international concerns. In addition to 
transnational crimes, those crimes perpetrated domestically also have increasing 
transnational features, particularly considering the convenience of the cross-border 
movement. In this regard, the importance of international cooperation (extradition) in 
combating crimes also could be drawn out from the Interpol and the use of its Red 
Notice. Although there is uncertainty regarding the legal status of the Interpol,59 and 
the use of the Red Notice sometimes attracts criticism,60 a great deal of value has been 
 
57 Kimberly Prost, ‘Foreword’ in Neil Boister and Robert Currie (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational 
Criminal Law (Routledge 2014) xvi. 
58 For example, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes has 147 signatories and 190 parties; 
the UN Convention against Corruption has 140 signatories and 187 parties.  
59 For example, see Amy Mackinnon, ‘The Scourge of the Red Notice: How Some Countries Use Interpol to Go 
after Dissidents and Debtors, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/the-scourge-of-the-red-notice-interpol-uae-
russia-china/> accessed 29 May 2020.  




recognised in the context of combating transnational crime. For example, in some 
bilateral extradition relations, states are able to initiate provisional arrest on the basis of 
the Red Notice.61 More specifically, the increasing number of issues of the Red Notice 
undoubtedly signifies the threat of those serious crimes that the international 
community confronts as well as the states’ collective commitment to strike back.62 
 
In the opinion of Ilias Bantekas, ‘the procedure [of extradition] is subject to a variety 
of human rights considerations, but these cannot be used to challenge the legitimacy of 
the process of surrender.’63 As has been revealed in the above sections, it is true that 
there should always be sufficient guarantees of human rights safeguards of all 
individuals involved in international criminal justice. In the meantime, it is equally 
important or even more important that the protection of fugitives’ human rights does 
not undermine the core value of extradition, ensuring its role in fighting against 
transnational crime is adequately served. That is to say, in some instances concerning 
certain rights (right to life for example), extradition should not be blocked without any 
exception or proportionality consideration.64 As Geoff Gilbert reaffirms, ‘protection 
should not equate to impunity.’65 It is widely agreed that criminals should not be able 
to evade justice by crossing state borders. However, excessive barriers from human 
rights law indeed largely increase the chance of ‘delay in justice enforcement, and 
 
61 For example, Extradition Treaty between China and Italy, Art 9. 
62 Although we do not exclude the cases where the Red Notice is issued ‘improperly’, the figures of the currently 
valid Red Notices (around 62,000, including 7,000 are public) are impressive. In 2019, 13,377 Red Notices were 
issued. See https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices accessed on 27 May 2020. 
63 Bantekas, International Criminal Law (n 18) 374. 
64 This will be examined in Chapter 4 in detail. 




potentially denial of justice’.66  This section aims at giving an explanation of the 
necessity to prioritise extradition in certain circumstances where the extraditee is facing 
the death penalty. That is to say, it will explain a number of reasons in favour of the 
call for flexibilities. 
 
To begin with, part of the reasons that the ECtHR should make the suggested change 
of being more flexible in relation to extradition to retentionist states is substantiated by 
political arguments supported by the fact that there is no international legal prohibition 
of the death penalty per se. In spite of the difference, political arguments are highly 
relevant both in legal analysis generally and in relation to the main arguments raised in 
this thesis. There are many examples of the governments or politicians of the States 
Parties kicking against the Court or its decisions. In practice, the political backlash 
could affect or delay the compliance with the Court’s judgment as we already seen in 
many cases. For example, in the former Prime Minister David Cameron’s response to 
the judgment of Hirst v. the United Kingdom case in 2005,67 which concerned the 
prisoners’ voting rights in the UK, he initially said implementing the judgement of the 
ECtHR makes him feel ‘physical ill’.68 Successive UK governments had refused to 
enforce that judgement until September 2018 when the case was formally closed by the 
Council of Europe based on the UK’s revised proposal of ‘compromised’ 
implementation.69 The UK’s reluctance to execute the ECtHR’s judgements has set a 
 
66 Duffy (n 24) 162. 
67 Hirst v. the United Kingdom App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005). 
68  Alex Aldridge, ‘Can ‘Physically Ill’ David Cameron Find a Cure for His European Law Allergy?’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/may/06/david-cameron-european-law-allergy> accessed 15 July 2020. 




‘deleterious’ example to the other States Parties. In Russia and Turkey, for instance, the 
implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments has been a continually topical issue.70 In 
Trabelsi v. Belgium case,71 in addition to the controversial issue of the compatibility 
of ‘de facto irreducible’ life imprisonment and Article 3, it was notable that Belgian 
authorities extradited the Tunisian terrorist to the US disregarded the ECtHR’s interim 
measures with a view to suspending the extradition. Although Belgium’s decision was 
mainly based on the guarantee it received from the US, it was believed that the danger 
and potential security threats to Belgium caused by the applicant did help it made the 
decision much easier.72 It was the revolt by some Contracting Parties like the UK and 
Belgium that promoted the proposed reform of the ECtHR,73 the essence of which has 
also been reflected in Protocol No. 15. 
 
Since the 9/11 attack, the considerable changes in the political sphere has put the ‘war 
on terror’ into the frontline of states’ priority, which inevitably affects states’ policies 
especially regarding the law enforcement. Although extradition or the interests served 
via extradition is not just about terrorism or public security, we can still draw some 
 
ent.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7461/>accessed 15 July 2020. 
70 For example, see Bill Bowring, ‘Russia’s Cases in the ECtHR and the Question of Implementation’ in Lauri 
Mälksoo and Wolfgang Benedek (eds.), Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect 
(CUP 2017); European Implementation Network, ‘Turkey’ <http://www.einnetwork.org/turkey-echr> accessed 15 
July 2020. 
71 Trabelsi v. Belgium, App no 140/10 (ECtHR, 4 September 2014). 
72 Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Belgium Violated the ECHR by Extraditing a Terrorist to the USA despite an Interim Measure 
by the Strasbourg Court: Trabelsi v. Belgium’ <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/09/12/belgium-violated-the-
echr-by-extraditing-a-terrorist-to-the-usa-despite-an-interim-measure-by-the-strasbourg-court-trabelsi-v-belgium/ 
accessed 15 July 2020; Luk Vervaet, ‘Belgium: Possible Extradition of Nizar Trabelsi to the United State : Another 
Act of War?’ <https://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/august/belgium-possible-extradition-of-nizar-trabelsi-to-the-
united-state-another-act-of-war/> accessed 15 July 2020. 
73 For example, in the Speech on the European Court of Human Rights, David Cameron put forward that ‘the role 
of the Court has never been more challenging’. Among which, he raised doubts regarding the increasingly limited 





inspirations from the debate on security v. human rights in the context of the war on 
terror.74 As Andrew Ashworth points out,  
 
‘Growing public and political concern about security in general, and specifically about 
what is described as the ‘terrorist threat’, has brought calls for more intrusive investigative 
power, for revisions of criminal procedure, for new and wider criminal laws and for 
harsher penalties.’75 
 
On the one hand, political arguments, to which the discussion in this thesis will refer, 
overlap and are applicable to the legal argument that I present for several reasons. 
Precisely, the ongoing global changes of transnational criminality are directly reflected 
in political views and decisions, which provide the overarching reasons for looking for 
a legal solution to provide European states with some flexibility to extradite to the 
retentionist, via the margin of appreciation. In other words, those political points are 
reasons behind the proposed alteration of the ECtHR’s legal standard. It is undeniable 
that the priority on public interests held by the politicians and governments is often 
contradicting with individuals’ human rights. There are many examples of the apparent 
willingness, or at least acquiescence, of abolitionist states,76 from political perspectives, 
to extradite or deport ‘unwanted people’ to other states, regardless of the death penalty, 
for the sake of their own national interests. In addition, there were many complaints 
 
74 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights’ in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus 
(eds.), Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2007). The main point of Andrew Ashworth will be explained 
in Chapter 4.3.4. 
75 ibid, 210. 




from some politicians in some States Parties against the inflation of the protection under 
the ECHR and calls for its reform. For example, the indeterminate relation between 
individuals’ human rights and national security and public interests has been a 
continuously debatable focus of the UK’s successive governments. As the then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair maintained on his speech on criminal justice reform in 2006,  
 
‘…the human rights of these individuals, if considered absolute, would militate against 
their deportation. But surely if they aren’t deported and conduct acts of terrorism, their 
victims’ rights have been violated by the failure to deport. And even if they don’t commit 
such an act or they don’t succeed in doing so, the time, energy, effort, resource in 
monitoring them puts a myriad of other essential task at risk and therefore the rights of 
the wider society. This is not an argument about whether we respect civil liberties or not; 
but whose take priority. It is not about choosing hard line policies over an individual’s 
human rights. It’s about which human rights prevail. In making that decision, there is a 
balance to be struck. I am saying it is time to rebalance the decision in favour of the decent, 
law-abiding majority who play by the rules and think others should too.’77 
 
Nearly a decade later, in 2015, in the UK’s Conservative Party’s proposal for human 
rights reform, David Cameron insisted that the European Court of Human Rights has 
developed ‘mission creep’. In other words, human rights are given too much priority, 
 
77 See Tony Blair, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech on Criminal Justice Reform’ <https://www.theguardian.com/pol




and human rights law is overused ‘with little regard for the rights of wider society’.78 
For example, under the current interpretation of the ECHR, those foreign terrorists and 
other criminals whose remaining would pose a severe threat on the national security are 
able to make a number of human rights arguments against their extradition or 
deportation, or at least postpone their removal. In the opinion of those politicians and 
those human rights sceptics, individualistic European human rights law is inhibiting the 
collective action from tackling transnational crimes for the greatest good of the public.79 
Until the time of writing, the UK’s relationship with the European Court of Human 
Rights is still an indiscernible issue.80 Nevertheless, no matter which government is 
concerned and no matter what specific circumstances are taken into account, the choice 
should be in favour of the greatest interests of the greatest number of people. It is 
noteworthy that the core value of the above political decisions is corresponding to the 
essence of proportionality calculus to a certain degree, which accommodates the idea 
that more flexibilities could be conferred to states in dealing with the conflict of 
interests between the public and the individual. That is to say, the margin of appreciation 
could be applied in assessing the extradition request for people facing the death penalty 
sentence or execution. I admit that it would be a big change for the Contracting Parties 
to the ECHR, they might be unlikely to accept. But that does not alter the validity of 
 
78  See The Conservative Party, Manifesto 2015 
<http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/Conservatives.pdf> accessed 9 August 2018, p.73; 
The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s 
Human Rights Law p.3.    
79 Ashworth (n 74) 205-6. 
80 For example, see Merris Amos, ‘The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom’ 
(2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 763-85; see Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, ‘UK must 
Leave European Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa May’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-
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the argument that I raise in this thesis that they are exporting the non-universal value 
and allowing the proposed flexibility would not contradict general international law. 
More importantly, the examples of political observations or opposition against the 
ECtHR explains why the change should be made and how likely those changes would 
find support from the political or governmental aspects. 
 
On the other hand, as Steven Greer claims, ‘drawing lines between Convention rights 
and legitimate public interest limitations inevitably involves weighing difficult and 
controversial political questions, rather than addressing narrow technical legal issues.’81 
Interpreting and implementing the Convention are complex, in which political concerns 
or political motivations are unavoidable. For any Contracting Parties, respect the human 
rights under the Convention is definitely an indispensable obligation but clearly not the 
only one in its decision-making process. This is particularly apparent in the context of 
the margin of appreciation, as will be illustrated in Chapter 4.3, the essence of which is 
to resolve the conflict between the individual human rights and other collective interests. 
Applying the doctrine to varying circumstances in different states is influenced by their 
diverse political backgrounds, particularly concerning those morally, culturally, 
religiously sensitive issues.   
 
On top of that, extradition law itself, as David Sadoff describes, ‘is deeply suffused 
with politics to the point where the two often become inseparably co-mingled and the 
 
81 Steven Greer, ‘The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin 




law itself at times can be difficult to isolate as an independent variable.’82 Although 
the ‘political offence exception’83 has been widely acknowledged, in reality, it is really 
hard to eliminate the political influence on extradition cases. As discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, political factors are embedded in the whole process of 
extradition cases. 84  Additionally, in many states, the political or administrative 
authorities and the court are closely involved in making the decision on extradition 
cases. In other words, extradition has rarely been an issue that purely determined by 
courts. For example, in China, both the judicial departments and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs are entitled to examine at different stages of the extradition proceeding.85 In 
Canada, extradition cases are proceeded by three phases while the Minister of Justice 
has the power to make the final decision whether or not to extradite, albeit subjected to 
judicial review.86 
 
Secondly, an issue that is frequently reviewed is the alternatives to extradition. This 
means, if the role of extradition could be replaced by other kinds of approach to get the 
same result, the problem caused by extradition could be easily resolved by abandoning 
the use of extradition at all. However, that has not been the case. Alternatives to 
extradition refer to those ‘legal and extralegal rendition devices that do not fall within 
 
82 Sadoff (n 23) 24. 
83 For further discussion, see Sadoff (n 23) 199-210; Boister (n 16) 368-70; Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 
8) 669-738;  Julia Jansson, Terrorism, Criminal Law and Politics: The Decline of the Political Offence Exception 
to Extradition (Routledge 2019).   
84 Sadoff (n 23) 24-5. 
85 Extradition Law of China, Arts 16-29. 
86  See Canada’s Extradition Act 1999, Art 40; General Overview of the Canadian Extradition Process, 




the framework of formal extradition.’87  Since human rights law might render the 
fugitive impunity from justice, an important derivative issue here is whether there are 
sufficient backup measures to secure those accused or convicted fugitives to be brought 
to justice, when the extradition is unsuccessful.88 In other words, whether it could be 
guaranteed that the alternatives to extradition are legitimate, sufficient and effective 
enough to realise the interests that the extradition is supposed to serve.89 In practice, 
several alternatives to extradition have been employed by states and governments to 
secure the wanted fugitives are brought to their territory either when the extradition is 
unavailable on a number of grounds which will be discussed in Chapter 2, or states are 
unwilling to resort or deliberately circumventing the formal extradition procedure. 
Those alternatives are differentiated from each other, mainly according to their 
lawfulness and applicability in particular cases. Nevertheless, we can observe that 
extradition is not replaceable and in reality, the unavailability or failure of extradition 
are able to be fully offset by sufficient alternatives. Extradition still ‘serves an 
indispensable function, operates reasonably well in most instances, continues to 
represent the generally preferred means of bringing fugitives to justice, and its very 
threat can have powerful, even mortal, consequences.’90 
 
For example, one of the most common alternatives is the reliance on the host state’s 
 
87 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition’ (1973) 
7 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 26. 
88 Either ‘unavailable’ or ‘undesirable’. See Sadoff (n 23) 3-4. 
89 For example, see Sadoff (n 23) chapter 9-12; Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) Chapter IV and V; Boister 
(n 16) 387-9. 




national immigration law to deport non-national fugitives from its territory. In many 
cases, deportation has been proved to be an effective way by which the de facto result 
of extradition can be achieved. 91  However, compared with extradition, taking 
deportation as an alternative has its weakness, especially concerning the procedural 
safeguards of the fugitive. Most importantly, even though deportation works well as an 
alternative to extradition by achieving the same result in certain cases, it does not and 
would not overcome the conundrum that many retentionist states confront in extradition 
where the fugitive is wanted for capital offences. This is because the Member States of 
the Council of Europe are legally obliged to prohibit the removal of individuals to 
another where the death penalty is possible, irrespective of extradition, deportation or 
exclusion.92 The relevance of deportation will be further analysed in Section 2.5. For 
this reason, the alternatives are not satisfactory in overcoming the barrier that 
retentionist states face in getting extradition from the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. 
 
Thirdly, within the current framework, when extradition cases involving the death 
penalty, the insistence on the assurance seems to be a normative practice in international 
law.93 However, does the use of assurances really resolve all problems arise from the 
gap between the abolitionist and retentionist states in international criminal cooperation? 
What is the essence of the use of assurances, and does it cause any side effects? Also, 
is there any better alternative to respond to this ‘stand-off’? The answers to the above 
 
91 Choo (n 25) 1381-96. 
92 For example, Preamble (13) of the European Arrest Warrant upholds that ‘no person should be removed, expelled 
or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty…’ 
93 For example, see UN Model Treaty on Extradition, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/116, amended 




questions require further debate, which will be looked into in Chapter 4.  
 
Last but not least, the primary suggestion put forward in this thesis is determined by the 
underlying legal argument that the death penalty itself is not universally prohibited in 
international law. As will be thoroughly explored in Chapter 3, on the basis of the 
assessment on the lawfulness of the death penalty in international law, which comes out 
that the death penalty is not universally prohibited in treaty law or customary 
international law, although international human rights law forcefully regulating how the 
death penalty is carried out and against whom. The ECtHR is, in effect, unjustifiably 
exporting a non-universal legal standard that affects the sovereignty of retentionist 
states to regulate criminal justice in the way that they themselves consider appropriate 
or legitimate.   
 
Against this background, this thesis argues that the ECtHR’s approach in determining 
extardition of people to retentionst states should be adjusting by conferring its States 
Parties with more flexibilities. In other words, in certain circumstances, extradition is 
supposed to be prioritised against the conflciting interests of the extarditee’s right under 
Article 2. In order to achieve the above target, a greater use of the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation in relation to Article 2 ECHR in extradition and expulsion cases is 
advocated. This means states should be given limited discretion to decide whether or 
not extradition should be processed. The margin of appreciation is a European concept 




been a minimum application of the doctrine in regard to Article 2, it has not so far been 
applied in such a way as to allow extradition to face the death penalty. Admittedly, this 
thesis attempt to provide reasons to rethink the margin of appreciation in relation to the 
death penalty, regardless of the ECtHR’s willingness to accept. The main discussion on 





















2. The Operation of Extradition Law 
 
As illustrated in the mandate of the National Crime Agency,  
 
[s]erious and organised crime is a transnational threat. No single agency or country 
working in isolation can combat sophisticated organised crime groups operating across 
borders. Collaboration with international partners is vital to combat serious and organised 
crime threats at source.94 
 
Extradition, which is delicately defined by David Sadoff as:  
 
a cooperative law enforcement process by which the physical custody of a person: (i) 
charged with committing a crime or (ii) convicted of a crime whose punishment has not 
yet been determined or fully served, is formally transferred, directly or indirectly, by 
authorities of one State to those of another at the request of the latter for the purpose of 
prosecution or punishment, respectively.95 
 
Extradition originates from and reflects the common interests and the shared values in 
combating transnational crime and there are several reasons that states need to obtain 
extradition as well as to extradite.96 It has shown growing significance in international 
 
94 National Crime Agency, ‘Fugitives and International Crime’ <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/wha
t-we-do/how-we-work/providing-specialist-capabilities-for-law-enforcement/fugitives-and-international-crime>  
accessed 26 April 2019.  
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criminal justice, 97  and some states are parties to a large number of extradition 
agreements. For example, there are approximately over 1000 extradition treaties in 
effect all over the world.98 Through the EU’s European Arrest Warrant scheme, the UK 
has expedited extradition arrangements with the other 27 EU Member States and has 
further individual agreements with over another 100 states or territories. The US has 
signed more than 100 extradition treaties with other sovereign states.99 The widespread 
presence of extradition treaties indicates those state parties have accepted to engage in 
extradition to respond to transnational crime as long as the request is in accordance with 
the treaty provisions. In transnational criminal law, extradition is an essential approach 
in combating cross-border crime and international crime. It serves as one of the most 
indispensable parts of the integrity of the international judicial cooperation framework. 
Furthermore, extradition is a direct and effective approach for the state willing to 
remove individuals who are believed to threaten the national security and public order 
within its territory. 
 
The main orientation of this chapter is beginning with the observation that extradition 
could have significantly helped states in bringing international fugitive back and 
performing the law enforcement function. However, its values have not been fully 
realised as expected. The exercise of extradition is impeded by various factors. Firstly, 
states have no inherent obligation to extradite; most extradition practice has relied on 
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the extradition treaties. Secondly, extradition law itself has a number of requirements 
or unavoidable conditions. Thirdly, extradition is increasingly affected by international 
human rights law where the latter has become a core strand within the former, 
particularly involving the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. As will be explored in the 
following sections, there has been continuing attempts to address the first two aspects, 
mainly by simplifying or standardising the extradition procedure, so as to facilitate the 
international cooperation in combating crimes. However, the relation between 
extradition and fundamental human rights has not been properly dealt with. The death 
penalty is a specific one that, it is argued here, interferes the extradition values 
disproportionately. The discussion in this chapter denotes the increasing reliance upon 
international cooperation, which will provide evidence that much more significance 
should be placed upon extradition in considering the refusal grounds deriving from 
human rights (the death penalty). In other words, extradition should and could be 
performed in a more dedicated and human rights-compliance way. 
 
To be specific, this chapter is going to set out some of the key terms and issues regarding 
‘extradition law’, particularly focusing on international human rights law, inter alia, the 
death penalty, as a ground for refusal. Before we get into the discussion on why the 
nexus between extradition and the death penalty is imbalanced or disproportionate and 
how it could be reformed with the suggested mechanism, it is necessary to firstly 
corroborate what extradition is, why it is particularly important in light of the present-





2.1 The rationale of extradition and the realisation of its values 
The society we live in is witnessing enormous changes in almost every aspect of life. 
Some of those changes are what we can exploit and get benefits from. However, those 
changes also bring about various challenges that we have to face and respond to. Among 
which the way of communication and movement is one of the most considerable ones. 
People and people’s activities are by no means delimited by state borders, which 
includes those perpetrators and crimes. In the age of globalisation with convenience in 
cross-border movement in multiple forms,100  the status of national borders in the 
criminality is changing.101 These changes are speedily reflected in criminal law and the 
transnational crime in particular, which is perpetrated and propagated at unprecedented 
degrees.102 As Vesna Stefanovska asserts, ‘even common crime, has lost its primarily 
territorial’.103 The fact is that crime is now committed in an increasingly borderless 
sphere, but in the meantime, the state’s criminal jurisdiction is still quite territorial and 
restrained by national borders.104 Against the is background, criminals are much easier 
to escape justice by exploiting the weakness of boundaries, they make use of the 
national borders which in this situation, providing illegal impunity from the states’ 
enforcement jurisdiction to arrest, prosecute and punish those criminals based on their 
 
100  Phil Williams, ‘Organizing Transnational Crimes: Network, Markets and Hierarchies’ in Phil William and 
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61. 
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103 Vesna Stefanovska, ‘Extradition as A Tool for Inter-State Cooperation: Resolving Issues about the Obligation to 
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a general analysis on the jurisdiction and sovereignty, see Boister (n 16) Chapter 16; Bassiouni, International 




own domestic criminal law. In the meantime, states are highly threatened by the 
increasing severity of global security. For example, the war on terror has been deemed 
as a significant matter that proliferated all around the world, which is also 
acknowledged in successive jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Extradition has always been 
highly valued by states since it provides a formal legal channel of transnational criminal 
cooperation whereby the requested state surrenders the fugitive offender who is 
presenting or captured in its own territory to the requesting state for the only purposes105 
of trial or executing sentences, in which the requested person is convicted of or alleged 
to have committed a specific crime. 106  In this situation, the objectives of the 
suppression of crimes and the guarantee of criminal jurisdiction enforcement of the 
requesting state can be largely realised. 
 
The extradition law is indeed underpinned by the rationale that seeking to carry out the 
effective cooperation in criminal matters, particularly when the offence falls within the 
category of terrorism or other transnational crimes. As outlined in Chapter 1, governed 
by the principle of sovereign equality, states are only able to fulfil their exclusive 
enforcement jurisdiction within their own territory.107 However, when the offender is 
not in the territory of the state, according to the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction,108 
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although the state is competent to criminalise particular offences, 109  its direct 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction would be hampered because of its strictly 
territorial nature110 and the concerns of sovereignty principle.111 Typically, one state 
cannot exercise its judicial power to ‘arrest and detain, to prosecute, try and sentence, 
and to punish persons’ 112  within the territory of another state without relevant 
permission or cooperation otherwise it would be deemed as an infringement to the state 
sovereignty. 113  For this reason, states often have very limited options except for 
transnational criminal cooperation so as to enforce its jurisdiction extraterritorially and 
prosecute or punish the offender according to the domestic criminal law.114 This is 
likewise regarded as the legal and practical foundation of the exercise of extradition 
law.  
 
In the second, the establishment of an extradition relationship, either bilateral or 
multilateral, is essentially based on the shared values and mutual interests of both 
participating states.115 Although the designation of extradition mechanism is to fulfil 
the requesting state’s enforcement of criminal law, it does also meet the demand of the 
requested state, at least from the following perspectives. Without regard to the political, 
diplomatic or economic motivations behind the fulfilment of the extradition request as 
 
109 Dan Stigall, ‘Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement 
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revealed in Section 1.1, and also without regard to the reciprocal incentives which will 
be discussed in Section 2.2.2.2, extradition is by no means just for the interests of the 
requesting states. In cases where the requested fugitives are involved in terrorism-
related crimes or other transnational crimes, which pose a serious security threat to the 
national interests of the requested state, fulfiling the extradition request is the best way 
to remove those undesirable people and eliminate the unpredictable risks. This can be 
found in continual argument from the UK government in extradition, deportation cases. 
Furthermore, taking China’s global anti-corruption campaign as an example, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand are some of the most popular countries to which the 
criminals, particularly corruption suspects, flee from China. Those countries, to a 
certain extent, have become de facto safe havens for criminals escaping from China, 
which has given rise to an alarming issue. The money stolen from taxpayers immensely 
damages the state’s economy as well as the public’s confidence of justice, fairness and 
the rule of law. In the meantime, the large amount of hot money brought by those 
corrupt officials undermines the economic order of the host state. For instance, they use 
the illegal proceeds to buy estates, which inflates the financial market, and results in 
the middle class cannot afford to buy a house.116 With respect to the points raised in 
this section and Chapter 4, it is fair to say extradition serves the interests of both 
participating states. Simply put, it serves the interests of the collective. Therefore, the 
argument made in this thesis is equally applied to extradition cases involve terrorism or 
other transnational crimes, and those ‘normal’ extradition cases. However, it is 
 




particularly compelling in relation to the former.  
 
Thirdly, everyone must take responsibility for their acts (or omissions) that breach the 
law. It is widely agreed that criminals should not be able to evade justice by crossing 
state borders. In this regard, extradition helps those fugitives get their ‘just deserts’. It 
relates to the issue of pursuing the justice of law by making it possible for the requesting 
state to bring the fugitive criminals to their territory and impose the due trial or penalty 
on the offenders for their misdeeds. As a matter of fact, extradition has become a 
significant approach of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters, and it has been a 
direct approach to fight against impunity otherwise the national physical border would 
become the boundaries between guilt and innocence. Without the platform of 
extradition, criminals may escape from justice and never have to face trial or 
punishment, due to the unavailability to getting them in custody and all those barriers 
to performing the jurisdiction abroad.117 In this case, the accused fugitives’ impunity 
from the criminal law is in breach of the principle of legality and the justice of law.  
 
In summary, the establishment and exercise of extradition law are intrinsically for the 
purpose of conferring the requesting state with relevant judicial power to enforce its 
domestic criminal law on those alleged offences and convicted offenders, by 
prosecuting them, making a sentence or executing the corresponding penalty.118 In 
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essence, the extradition law is undoubtedly in accordance with not only the principles 
and the development tendency of international criminal law, but also the needs of the 
reality. This means, ultimately removing the safe haven for fugitives and combating 
crimes, especially the severe transnational crimes that violate the interests of the whole 
international community. The existence of an operative extradition treaty, or a 
successful completion of an extradition case, is not only meaningful for that specific 
case, but more importantly, it explicitly sends a clear and firm message to other fugitives 
and those who attempt to escape from justice by fleeing abroad that this way does not 
work and no matter where they flee to, there is no safe haven. Under such circumstances, 
it is not difficult to understand that extradition is attracting increasing international 
concerns and states are inclined to cooperate or remove specific individuals via this 
kind of approach,119 even at the expense of violating their human rights obligations.  
 
2.2 The legal basis of extradition 
Considering the increasing importance of extradition, it seems plausible to presume that 
states are obliged to extradite in the context of crime-fighting. However, that is not the 
case. Being the most indispensable subject of international law,120 according to the 
principle of territorial sovereignty,121 states should have the exclusive right to their own 
domestic affairs, including the criminal offences perpetrated within their territory.122 
Furthermore, they should be endowed the judicial discretion either to grant or refuse to 
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surrender the arrested to another state or on what condition to surrender. 123  In 
international law, it has been ‘universally accepted’124 that the state has neither an 
inherent binding obligation to extradite125 nor the right to have its wanted fugitives 
extradited from other states, despite its potential necessity.126 In this case, the legal 
basis of extradition law definitely deserves our prior examination before getting to 
further extradition-related issues. That is to say, it largely determines not only the extent 
to which the exercise of extradition would be successful, but also the state’s interests in 
bringing international fugitives back for prosecution or punishment.  
 
2.2.1 Treaty-based extradition 
2.2.1.1 Comprehensive extradition treaties 
In international law, the legal basis for extradition is traditionally and generally derived 
from a variety of bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties.127 Building up a treaty-
based extradition relation is for the sake of states’ interests to fight against crime with 
the guarantee of legal certainty and predictability.128 For some states, common law 
countries in particular such as the UK, the United States and Canada,129 the executing 
of extradition is strictly derived from the premise of an extradition treaty. In other words, 
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if a state is willing to secure the wanted person being returned from those countries, it 
has to engage an extradition relation with them first. In fact, there have been many cases 
in which the vacancy of a valid extradition treaty giving rise to the barrier to extradition 
or the impunity.130 
 
Over the past decades, a large number of bilateral agreements have been concluded with 
states, particularly in the post-World War Two period.131 Most states are bound by a 
series of bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements. They have entered into 
international conventions which also impose an obligation on member states to 
extradite the offender who is convicted or alleged to have perpetrated certain 
extraditable crime. These bilateral, regional and international instruments constitute the 
primary legal foundation of extradition in the current framework, regulating the rights 
of fugitives and the responsibilities of states in the extradition process. For instance, the 
UK signed an extradition treaty with Sweden, the US and France in 1963, 1972 and 
1978 respectively, Canada and the US signed in 1971, Germany and Austria did it in 
1975. Although China does not maintain extradition relations with most countries 
where offenders are keen to flee to, such as the US, Canada, New Zealand and Germany, 
it still has operative extradition relationships with 37 states. These bilateral treaties, on 
the basis of mutual negotiation and respect, provide the participating countries with the 
legal foundation and procedural requirements for extradition. The bilateral treaty is 
probably the most common form of the extradition basis. It supplies the contracting 
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states with more space and freedom, and thus can be more easily to be negotiated and 
determined by the two participating states based on their own legal, political, diplomatic 
and social concerns.132 And also, it works better in accommodating the difference 
between only two states. 133  However, the prevalence of bilateral approach also 
negatively affects the extradition law’s uniformity reform and adds a lot of unnecessary 
complexities. Due to the lack of a universal standard, each bilateral treaty may have 
distinctiveness and flexibility. If this continues to be the main source of legal basis, the 
vast number of bilateral treaties concluded and continuously amended by the 193 UN 
Member States will definitely make the international extradition scheme more 
complicated and cumbersome.  
 
Apart from bilateral treaties, multilateral extradition treaties including regional and sub-
regional ones are equally important in performing the legal foundation of extradition.134 
For example, in regional context, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition, the 
Arab League Extradition Agreement, and the European Convention on Extradition,135 
these arrangements regulate the relevant issues about extradition such as the scope, 
procedures, conditions and limits, and instruct the extradition process among the States 
Parties in the American, Arab League and European area respectively. Besides, 
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multilateral arrangements can be recognised as the functional guidance for member 
states to institute bilateral treaty relations, and also can be applied as supplements for 
the lack of bilateral extradition agreements by whose states that cannot extradite 
without a treaty. 
 
In this regard, the supranational European Union has gone perhaps the furthest with the 
establishment of the European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter the EAW). This is a must-
mentioned regional legal framework in the context of extradition law reform,136 which 
was introduced to simplify and standardise the judicial arrest and surrender process 
within the jurisdiction of the European Union.  
 
The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view 
to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or 
detention order.137  
 
The EAW builds up a streamlined but comprehensive legal mechanism for European 
Union Member States to cope with the practical issues in judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. From the legislative level, the implementation of the EAW is a 
response to the complicity of the escalation of extradition arrangements within EU, and 
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at that time, the weakness of the extradition framework as well as the needs of the 
suppression of crimes. The EAW makes extradition obligatory within the EU. On the 
one hand, it reduces the substantive and procedural obstacles to extradition by reaching 
an agreement of a new supranational scheme that undoubtedly provides a relatively 
standard and flexible mechanism based on a high degree of mutual recognition and trust 
in judicial decisions among Member States.138  On the other hands, it ‘marked an 
attempt to replace extradition in the traditional sense with a system of surrender without 
the involvement of the executive and with the minimum of formality.’139 This means, 
as one of the most immediate impetuses to enhance the cooperation, the whole process 
of arrest and surrender has been an exclusively judicial issue and accordingly, the 
administrative and political influence would be largely minimised.   
 
The adoption of the EAW would neither destroy the Member States’ pre-existing 
extradition relations nor ban them from setting up further bilateral or multilateral 
extradition instruments.140 As for the extradition with non-EU states, EU Member 
States’ conclusion of extradition agreements and the engagement of extradition 
relations should always be in accordance with the inherent principle of the EAW. For 
these accounts, this scheme is respected as an expression of the trend of the future 
extradition reform. The other bilateral and multilateral level of extradition operation is 
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also supposed to be as uniform and standard as possible to reduce the complexity and 
bureaucracy so as to effectively fight against grave crimes that infringe the common 
interests of the international society.141 For example, another initiative to streamline 
the extradition process in Nordic states was inspired by the EAW and established the 
Nordic Arrest Warrant in 2005 and entered in force for all Member States142 in 2012. 
 
The EAW’s establishment and operation have not only achieved unprecedented 
improvements and a lot of positive results with regard to the law enforcement,143 but 
also attracted extensive discussion with great controversies; a number of problems have 
emerged. To be more precise, the legal basis per se, upon which the EAW was initially 
introduced and subsequently implemented, is questioned. The high level of mutual trust 
and recognition across the Member States of the EU actually has a little foundation in 
practice.144 The gradual harmonisation of extradition proceedings within the EU is still 
a hard mission even after the adoption of the EAW. Because the pivotal problems of 
extradition law are the variability of its application as well as the discrepancy of the 
national law on which its operation relies.145 It is too early and ‘idealistic’ to say that 
the harmonisation or reconciliation of those sui generis characteristics of criminal 
justice systems have been reached or can be reached.146 In fact, neither the conflicts 
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nor the distinctions of different states’ substantive and procedural law as well as the 
structure, standard, effectiveness, fairness and reliability of their political and judicial 
systems, at the European Union’s level, are unlikely to be eliminated or harmonised to 
the same or similar degree, at least not possible to realise at this time.147 For these 
reasons, absolute trust and recognition of each other’s judicial competence and 
decisions is indeed unrealistic and non-existent.148 In some cases, states would be 
reluctant to assume these risks of uncertainty at the cost of comprising their state 
sovereignty.149  
 
In addition, another principal criticism of the EAW is that both the Framework Decision 
per se and some of its Member States’ practice have placed too much emphasis on the 
procedural simplicity and accordingly, the fundamental rights of the people subjected 
to the arrest warrant are not fully regarded.150 The presumption of the equivalence of 
the standard of justice, particularly in the human rights sphere, might exist in theory, 
but indeed cannot be realised in reality. This also undermines the practical basis of the 
principle of mutual trust and recognition. The Convention obligations have not been 
fulfiled by its Contracting Parties at a same or similar degree. The fact that all Member 
States of the EAW are bound by the ECHR or any other multilateral human rights 
treaties does not restrain them from violating extraditees’ human rights in practice.151 
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For example, there are indeed a large number of cases against the EU Member States’ 
violation of the ECHR.152  Against this background, it is argued that the assumed 
mutual trust and recognition are ill founded in relation to human rights protections. As 
Alegre and Leaf argue, ‘there is a long way to go before mutual recognition can be said 
to be based on a genuine mutual trust.’153 It should also be noted that the EAW has also 
been doubted for its overuse or disproportionate use for minor offences, which is mostly 
due to the lack of the proportionality test requirement. 154  This means, national 
legislation play a determining role in this regard, which is obviously varying in different 
Member States.155  
 
2.2.1.2 Extradition provisions in suppression conventions 
It is noteworthy that extradition provisions are well established in a number of 
conventional schemes aiming at combating certain types of crime. The shared value 
and the collective commitment to combating transnational crimes and safeguard the 
rule of law at both national and international level are expressly embodied in those 
suppression conventions. These extradition-related terms not only serve as an 
indispensable part for of integrity of the extradition basis, but also manifests an 
increasing reliance on extradition in response to the globalised criminality. Normally, 
those agreements contain the clauses regarding extradition as a means of international 
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cooperation in fighting against a specific category of crimes156 and eliminating the safe 
haven. For example, Article 16(4) of the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime identifies that: 
 
If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it 
may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to 
which this article applies.  
 
This article provides an alternative legal basis in relation to the crimes to which it 
applies for those Contracting Parties that are not already bound by a comprehensive 
bilateral or regional extradition treaty, which makes up the insufficiency of extradition 
application that is solely built on a treaty. Similar provisions on extradition can also be 
found in Article 44(5) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and Article 
6 the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. Regionally, a list of Council of Europe treaties incorporates 
specific extradition-related provisions dealing with international cooperation to fight 
against serious transnational crimes.157  
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Unlike ‘international crime’ to which specific international criminal courts and 
tribunals have jurisdiction,158 combating transnational crimes under most of the above 
suppression conventions, there are no supranational judicial bodies to impose criminal 
responsibility directly on individuals. 159  Prosecution and punishment of those 
offenders are predominantly replied on the law enforcement at the domestic level.160 
However, a state cannot succeed in doing it by itself.161  As Robert Cryer, Darryl 
Robinson and Sergey Vasiliev claim, it ‘requires cooperation among government and 
among law enforcement agencies.’162 ‘To facilitate effective domestic prosecution, 
States have concluded international agreements providing for cooperation among States 
which otherwise might have few law enforcement concerns in common.’163    
 
Valerie Eggs stresses that ‘the need to tackle crime at the international level has 
necessitated these treaties, while extradition has provided the key to enforcement.’164 
These multilateral or international suppression conventions aiming at combating a wide 
range of transnational crimes reflect not only the international community’s 
confrontation of the common threat, but also different states’ shared values in response 
to those challenges so as to safeguard the national interests. 
 
2.2.1.3 Quest for a universal extradition regime 
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The UN Model Treaty on Extradition is generally acknowledged as an achievement of 
the template with a relatively comprehensive extradition framework, ‘because of both 
its contents and structure’165. On the one hand, the UN Model Treaty reiterates the 
necessity of an integrated, effective and streamlining mechanism of international 
criminal cooperation. It serves as both the guidance and catalyst for states to either 
negotiate and enter into bilateral and multilateral extradition relations or enact national 
extradition legislation.166 On the other hand, it provides a set of useful instructions with 
respect to core requirements of extradition law and also, relevant technical issues in 
arrest and surrender procedures are also incorporated. Notably, it contains a number of 
mandatory grounds (Article 3)167 and optional grounds (Article 4)168 in which the 
extradition is considered as inappropriate and should be denied by the requested state. 
Those refusal grounds have been adopted and reflected in many extradition treaties and 
cases,169 nevertheless, in practice, they are not universally interpreted and applied at 
the same standard.170 
 
As we can see, although the UN Model Treaty has made its own contribution, its non-
binding nature indeed blocks itself becoming the legal basis of extradition law. It should 
be noted that despite the existence of extradition provisions in a number of international 
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conventions aiming at the repression of specific crime171 as well as some regional 
extradition treaties, there is no universally applicable extradition treaty with binding 
force at this moment.172 Thus, the state practice in the context of extradition cannot be 
widely, consistently and uniformly obligated. Yet states keep the power not only with 
respect to whether or not to engage in extradition relations with other states, but also 
the conditions and contents of the extradition treaties; it is also the states themselves to 
determine to what extent their exercise of extradition is permanently treaty-based or ad 
hoc due to reciprocity. All of these uncertainties will negatively affect the obligation to 
extradite gaining the characteristic of customary international law. 173  For these 
concerns, a universal extradition treaty of general application is indeed necessary 
although it seems not to be established in the short term. 
 
2.2.2 Extradition in the absence of treaties 
2.2.2.1 Domestic legislation 
The extradition treaty constitutes the dominated part of its legal basis and it is welcomed 
by most participating states, regardless of whether it is bilateral, multilateral or 
international. However, the problem frequently arises in the absence of an existing 
treaty. It is true that the unavailability of extradition treaties does not equate the 
unavailability of extradition, and states in certain cases are able to extradite 
 
171 For example, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 
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unilaterally.174 In limited cases, the domestic legislation can formulate the legal basis 
of extradition and propose ad hoc extradition based on the principle of reciprocity.175 
As Helen Duffy observes, ‘[s]tates may, and increasingly do, extradite on the basis of 
national law without a treaty or arrangement, in accordance with the desire to improve 
international cooperation in respect of serious offences.’176 
 
Domestic laws have a number of functions in actuating extradition. Firstly, it is the 
supplement to the lack of relevant pre-existing treaty. Certain states have either specific 
legislation on extradition, or penal code contains the extradition provisions, which 
lawfully draws the state into extradition relations in particular cases and impose the 
obligation to extradite on certain conditions. Secondly, for those dualist states in 
particular, the obligation stemming from extradition treaties has to be translated into 
national legislation. 177  The domestic implementing legislation in this situation is 
required to bring the treaty obligation into force. Finally, it conducts as an instruction 
to the courts and executive organs regarding the cases when the requirement, procedure 
and efficacy of extradition are not explicitly stated in the relevant instruments.178 That 
is to say, domestic legislation interprets how extradition should be carried out in 
practice.179 In spite of the above relevance, it has to admit that the quantity and quality 
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of domestic legislation with respect to extradition is ‘unevenly distributed across the 
world’180 and the mere existence of domestic law is not adequate to trigger extradition 
in practice. 
 
2.2.2.2 Reciprocity in extradition law  
Reciprocity is a mutual concession of advantages to get particular interests, which is a 
sort of courtesy that one state confers to other states of its own accord.181 It is carried 
out of concerns on diplomatic relations or foreign policies, and also on the presumption 
that the recipient countries will bestow the equivalent courtesy in similar cases. In 
general, reciprocity is embodied in states’ recognition, adoption or enforcement the 
legislation or judicial decision of other states, which is built on mutual respect and 
deference rather than originated from a legal obligation. In the context of extradition, 
reciprocity is of major significance, which is simply read as one state agrees to extradite 
on the condition that the requesting state undertakes to extradite in equivalent situations.  
 
Reciprocity is particularly indispensable in the non-treaty based ad hoc extradition 
cases. On the one hand, it is the cornerstone and also the driving force behind the 
operation of extradition law.182 Whenever the reciprocity is absent, states would lose 
the enthusiasm to engage in extradition relationships. More broadly, almost all judicial 
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cooperation and legal assistance are dominated by the principle of reciprocity.183 This 
means, reciprocity is seen as not only the legal basis but also the requirement of 
extradition. In Cherif Bassiouni’s words, reciprocity stands as the ‘underpinning of 
substantive requirements’184 of extradition. The substantial requirements, which will 
be discussed later, are all based on reciprocity ‘in the sense of equivalent mutual 
treatment deriving from the mutuality of legal obligations.’185 On the other hand, in 
cases where the two engaged states have no permanent treaty relations, under the 
current extradition law, the success of extradition surrender is largely rested on states’ 
reciprocity.186 Extradition may succeed based on reciprocity. It reflects not only the 
mutual respect for the independent sovereignty, but also the pursuit of real benefits of 
states. The former may be the prerequisite for further cooperation,187 since without the 
independent and equal existence of state sovereignty, the international community and 
international public order would be utopian. While real interests motivate states to 
interact to a higher level mutually. For instance, Article 3 of the Extradition Law of 
China stipulates that China is willing to cooperate with other states in extradition based 
on the principle of equality and reciprocity. This provision reflects not only China’s 
determination to join the campaign in combating transnational crime, but also manifests 
the backbone of the inter-state cooperation, which comes down to states mutual 
interests. 
 
183 All stages of state cooperation are ‘governed by the principles of sovereign equality, reciprocity and mutual 
interests.’ Stahn (n 17) 230. 
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Taking David Price case as an example,188 which manifests the role of reciprocity in 
extradition cases and also the implementation of the ad hoc arrest and surrender. It was 
the first extradition case between China and the UK, although there was no formal 
extradition treaty between the two countries and the extradition cannot be proceeded on 
a regular basis. Price was a dangerous paedophile arrested in 2003, with hundreds of 
indecent pictures, showing his perpetration of appallingly sexually abusing the very 
young and vulnerable children. Moreover, he was accused of producing and 
propagating those pictures.189 Price skipped the bail in the investigation process and 
fled to China via Kenya and Tanzania, on the presumption that he would not be brought 
back to the UK to stand trial. As the Chief Crown Prosecutor of CPS Mersey-Cheshire 
inferred, Price believed he could escape justice because of the lack of extradition 
agreement between China and the UK. However, after six-year immense efforts of the 
two countries to negotiate the cooperation, the extradition was finally secured.  
 
The UK government submitted the formal extradition request to China in August 2010, 
two months later, the request was approved by the Chinese authorities. Price was 
arrested and detained by the Chines authorities in May 2011. On 7 November 2011, he 
was transferred to the Merseyside Police officers and brought to the UK under escort, 
and finally sentenced to seven years and eight months imprisonment. As the Detective 
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Inspector in this case Steve Jones stressed, everyone should be responsible for what he 
did. At the same time, eliminating the possible safe haven and bringing the offender to 
justice are not only the victims but also all innocent people’s deserved entitlement. 
Although Price was not prosecuted for his more severe sexual assault crime due to the 
terms of the extradition agreement,190 this case can still be taken as a precedent of 
extradition in the absence of a treaty. It had taken the first step and made progress in 
the extradition relations between the two countries, which convincingly proved that the 
treaty precondition could not be an absolute obstacle to extradition in the modern 
globalised society. Extradition law is expected to be fitted with more flexibility to meet 
the demand for suppression crimes. 191  In fact, following the release of the Joint 
Statement on the Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the coming into 
effect of the Treaty between the UK and China on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, China and the UK held the first ‘High-Level Security Dialogue’ in Beijing in 
June 2016.192 The Dialogue affirmed the significance of the bilateral cooperation of 
the two states in ‘counter-terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, illegal migration’193 
and other serious international security issues. China and the UK reached an agreement 
on strengthening the cooperation via extradition in combating transnational organized 
crime on a case-by-case basis.194 The above David Price case and the bilateral dialogue 
between China and the UK were indeed a reiteration of the greater importance of the 
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international criminal cooperation and more importantly, the practicability of 
extradition in the absence of available extradition treaties.  
 
2.3 Substantial requirements of extradition  
In spite of its well-designed functions in combating transnational crime, in practice, 
extradition by no means secures an easy return of the fugitives. A number of conditions 
could be used by the requested person to challenge the extradition decision so as to 
avoid being extradited. Some of the substantial requirements of extradition themselves 
are self-evidently constituting the refusal grounds by which both the requested state and 
the extraditee can invoke. It is not possible to address all related aspects exhaustively 
in this section, but some of the most commonly mentioned accounts will be delineated. 
 
2.3.1 Double criminality  
A range of substantial requirements has been widely acknowledged, which constitute 
an indispensable part of nearly all extradition treaties and national legislation in a 
similar way.195 Double criminality might be the most widely recognised rules with the 
customary nature.196 The principle derives from the maxim nullum crimen sine lege 
and the principle of legality,197 which can be read as no one should be subject to 
prosecution or punishment for any act or omission that has not been unambiguously 
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criminalized by the domestic law or international law.’198 It is accepted that the crime 
for which extradition is requested must constitute a crime in both the requesting state 
and the requested state199 at the time of commitment.200 Double criminality, on the one 
hand, is a pursuit of the justice of criminal law and definitely protection of the fugitive, 
since the requested individuals cannot be surrendered, prosecuted or punished for the 
acts that are not defined as criminal in any extradition engaged state. That is to say, the 
designation of double criminality could also safeguard against the extradition of people 
on spurious or questionable grounds. On the other hand, this requirement is an 
expression of the reciprocal respect for state sovereignty and its penal system, because 
states are allowed to reasonably refuse to grant the extradition request for the conduct 
that is not culpable in their own legal system.201  
 
In spite of the wide acceptance, the practice of double criminality is sometimes 
complicated and fragmented,202 which is interpreted and applied differently according 
to different countries and extradition treaties. In general, there are two approaches to 
examine whether the offence conforms to double criminality, namely, in concreto and 
in abstracto. According to in concreto rule, whether the offence falls within the double 
criminality is rigorously assessed by its exact name, constituting elements and severity 
of punishment in the penal code of the two states.203 Unlike in concreto, the approach 
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of in abstracto is far more flexible. It is a ‘fact-driven approach’204 based on the 
inherent act and criminality of the offence, regardless of its superficial or external 
characteristics. In other words, double criminality will be satisfied when the given 
offence is substantially equivalent in two states rather than totally identical.205 Adhere 
to the in abstracto method, the crime underlying the extradition request enjoys the 
priority in the assessment. The requested state is capable of evaluating the sufficiency 
of immanent elements and determining the specific cases in terms of the severity of the 
offence or the minimum level of penalty. This helps to avoid examining the judicial 
system in other states’ jurisdictions206 and prevent the crime from being defined as non-
extraditable only because of the different labels or interpretation of the crime between 
the requesting and requested countries.207 The in abstracto approach, to some degree, 
will presumably remove the barriers to extradition that are solely based on the divergent 
legal systems in various countries, and also provide a more open-ended standard to 
crimes which avail itself to be satisfied for the purpose of extradition. For these reasons, 
in abstracto is more appropriate in the context of responding to cross-border crime in a 
globalised world.  
 
Nevertheless, no matter what approach is adopted, double criminality itself exists as an 
obstacle to extradition. The absence of a uniform standard in evaluating this 
requirement inevitably makes the extradition process more inculpates. This results in 
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the debate on the extent to which this requirement is inappropriate and unnecessary. 
The opponent is of view that this requirement provides the fugitive with extensive 
protection. Complying with double criminality, the requested state’s domestic criminal 
law will in facto influence the result of extradition. However, it is not reasonable to 
exclude the requesting state’s accessibility to prosecution or punishment of the 
offenders merely because of the law of the requested state. If that were the case, the 
legality of the requesting state’s criminal decision would be destroyed. The fugitive is 
able to easily refrain from the justice of the commitment by the effort to justify the 
dissatisfaction of double criminality. In specific situations, for example, the perpetrator 
of a criminal offence is likely to gain illegal impunity by fleeing to a state in which his 
previous conduct is not criminalized or there is no analogous crime. However, the above 
situation might only exist in theory. In practice, the crime for which the requested 
fugitive commits is normally the common crime that is widely proscribed. For this 
reason, it is argued that double criminality requirement is no longer necessary and 
removing it will not impair the integrity of extradition, particularly the interests of both 
the requesting and requested states.208  
 
As a matter of fact, double criminality has already been mitigated in practice and more 
flexible reforms have been adopted. For example, under the EAW framework, this 
traditional extradition requirement is fundamentally changed, which impels states to 
cooperate in a more convenient approach, irrespective of the existence of hurdles and 
 




controversies.209 To be precise, it removes the double criminality requirement for 32 
categories of offences provided the offence meets the three-year imprisonment 
assessment according to the criminal law of the issuing state.210 This means, for the 
listed crimes, on the one hand, the actual threshold of the requirement is lowered, and 
the requested state’s criminal law is irrelevant in this process. On the other hand, so 
long as the crime in question meets the penalty threshold, it will be regarded as an 
extraditable offence. Therefore, the extraditability test is not required. Furthermore, an 
ultimate example can be found in the Nordic Arrest Warrant, where this requirement is 
completely repealed. In other words, the criminal law of the requested state will be 
irrelevant to the result of extradition and will not be justified to refuse the extradition 
request. This advanced measure makes the NAW goes one step further than other 
mechanisms at mutual trust and enhancing extradition procedure, which is attributed to 
the far more similar penal systems among the Nordic countries.211 
 
2.3.2 Extraditability 
Double criminality is not the only requirement for the crime per se. When the crime for 
which extradition is requested is criminalized in both the requesting and requested 
state,212 it will then be subjected to a certain criterion regarding extraditability. In its 
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colloquial sense, extraditable offence means that the crime underlying the extradition 
request has to be grave enough in both participating states so as to be extraditable. 
Simply put, the fugitive should be worthwhile to extradite.213 The threshold to qualify 
as extraditable is normally determined by states according to the legal basis of their 
extradition relationship. Differences in what crime is extraditable are also influenced 
by various legal, political and social considerations of states or their special interests in 
certain period of time.214    
 
Nevertheless, a general approach in deciding the extraditable offence can be found in a 
series of bilateral or multilateral extradition treaties and domestic legislation. 215 
Normally, it is either assessed by a severity threshold or expressed by an enumerative 
list. More specifically, the former formula evaluates whether the offence is extraditable 
or not by the degree of severity of its deserved penalty. Only the offence, for which the 
extradition seeks, be punished by the given level of punishment can the extradition 
request granted. For example, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition requires 
the crime for which the extradition seeks to be punished ‘by a penalty of not less than 
two years of deprivation of liberty under the laws of both the requesting State and the 
requested State’216 and ‘ [w]here the extradition of an offender is requested for the 
execution of a sentence involving deprivation of liberty, the duration of the sentence 
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still to be served must be at least six months’217 . The Extradition Law of China 
conditions the extradition request as  
 
‘where the request for extradition is made for the purpose of instituting criminal 
proceedings, the offence indicated in the request for extradition is, under the laws of both 
the People’s Republic of China and the Requesting State, punishable by a fixed term of 
imprisonment for one year or more or by any other heavier criminal penalty; where the 
request for extradition is made for the purpose of executing a criminal penalty, the period 
of sentence that remains to be served by the person sought is at least six months at the 
time when the request is made.’218 
 
The eliminative method is more appropriate because it abolishes the limited border of 
extraditable crimes and it is more sensitive to the development of international law as 
well as the changes of international and transnational crimes.219 This approach thus is 
more proper to generalise the range of extraditable crime and more likely to incorporate 
as many serious crimes extraditable as possible.  
 
By comparison, the enumerative approach is much more direct by making a list of all 
specific offences when drawing up the extradition agreements. In other words, if the 
requested crime cannot be categorised into this list, it may be deemed as non-
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extraditable, and extradition may not be successful. This kind of method is more 
commonly accepted in the suppression conventions. For example, Article 6(1) of the 
Drug Trafficking Convention stipulates that the extradition clause can only be valid in 
relevance to the offences listed in Article 3. 220  Although this approach seems 
straightforward at first glance, less ambiguous in interpretation and application, the 
number of states that adopting this approach is continually reduced for its apparent 
weakness. The content of the enumerative list is determined when the extradition 
agreement is signed up. However, the means and natures of crime are increasingly and 
significantly changing from day to day, and the demand for extradition as an effective 
method of transnational criminal cooperation is also virtually promoting. In this 
situation, the rigid list cannot be so flexible and convenient as to keep pace with the 
changing transnational criminality, and in practice, the procedure of its revise and 
augment is quite cumbersome and time-consuming. 
 
The designation of the extraditability requirement can explicitly regulate the extradition 
process operated only for offences of significant interests of criminal justice of the 
requesting state, avoiding the misuse of extradition for the ordinary and minor offences 
such as theft, burglary, forgery and affray.221 However, despite the rationale of defining 
extraditable offences, there are still flaws that can be reformed. To be more precise, the 
formula of clarifying unpermitted crimes could be more unified. For example, adopting 
the enumerative method to exclude all crimes that are internationally or universally 
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proscribed from the non-extraditable list, which reduces the possibility of dispute in 
given cases and automatically prevents offenders of those gross crimes from gaining 
exemption. And after that, a standard minimum level of criminality test shall be 
employed, which could be assessed by severity of the harm or threat to the victim and 
public interests, thus the specific minimum penalty in this case is still subject to be 
negotiated and ascertained.222 
 
2.3.3 Specialty  
It is an important requirement of extradition to guarantee the crime for which the 
extraditee will be charge or the sentence which the extraditee will serve in the 
requesting state is identical to that listed in the extradition request. This is incorporated 
in the specialty requirement,223 which still reflects the esteem of reciprocity and mutual 
trust.224 Specialty refers to the notion that the requesting state must comply with its 
extradition request and only prosecute or punish the offence or offences for which the 
extradition is sought unless gaining either the consent of the requested state or the 
extraditee’s waiver. Furthermore, any limitation or assurance set in the extradition 
requested must be observed by the requesting states. In other words, the entire content 
of extradition request including all potential prosecution and punishment as well as the 
treatment of extraditees should be openly informed and agreed in advance; the real 
purposes and foreseeable results of the extradition should be precisely in accord with 
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the prior request. Therefore, the extradition law will not be indiscriminately abused for 
deceptive purposes. Theoretically, extraditees’ treatments after return to the requesting 
state can be guaranteed with definiteness, and they may not suffer from potential 
discriminatory custody, prosecution and sentence for any offence any than those in the 
aforehand extradition request. The overall extradition process can be ensured with a 
general degree of certainty and clarity. 
 
For example, the bilateral extradition treaty between the United State and Italy225 
incorporates the rule of specialty, although with exceptions: 
 
1. A person extradited under this Treaty may not be detained, tried or punished in the 
Requesting Party except for: 
(a) the offense for which extradition has been granted or when the same facts for which 
extradition was granted constitute a differently denominated offense which is extraditable; 
(b) an offense committed after the surrender of a person; or 
(c) an offense for which the Executive Authority of the United States or the   competent 
authorities of Italy consent to the person’s detention, trial or punishment…  
2. A person extradited under this Treaty may not be extradited to a third State unless the 
surrendering Party consents. 
 
The above clauses explicitly define that the requesting state’s power over the wanted 
 




person is limited after the surrender.226 Or rather, what crime for which the extraditee 
can be prosecuted or punished is subjected to the agreed extradition requested.  
Additionally, the rule of specialty also prohibits the requesting state to detain and re-
extradite the fugitive to a third state,227 with the exception where the requesting state 
gets the extraditee’s consent or the extraditee once leaves the jurisdiction of the 
requesting state after the surrender.228 
 
Generally speaking, specialty can be taken as a precautionary requirement for post-
extradition considerations, set out in permanent or ad hoc extradition agreements. It not 
only prevents states from misusing or prosecutorial abuse of extradition, but more 
importantly, greatly protects extraditees’ fundamental human rights from potential 
unfair and prejudicial treatments after their surrenders, especially when the political 
offence is in question. 
 
2.3.4 Other requirements of extradition 
Apart from the above requirements, extradition is also subject to many other conditions. 
For example, the nationality of the fugitives affects the result of extradition in many 
cases. Article 8(1) of the Extradition Law of China provides that no Chinese shall be 
extradited to other states.229 The rationale of this exemption is mainly based on a state’s 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its own nationals and the protection of their human 
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rights, on the assumption that its own nationals might be subjected to unpredictable 
mistreatment either in prosecution or in punishment in foreign states.230 The nationality 
exception might be one of the most controversial exceptions to extradition, which is 
hard to get over. It raises many substantial issues concerning its rationale as well as the 
remedial approach. It deviates from the fundamental values of extradition, namely, 
mutual trust and combating crime. It provides with the requested state a possibility to 
refuse the extradition request by conferring nationality to someone concerned.231 This 
exception does provide a privileged opportunity for those whose nationality state 
adheres to this exception as a protection of its nationals. They are able to get impunity 
by returning to the state of nationality after committed crimes abroad, or if they were 
never leaving the state of their nationality. Moreover, states have different domestic 
regulation on nationality. In some places where there are flexible policies in terms of 
conferring citizenship to naturalized nationals or rather, nationality has been a tradable 
item that might be acquired for certain purposes.   
 
A series of measures have been taken to eliminate the possible safe haven caused by 
applying the nationality exception, which might enable criminals to go unpunished for 
what they perpetrated.232 Of those, the issue that is particularly focused and highly 
debated is the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.233 This mean, when the requested 
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state refuses to extradite its own national to other countries, it has the duty to prosecute 
on its own. For example, both Article 16 (10) of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Crime and Article 44 (11) of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption include that if a State Party does not extradite solely on the nationality 
exception, it ‘shall, at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to 
submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution.’ Theoretically, aut dedere aut judicare could be adopted as a remedial 
measure or alternative to extradition and apply to cases wherever any impediment 
prevent extradition so as to eradicate the loophole and guarantee the fugitive is brought 
to justice. However, the principle per se has its limitations which obstruct its normalised 
and universal application. It is of ambiguity and dispute particularly in relation to the 
legal basis and applicable standard. In practice, the host state is also facing the 
difficulties of no appropriate jurisdiction and the evidence-related matters in 
prosecution.   
 
Deriving from the Roman law maxim bis de eadem re ne sit actio, which is known as 
double jeopardy in English. Ne bis in idem is a basic principle of international criminal 
law, 234  and also being taken as fundamental human rights. 235  The operated of 
extradition is well affected by this general principle of law236 and almost in every 
 
234 Antonio Cassese, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 315-7. 
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(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), Art 14 (7) ; Protocol No. 
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extradition agreement related provision is contained.237 At first, ne bis in idem protects 
a person from being prosecuted or punished for the same offence twice. Thus, when it 
is applied to extradition, a request can be reasonably refused if the fugitive has 
previously been convicted or acquitted for the same offence upon which the extradition 
relies.238 Secondly, in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata,239 ne bis in idem is 
an expression of the respect for the legal validity, veracity and completeness of the 
court’s final judgment in criminal proceedings.240 When the offence concerned is of 
transnational nature, it is also the mutual respect and trust for other states’ sovereignty 
as well as the criminal system. Finally, under the protection of ne bis in idem, the whole 
criminal trial will not be disrupted or extend by interminable repetition caused by 
transferring the defendant and shifting jurisdictions, the authority and effectiveness of 
law can be ensured to a certain degree.241  
 
The guarantee of the principle of ne bis in idem within the criminal system of the same 
state might be a bit easier to define. However, it seems that the difficulties in observing 
this rule may be inevitable when it involves adjudications from the courts of various 
countries. This is exactly the challenge what the practice of extradition is facing. The 
legal system of different states is more or less incompatible, and the understanding and 
recognition of a specific crime are neither comprehensive nor unanimous. Transnational 
 
237 For example, see UN Model Treaty on Extradition, Art 3 (d), (e); Extradition Law of China, Art 8 (2). 
238 See UN Model Treaty on Extradition, Art 3 (d); EAW, Art 3(2); Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Art 
4(1). 
239 Gerard Coffey, ‘Resolving conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings: interpreting Ne Bis In Idem in 
conjunction with the principle of complementarity’ (2013) 4 New Journal of European Criminal Law 59. 
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application of ne bis in idem still keeps its inconsistent status. In the current practice of 
extradition, ne bis in idem is mainly rested on the national law of the participating states 
as well as the provisions in the extradition treaty and therefore needs to be bilaterally 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.242 
 
On the whole, a variety of impediments or refusal grounds have been fully reached in 
literature, including but not limited to political offence exception, military and fiscal 
offence exception. The Revised Manual on the Model Treaty on Extradition provides a 
five-category method to sort the impediments/refusal grounds.243 Cherif Bassiouni 
established an advanced way of classification, which categorises into grounds relating 
to the offences charged, the special status of the fugitives, the criminal charge and also 
the potential treatment of the fugitives in the prosecutorial process and punishment.244 
While David Sadoff’s approach is analogous but is more comprehensive.245 It absorbs 
the requirements of extradition as its obstacles and also extends to political as well as 
international relation concerns.246  
 
Since the practice of extradition implicates the issues in both international law and 
national law.247 There is no doubt that the actual extradition application, in particular 
the procedural issues, is varying according to each extradition agreement and different 
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legal basis applied. Nevertheless, the above discussed common features of extradition 
law still could be concluded, which are indispensable in the integrity of extradition 
law.248. However, it is more important that the existence of the above requirements or 
impediments deriving from extradition law per se, even they do not obstruct the 
extradition at the end, the assessment and compliant indeed suspend the extradition and 
make it less efficient. In such cases, it might be more feasible to reform rather than to 
abolish. Under such circumstances, it has to admit that even if the lawful application of 
the death penalty should not be a barrier to extradition, as this thesis argues, these 
conditions would still need to be applied, and the state requesting extradition has to 
circumvent these impediments.   
 
It is also noteworthy that extradition law itself is an evolving subject, which witnessed 
notable changes in the past decades, as David Sadoff encapsulates,249 there has been 
continuously more emphasis on the use of extradition in combating transnational crime. 
On the one hand, there is an increasing number of both new established bilateral 
extradition treaties and cases that extradition is successfully applied. On the other hand, 
the scope of exceptions to extradition is narrowed, particularly when a serious 
international crime is concerned. 250  This means, the requested state may have 
increasingly limited grounds to refuse the extradition request for those crimes.251 There 
is indeed a progressive tendency that the extradition process is designated to be more 
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flexible, harmonised, simplified and efficient. Domestically, specific extradition 
legislation is established to pave the way for advanced criminal cooperation. Regionally, 
a more reinforced multilateral legal framework is built up to promote states’ judicial 
cooperation. While the European Arrest Warrant can be seen as one of the most 
remarkable reforms in this regard and many other examples could also be found in the 
Nordic Arrest Warrant and the CARICOM Arrest Warrant.252 
 
2.4 The conflict between extradition and human rights  
The over-long and tangled process of extradition as well as its low efficiency in 
operation is partly due to a variety of requirements of extradition law per se, as 
discussed in the section above. Notably, it is also ascribed by the dominance of 
international human rights law, in which the issues of the death penalty and torture and 
other ill-treatment are most vigorous. In contemporary society, states are bounded by 
various human rights treaties, both regionally and internationally, and they are easy to 
find themselves in conflicting obligations. As demonstrated in Chapter 1.2, human 
rights terms are directly expressed in extradition agreements. For example, the EAW 
sets out the provision in its Preamble: ‘This Framework Decision respects fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union…’253  
 
At the early time, it was not the purpose of extradition law to address the rights of the 
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extraditee, which was only a more recent addition. As Cherif Bassiouni stated, 
extradition was considered as a relation between states where the rights of extraditees 
did not get adequate concerns. ‘This situation permits the violation of human rights and 
only recently has been challenged.’254 The human rights movement in past decades has 
‘turned its attention to extradition’255 and placed the individual extraditee at the centre 
of the whole extradition process. Under such circumstances, states are more or less 
confronted with the conflict between human rights and extradition.     
 
Kyung Yup Kim is a Korean-born New Zealand resident, who was accused of 
murdering a 20-year-old Chinese young woman named Peiyun Chen and discarded her 
body in a wasteland in Shanghai on 11 December 2009. Kim fled to New Zealand via 
South Korea after the homicide. New Zealand received the request from China for 
extraditing Kim to face the charge, and in no time, it ordered the warrant to arrest Kim 
in June 2011. Kim has already been in custody since then while fighting against the 
extradition decision on human rights grounds and striving for bail. In December 2015, 
the then Minister of Justice Amy Adams approved the extradition request with China’s 
prior assurance that Kim would get sufficient access to a fair trial and would not be 
subjected to torture and the death penalty once convicted. The assurance was followed 
by a permitted channel of monitoring the extraditee’s treatment in China subject to the 
ex ante promise.256 The New Zealand government was thus satisfied with the assurance 
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that there would be no risk of human rights violations resulting from the extradition. 
 
However, the decision was blocked by the New Zealand High Court in the judicial 
review process that was applied by Kim’s counsel.257 Although there was significant 
opposition to the use of the assurance, particularly regarding the torture and other ill-
treatment, it was accepted as a relevant factor in evaluating the extraditee’s prospective 
suffering upon return.258  In this case, Justice Jillian Mallon explained the Court’s 
disbelief in the credibility and adequacy of the assurance in protecting Kim’s human 
rights in China with a series of justifications. She called for the Minister to reconsider 
the extradition order.259  The High Court’s judgment left the long-drawn case in a 
pending stalemate once again, and Kim had to wait for further reviews and decision.260 
There has been a second decision of the then Minister of Justice in favour of extradition 
in 2016, with a further undertaking given by the Chinese government. The High Court 
did not block the New Zealand government’s decision this time.261 However, until 
recently on 11 June 2019, the New Zealand Court of Appeal quashed the government’s 
decision to extradite once again and asked the current Minister of Justice Andrew Little 
to reconsider the extradition request, particularly the alleged human rights concerns.262 
Therefore, this extradition case has again been halted and currently is pending at the 
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New Zealdn Supreme Court.263 
 
This unclosed case has just shown one of the ways in which human rights connect the 
issue of extradition. More importantly, it sketches one of the human rights dilemmas in 
enforcing the extradition cooperation, manifesting that the priority in the established 
case was not correctly and proportionately given to human rights when it collides with 
extradition. Seemingly, it indicates the New Zealand judicial authorities’ distrust on the 
credibility of the Chinese government’s assurance and creating the blockage, which also 
shows that the inhibiting power of human rights law even when there is political 
agreement to extradite.264 In this case, it should admit that the position and opinion of 
the political authorities (successive Justice Ministers) and judicial authorities (domestic 
courts) might be different, even opposite.265 Nevertheless, the Ministers’ assessments 
and decisions are neither purely political nor in breach of law (nationally or 
internationally). 266  Instead, the Ministers’ power to determine whether or not to 
surrender is entrusted by the Extradition Act 1999 and their decisions, in this case, are 
not made without legal basis.267    
 
If we diagnose it in depth, it could be seen as overuse of exceptions to extradition, and 
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also impels us to reconsider the role of human rights law in extradition. In this case, 
Kim and his lawyer were accused by the Chinese government of hyping up the human 
rights law, particularly the issue of torture and fair trial, to escape from justice and 
punishment. 268  It did impede the criminal cooperation between China and New 
Zealand, notwithstanding the fact that there was no operative extradition treaty between 
the two states;269 and stand in the way of the pursuit of the effective suppression of the 
homicide crime that Kim was suspected of perpetration. This drawn-out case also 
reveals the predicaments and embarrassments that many states, including China 
encounter in extradition cooperation while dealing with the person’s human rights 
appeal. The Chinese government has made every effort to negotiate with New Zealand 
including providing a number of assurances. 270  However, it still has failed in 
persuading the New Zealand’s courts who own a high level of discretion. It is 
noteworthy that in the proceedings over the last decade, whether or not Kim is guilty 
of the intentional homicide was of little concerns. This means, the relationship between 
an individual’s human rights and combating crime was not proportionately dealt with. 
It also should be noted that this case has set a bad example for those people who commit 
serious crimes in China and given them a hint that New Zealand might be a place where 
they can escape the justice.271   
 
 
268 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s 
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In both theory and reality, extradition is a quite complex process because it involves 
various fields of law and in particular, it has to accommodate and coordinate the 
differences in criminal justice between two participating states. The complicity is 
amplified when the human rights of the fugitive criminal are added as a critical concern 
in extradition. This means, extradition has no longer been a pure criminal issue. Instead, 
it is crucial to search for a way to better deliver the needs of combating serious 
transnational crimes without sacrificing the fundamental rights of individuals.272 The 
growing concerns on human rights law are affecting the extradition law in many ways, 
and there are certain specific rights can be invoked as the bar to extradition or at least 
limiting states’ obligation to extradition. Some scholars even claim that the system of 
human rights does contain rights of a customary international law character and thus 
should enjoy priority in the extradition practice.273 The discussion firstly comes to the 
question on does a general human rights exception exist in extradition law? As has been 
richly illustrated by a number of scholars and commentators, 274  the answer is 
unquestionably negative; not all human rights qualify as insuperable barriers. 
 
To be precise, in Soering case, the UK faced a conflict of obligations. According to the 
bilateral extradition agreement with the US, it was obligated to extradite; while on the 
basis of the ECHR, it was also liable to decline the extradition for the protection of the 
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fugitive’s human rights.275 The Court explained that the States Parties’ human rights 
obligation does not mean all Convention rights are applicable as the barriers to 
extradition.276 As Harmen van der Wilt points out, ‘not all violations of every right’277 
could be taken as barriers to extradition. There is no inherent hierarchy between general 
human rights and extradition. In such cases, the question that matters here should be 
which human rights will be the barrier to extradition and to what degree of violation of 
those rights is required to be considered as the refusal grounds. But undoubtedly, 
resolving either of the above two questions would unavoidably add to the already 
lengthy and complex extradition process.  
 
More importantly, different human rights are varying not only in their nature and 
status,278 but also in their application by different states and regions. With regard to the 
former point, it is important for the state to carry out a case-to-case assessment on the 
conflicting interests involved and determine whether limiting one for the sake of 
another is lawful, necessary and proportionate. This is in essence what the margin of 
appreciation confers and will be looked at in Chapter 4. As for the latter, it is the fact 
that different states and regions might take different measures to deal with the conflicts 
between human rights and other interests while it is admitted that the European standard 
has advanced further than other places, which is particularly compelling regarding the 
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question of the death penalty. The above discrepancy regarding the death penalty does 
set the general context of this research. While there are many other human rights 
barriers to extradition, the death penalty is one of the biggest and the most controversial 
obstacles. Although retentionist states, in international law, are not explicitly obliged to 
abolish the death penalty, the fact that the existence of the death penalty has been a de 
facto exception to get people extradited from most of the abolitionist states.279  
 
As a matter of fact, many extradition agreements explicitly incorporate the provision 
with respect to the death penalty exception. For example, the death penalty has been 
written in the extradition treaties between China and France and between China and 
Spain as an agreed ground for refusal unless sufficient assurances are provided.280 The 
EAW protects people from being ‘removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there 
is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty…’281 In the 
Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of 
America, it reads as  
 
Where the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws 
in the requesting State and not punishable by death under the laws in the requested State, 
the requested State may grant extradition on the condition that the death penalty shall not 
 
279 The death penalty is put in the context of the conflicts between human rights and extradition here and will be 
further discussed regarding its human rights nature in Section 3.3.1. However, it should be noted that the death 
penalty is not solely a human rights issue. The issues of its application, abolition or resumption are all subjected to 
various non-human rights law considerations, which will be outlined in Section 3.2. 
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be imposed on the person sought, or if for procedural reasons such condition cannot be 
complied with by the requesting State, on condition that the death penalty if imposed shall 
not be carried out. If the requesting State accepts extradition subject to conditions pursuant 
to this Article, it shall comply with the conditions. If the requesting State does not accept 
the conditions, the request for extradition may be denied.282  
 
Unlike the above two regional extradition agreements, which unambiguously ban the 
death penalty as the consequence of extradition, it is intriguing that the UN Model 
Treaty lists the death penalty exception in the category of ‘optional grounds for refusal’ 
instead of ‘mandatory grounds’ that include, for example, the protection against torture 
and other ill-treatment.283 This difference could be considered as indicating a certain 
degree of manoeuver for states to deal with the death penalty problem as it will be 
argued in this thesis. In other words, theoretically, the terms of the death penalty bar 
could be renegotiated by the participating states. 
 
However, in practice, the death penalty barrier has scarcely been overstepped without 
the use of assurances. The death penalty exception is also contained in the extradition 
treaty between two abolitionist states. For example, Germany and Canada have agreed 
as follow:  
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Extradition may be refused where the offence for which extradition is requested is 
punishable by death under the law of the requesting state and the law of the requested 
state does not permit such a punishment for that offence, unless the requesting state gives 
such assurances as the requested state considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not 
be imposed or, if imposed, shall not be executed.284 
 
Even if there is no provision in a particular extradition treaty expressly prohibiting the 
death penalty285 or in cases where there is no extradition treaty at all, the relevant 
national legislation would likely play a role as it did in the above Kyung Yup Kim case. 
However, to a great extent, those bilateral agreements or national approaches to deal 
with human rights issues, inter alia, the death penalty, in extradition process have been 
influenced by international human rights law. Despite this, the next chapter will show 
that there is in fact no international legal prohibition on the death penalty. This means 
that it is not strictly and internationally legally necessary for states’ domestic legal 
system to prohibit extradition of people to face the death penalty, even though many 
states have done so. 
 
2.5 The interrelation of deportation and extradition 
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture states, ‘[n]o State Party shall expel, return 
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("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ Similar provision 
can also be found in the Refugee Convention286 and the European Arrest Warrant: 
 
No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious 
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.287 
 
Furthermore, as can be found in a number of cases from the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR,288  it is indeed that extradition is sometimes depicted together with other 
approaches of removing people from one state to the other,289 especially deportation. 
In the context of combating transnational crime, the use of deportation is occasionally 
confused with extradition, particularly in the case where the person involves terrorism 
or serious transnational crimes and poses a significant national security threat to the 
requested state. In both situations, the host state has desirability to remove the person 
from its territory and for its own goods, to get rid of the potential threat on its territory.  
 
It is necessary to briefly sum up some of the critical differences between extradition 
and deportation, which lie as follow: (i) deportation is an immigration based approach 
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which reflects states’ sovereign power and comply with the requirements of domestic 
legislation, while extradition is a concept derives from criminal law as a means of 
strengthening international judicial cooperation; (ii) executing a deportation order is a 
unilateral act by the host state of which the deportee is not or is no longer a national. 
Deportation is primarily based on the personal conduct of the deportee, which could be 
the deportee’s presence is ‘unconducive to the public good’ or others,290 but stricto 
sensu, all of which are irrelevant to the cooperation from other state (receiving state),291 
while extradition is a bilateral act initiated and solely based on a request from the 
receiving state; (iii) as to the purpose, deportation is for the host state’s own national 
interests, particularly keeping the person outside its territory and safeguarding the 
security within its territory, whereas extradition aims to help the requesting state to 
bring the suspected or convicted to justice to face the trial or punishment, namely, help 
the requested state to enforce its criminal jurisdiction; 292  (iv) generally speaking, 
deportees are aliens or denaturalized nationals only, while in extradition cases, 
citizenship does not matter as much as that in deportation. This means the host state’s 
nationals are not always absolved unless the domestic legislation or treaty provision 
stipulates the opposite.293 
 
The most significant observation regarding the difference lies in the fact that there are 
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different interests at play, and the proportionality of a deportation’s impact upon human 
rights might not be the same as for an extradition. Therefore, while we are looking at 
the potential proportionality calculation about whether extradition should go ahead in 
the conflicts with the individual’s human rights protection, the calculation would be 
different from that of deportation cases. More specifically, the extradition calculation is 
about the interests of the requesting state (versus those of the individual; with particular 
consideration of the collective interests in transnational criminal cooperation). Whereas 
the deportation calculation is about the interests of the expelling state (versus those of 
the individual; with some respect for whether the national state of the deportee is willing 
to receive them). 
 
At first glance, it seems that extradition and deportation are two very different legal 
institutions that are conducted in parallel. However, a closer look reveals that, 
particularly in the context of this research, many aspects of deportation cases play a 
crucial role and are illustrative to the main argument set up in this thesis. More 
relevantly, the effects of deportation and extradition, to a certain extent, have a 
similarity. The issues and principles in deportation cases can be reasonably transplanted 
into extradition practice. For example, Chahal case is one of the most leading cases 
dealing with deportation in relation to Article 3 of the ECHR. Strictly speaking, it is not 
an extradition case, but the Court’ assessment and the decision of Chahal case is 




the requesting state that falls within the scope of Article 3.294 We will examine the 
ECtHR’s cases concerning Article 3 as a barrier to extradition or deportation in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
 
On the one hand, states could use the deportation as a disguised alternative to sending 
someone to another state when they cannot use extradition for that purpose, either 
because extradition is extremely burdensome or because it is unavailable for various 
reasons.295 In Cherif Bassiouni’s words, deportation is ‘resorted to as a way of avoiding 
extradition…if extradition is deemed unlikely and the authorities of the host states are 
unwilling to accept such a legal outcome, they seek other means more likely to procure 
the desired outcome.’296 Even in some cases, as David Sadoff opines,297 deportation 
could be assumed as a practical approach that satisfies the aims of ‘securing the physical 
custody of a fugitive and bringing him within a pursuing State’s judicial system to be 
prosecuted or punishment’, 298  which ‘functionally approximate the end result of 
extradition.’ 299  In reality, deportation has been used as a straightforward way to 
‘address terrorist related activity which cannot be evidenced in the criminal courts.’300 
For example, under UK’s immigration rule, the Home Secretary has the power to deport 
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any foreign national in cases where ‘his deportation is conducive to the public good as 
being in the interests of national security or of the relations between the United 
Kingdom and any other country or for other reasons of a political nature.’301 In short, 
the use of deportation is legally justified to realise the outcome that cannot be served 
by extradition in certain situations.   
 
On the other hand, many grounds for refusal, especially those deriving from human 
rights law, are not exclusively applicable to extradition.302 It has been acknowledged 
that states are fully entitled to enact and implement their own immigration policies on 
entry, remain and expulsion of non-nationals within their territory.303 This is viewed 
as an exclusive privilege of the sovereignty of states and processing internal affairs 
without interference.304 However, this right is not exercised in an unrestrained way, its 
enforcement to remove aliens from its territory or send them back to other countries 
may give rise to issues under international human rights law. 305  Under this 
circumstance and concerning the principal objective of this thesis, the principles of 
human rights law, particularly related to the European standard on the prohibition of 
extradition, deportation, expulsion or any transferring measures that expose the person 
to a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty as well as the principle of non-
 
301 Immigration Act 1971, Section 15 (3); see also Immigration Rule part 13, para 363.  
302 Costa (n 96) 88. (‘In the context of human rights, extradition and other forms of removal of a person from a 
given territory tend to be treated somewhat uniformly, allowing for the assumption that, where one of them is 
prohibited, so are the others.’) 
303 Ahmed v. Austria App no 25964/94 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996), para 38; Vilvarajah and Others v. The United 
Kingdom App nos 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87 (ECtHR, 30 October 1991), para 102. 
304 Nicola Rogers, ‘Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: Are New Principles Emerging?’ 
(2003) European Human Rights Law Review 53. 
305 Francesca Pizzutelli, The Human Rights of Migrants as Limitations on States’ Control Over Entry and Stay in 




refoulement, are fully and equally applied to the above two subjects. More specifically, 
the requested state’s willingness to extradite (either resulting from an extradition treaty 
or solely reciprocity based) and the need to deport are subjected to similar refusal 
grounds based on human rights concerns. 306  That is to say, in the current legal 
framework, neither extradition nor deportation is lawfully allowed (i) to a state where 
the extraditee or deportee is at a real risk of torture or other ill-treatment prohibited 
under Article 3 of the ECHR or (ii) to a retentionist state where there is a risk that the 
extraditee or deportee will be sentenced to the death penalty and that will be carried out. 
In short, human rights law provides similar impediments to deportation as to extradition. 
In both areas of law, we have seen a growing use of assurances to get around those 
problems. Even if deportation is used as a substitute in a certain case to bring fugitives 
to justice, it is still subjected to the death penalty dilemma, which does not get rid of 
the necessity of this thesis. In states’ commitment to combating transnational crime and 
bringing international fugitives to justice via either extradition or deportation, the 
controversies and problems in relation to the death penalty are analogous. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we sketched the contour of extradition law, with respect to its significant 
role in international criminal justice, particularly in the context of globalised criminality; 
its various legal basis upon which states are obliged to extradite; some of the major 
requirements of extradition and also, the relevance of deportation and other types of 
 




expulsion for the purpose of this thesis. More importantly, we have briefly revealed 
how the emergence and enlargement of the influence of human rights law have become 
a significant impediment to extradition. As we can see, the conflict between human 
rights and extradition does exist in reality, and then, the linchpin falls into the question 
that how we can understand this conflict or what is the essence of this conflict. Literally, 
either of the matters deals with the priority of the state’s two obligations, or rather, the 
human rights obligation, irrespective of where it derives from, and the treaty obligation 
to extradite. But on a deeper level, the underlying issue can be construed as the conflict 
of the interest of the individual’s human rights protection and that of the state/collective 
in combating crime. It is the main purpose of this thesis to resolve or mediate the 
conflict and ensure that the relationship between extradition and human rights is 
proportionate. Nevertheless, the conflict does not mean an automatic priority on human 
rights.  
 
One of the issues that is particularly focused in this thesis is the death penalty and its 
role in extradition between the Contracting Parties to the ECHR and the non-Parties 
that retain the death penalty. Admittedly, neither the death penalty per se, nor its use as 
a ground for refusing extradition has been universally accepted without divisions. The 
death penalty, which has been a disputable issue for decades, extends the controversies 
from the domestic sphere to the context of international criminal cooperation, 
extradition in particular,307 from an issue of criminal justice to the one governed by 
 




human rights law. Many states, particularly those Contracting Parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, not only prohibit the death penalty within their own 
penal systems, but also spread out their dedication to the death penalty abolition beyond 
and indirectly affect the use of the death penalty by other retentionist states. States that 
retain the death penalty are compelled to undertake to suspend the application of the 
death penalty or considerably restrict its use in the specific case in order to bring the 
fugitive back to their territory.308 However, no matter what decisions the retentionist 
state makes in response to the requested state’s demand, the effectiveness of the 
criminal law enforcement will, in the view of this thesis, be disproportionately reduced. 
For these concerns, this thesis argues that the importance of extradition in the repression 
of transnational criminality on behalf of the interests of the collective should be given 















3. The Death Penalty in International Law 
10 October 2019 was the 17th World Day against the Death Penalty.309 This annual 
observance marks the apparent trend toward the worldwide abolition of the death 
penalty. In this information era that people quickly get access to news regarding what 
takes place all over the world, it is easy to find reports on the death penalty cases. For 
example, on 20 January 2018, two Belarusian convicted of murder were sentenced to 
death,310 which were regarded as the first two people reported to be sentenced to death 
in 2018. As reported on 13 June 2019, a death row prisoner was being executed in 
secret,311 which should not be acceptable under any circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
strong objection from both national and international levels was not able to halt the 
execution or compel Belarus to make a moratorium.312  
 
In the United States, 25 people were reported being executed in 8 states in 2018.313 By 
the end of November, 20 criminals have been executed in 7 states in 2019,314 and 
further 65 executions have been scheduled.315  
 
In the beginning of 2020, after the Supreme Court rejected the last appeal, India 
 
309 For further details, see the website of the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty.  
310 See Amnesty International, ‘Two Men Sentenced to Death Penalty in Belarus’ <https://www.amnesty.or
g/download/Documents/EUR4977972018ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 7 October 2018.  
311  See Amnesty International, ‘Belarus: Amnesty International Condemns another Death Sentence Execution’ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4905352019ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 3 September 2019.  
312 See Council of Europe, ‘PACE Rapporteur Condemns Execution in Belarus’ <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/
xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=7526&lang=2&cat=5&fbclid=IwAR29xoygEEBeFHfCBCeHXczGOIrx5i
b0uh0d4UI0Z-iabX7auENjZ9qLBQo> accessed 1 October 2019.  
313 See Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Execution List 2018’ <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/201
8> accessed 19 December 2019.  
314 See Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Execution List 2019’ <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/201
9> accessed 19 December 2019.  
315 See Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2019’ <https://deathpenaltyinfo.




executed four criminals of the 2012 New Delhi bus gang-rape and murder case.316 
These are only three examples exactly disclosing the challenge that the abolitionist 
campaign is confronted with and also, the reality of the optimistic declaration of the so-
called overall trend toward abolition. What is more, in recent years, the issue of 
resumption has come into focus, which will be discussed below.  
 
The death penalty is indeed a controversial and well-discussed topic in both 
international treaty law and customary international law. Its legality has been long 
debated by people in various fields. It is not only a legal issue of criminal justice but 
also concerns the political, cultural, religious and social factors.  
 
In order to pave the way for substantiating that the ECtHR’s approach has become very 
restrictive but could, in theory, be changed,317 it is imperative to establish that there is 
no other international legal prohibition utterly impeding extradition of people to 
retentionist states. In other words, the death penalty could be lawful, and there could be 
some flexibilities in extradition to face the death penalty. More specifically, the core 
argument is established in three aspects. The primary task is to invalidate the so-called 
‘universal abolitionist consensus’ by analysing various figures which are most 
frequently used to advance the abolitionist discourse. Secondly, the discussion on a 
number of most controversial issues about the death penalty which lead to the view that 
 
316  Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘India Executes Four Men Convicted of 2012 Delhi Bus Rape and Murder’, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/india-executes-four-men-convicted-of-2012-delhi-bus-and> 
accessed 10 June 2020. 




it cannot, and will not, be abolished in a number of retentionist states. Due to the 
prediction that the death penalty will not be universally prohibited anytime soon, a 
substantial disagreement between abolitionist and retentionist states will persist, but it 
can be narrowed. Lastly, the most decisive issue is about the lawfulness of the death 
penalty. The death penalty is not subjected to a universal international legal prohibition 
either under treaty law or, more controversially, under customary international law. 
Therefore, it remains the case that as a matter of international law, the prohibition of 
the death penalty is far from universally accepted. The conclusion of the above issues, 
although some would argue for the contrast, serves as the precondition for the main 
argument of this thesis.  
   
3.1 Unpicking the apparent trend towards abolition 
As we shall see in this section many scholars and commentators have made a similar 
argument that the death penalty will almost inevitably become abolished universally. 
However, this is the idea that this thesis does not share. This section will firstly examine 
what is often taken to be the orthodox views, followed by a demonstration that the trend 
towards abolition is not as straightforward as some might say.   
 
Julian Knowles holds that ‘[t]he abolition of capital punishment represented perhaps 
the most important policy change during an era of marked social liberalisation and 
enlightened thinking.’318 Specifically, as William Schabas comments, ‘[p]erhaps no 
 
318 Julian Knowles, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United Kingdom: How it Happened and Why it Still 




single issue better illustrates progress in the protection and promotion of human rights 
than the progressive limitation and abolition of capital punishment.’319  To a large 
extent, the global campaign against the death penalty has been accepted as a human 
rights discourse320 and marked as an essential part of the development of international 
human rights law.321 In the past decades, the abolition of the death penalty has become 
a global focus of attention. Although it is still on its way, we have to admit that some 
achievements have already been made. Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle are of the 
opinion that,  
 
‘[t]he situation on the global plane has undoubtedly moved towards universal abolition. 
Instead of abolitionists being on the weaker flank, constantly being called upon to justify 
their position, it is now the retentionists that are on the back foot.’322  
 
There are primarily four international treaties and protocols that explicitly prohibit the 
use of the death penalty,323 which will be explored shortly. In the meantime, the death 
penalty has been abolished in the domestic law of many states. In Germany, Iceland 
 
319 William Schabas, ‘The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Review)’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 
537.  
320 It is advised that the death penalty has no longer been a solely domestic issue regarding criminal justice and the 
use of the death penalty indeed involves a number of human rights concerns. However, the opinions are divided on 
the question of whether it is persuasive to say the death penalty is entirely a human rights issue and is free from the 
discretionary power of states. This will be discussed in Section 4.3.1.  
321 See UNCHR, General Comment No.6 in Article 6 (Right to Life), adopted on 30 April 198, para. 6, ‘all measures 
of abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life.’ See also, UNCHR, Human Rights 
Resolution 2005/59: The Question of the Death Penalty, E/CN.4/RES/2005/59, 20 April 2005, ‘the abolition of the 
death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development of human rights.’ 
322 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, Progress Towards World-Wide Abolition of the Death Penalty (2015).  
323 For example, Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is now binding to 88 Contracting Parties; all 47 Contracting 
Parties except Russia have ratified Sixth Protocol to the ECHR and all but Armenia, Russia And Azerbaijan have 
ratified the Thirteenth Protocol; while Protocol to the American Convention on Human Right to Abolish the Death 




and Portugal, the death penalty is even forbidden with constitutional guarantees.324 
Following the Resolutions in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, the General 
Assembly adopted its Seventh Resolution on a moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty, in which states have not yet abolished the death penalty are asked to ‘establish 
a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing it’325. The number of states voted 
in favour of this Resolution reached a majority of 121 out of the 193 UN Member 
States.326 According to Saul Lehrfreund’s standpoint, the increasing number of states 
supporting the moratorium resolution (104 votes in favour the First Resolution in 2007) 
‘provides incontrovertible evidence of a dynamic towards the universal abolition of the 
death penalty.’ 327  Amnesty International views the compelling advocate of the 
Resolution as ‘a further indication that a global consensus is building to consign the 
death penalty to the history books.’328 This is because the moratorium is deemed as the 
impetus to ‘respect for human dignity and to the enhancement and progressive 
development of human rights’.329 As it asserts,  
 
The adoption of these ground-breaking resolutions has set the death penalty clearly within 
the human rights priorities of the international community and has generated a new 
 
324 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Art 102; Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, Art 69; 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Art 24. 
325  UNGA, Resolution on Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, A/RES/73/175, 17 December 2018, 
Preambular para. 4. 
326 UN Digital Library, ‘Voting Summary’ <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1656169?ln=en> accessed 3  
December 2019.  
327  Saul Lehrfreund, ‘The Impact and Importance of International Human Rights Standards: Asia in World 
Perspective’ in Roger Hood and Surya Deva (eds), Confronting Capital Punishment in Asia: Human Rights, Politics 
and Public Opinion (OUP 2013) 25. 
328 Amnesty International, Report on The Death Sentences and Executions 2018 (2019) 8. 




momentum among civil society and governments in all regions towards ending executions 
and repealing this punishment from national legislation.330  
 
According to the most updated annual report from Amnesty International, by the end 
of 2019, 106 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes and in all 
circumstances. The death penalty for ordinary crimes is prohibited in 8 states, and there 
are 28 de facto abolitionists.331 That is to say, the total number for abolitionist in law 
or practice arrived at 142.332 In particular, the recorded number of executions in 2019 
(657 in 20 states) fell to the lowest number in the past ten years.333 Compared to 2018, 
the number of the death penalty sentence also has a decrease from 2,531 to 2,307,334 
nevertheless, the number of states imposing the death sentence has increasing from 54 
to 56.335  
 
In light of the above numbers and facts, it appears to be widely recognised that we are 
facing steady and continual progress toward the universal abolition with an average two 
to three new countries abolishing the death penalty annually in the past decade.336 
 
330 Amnesty International, Death Penalty: UN Call for Moratorium on Executions Gains Record-High Support at 
Committee Vote (2018).  
331 It is argued, however, for those de facto abolitionists, the death penalty does still remain as a ‘theoretical 
punishment’ until it is fully abolished. More importantly, even though the death penalty has been de jure abolished, 
there is still a chance that it could be resumed, which will be looked at in this section. 
332 Amnesty International, Report on the Death Penalty and Execution 2019.  
333 ibid 
334 It should be noted that all these numbers are recorded by Amnesty International based on their own methodology 
and access to the information in various states. For such reasons, the accuracy may not be guaranteed in certain cases 
especially in those countries where the death penalty-related statistics are not fully disclosed.   
335 Amnesty International, Report on the Death Penalty and Execution 2019. 
336 Amnesty International, ‘Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries as of July 2018’ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5066652017ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 20 February 2019. 
Based on the list summarising the states that have abolished the death penalty since 1976, ‘[i]t shows that in the past 
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Scholars, William Schabas for example, even optimistically argued in 2014 that the 
ultimate abolition would become a reality in the next decade.337 Similarly, Amnesty 
International alleges that the death penalty will be ‘consigned to history’ in less than 40 
years.338 However, this is not as certain as it might at first seem. To be specific, Sir 
Nigel Rodley clearly recognised that while identifying the status or lawfulness of the 
death penalty in international law, the fact that over 50 states that retain the death 
penalty should be given equivalent consideration, particularly those are major global 
players including China, the US and India.339 In addition to the consideration of the 
political influence of those retentionist states, as a matter of fact, when the abolitionist 
states argue the death penalty as a violation of human rights, it should be borne in mind 
that the protection of human rights should begin with human beings per se and focus 
on human beings.  
 
Under such circumstances, the numbers gathered and published by Amnesty 
International in their annual Death Penalty Report unavoidably have limitations.340 The 
number of people (population) facing the death penalty should be given more attention, 
rather than merely focusing on the increasing number of abolitionist states. More 
specifically, if we look at those figures from the perspective of the number of people 
who live in those minority of retentionist states and thus are subjected to the potential 
 
337 See William Schabas, Universal Abolition: Only a Decade Away, Inner Temple, London (2014). 
338 Amnesty International, ‘Death Penalty: Abolitionist Reflections’ <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Doc
uments/ACT5076102017ENGLISH.PDF> accessed 15 March 2018.  
339 Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 279. 
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death penalty, a totally different result will come out. It is a fact that ‘the minority of 
countries which retain the death penalty are also among the most populous,’341 which 
is the fact that particularly reflected in Asian countries such as China and India. That is 
to say, countries with the world’s largest population including China, India, the United 
States of America,342 Indonesia, Pakistan and Nigeria are retentionists, along with 
many other states such as Japan, Vietnam, Iran, Singapore, Egypt, Thailand and Saudi 
Arabia. This roughly comes out the status quo that over half of the world’s population 
is by far living in the above countries and thus, potentially facing the death penalty 
legally. 343  Additionally, counting the number of abolitionist states is frankly 
meaningless taking into account the contemporary proliferation of small states in the 
late 20th century. For example, the separation of Czechoslovakia and the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and the USSR. For these reasons, it is fair to say that the alleged 
achievement on the progress of global death penalty abolition based on the number of 
abolitionist states does not reflect the truth.  
 
Furthermore, those figures could also be interpreted in different ways. For example, 
some interesting statistics recorded by Amnesty International also go against the above 
 
341 Fredman (n 307) 153. 
342 Up to now, the death penalty is still legal in 29 states of the USA, see ProCon.org, ‘States with the 
Death Penalty and States with Death Penalty Bans’ <https://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resour
ceID=001172> accessed 13 July 2019.  
343  See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘World Population 2019’ 
<https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019-Wallchart.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019. According 
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idealistic prediction made by the abolitionist group. At first, in 2018, several states 
witnessed an increase in the number of the death penalty sentence344 and the number 
of the execution345 . Similar increase in executions and death sentences were also 
recorded in 2019.346 Secondly, in general, the death penalty is taking place against the 
backdrop of the ‘abolitionist trend’. In spite of a decrease, the total number of known 
executions and the death penalty sentences in 2019 still accounted for 657 and 2,307 
respectively. By the end of 2019, there were at least 26,604 people in the death row.347 
It is not to argue that all of these executions and sentences that have taken place would 
meet the strict standards that will be examined and advocated, for the use of the death 
penalty, later in this chapter. For example, the above-mentioned Belarusian case which 
involves secret executions.348 However, it remains an undeniable fact that the death 
penalty is still being used in many countries. Thirdly, although the number of States 
Parties to the Second Optional Protocol is increasing, it is far from being accepted as 
‘universally ratified’.349 Fourthly, the result that there are a huge number of states 
voting for the Resolution on Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty in 2018 is 
understood differently or even oppositely. To be more precise, the adoption of this 
resolution runs counter to the essence of the global campaign on abolishment. ‘On a 
philosophical level, the decision to establish a moratorium rather than endorse outright 
 
344 For example, Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.  
345 For example, the USA and Belarus. Both Japan and Singapore got their highest number in the past decades. 
346 For example, increase in executions took place in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan and Yemen. A large number 
of states had more death sentences imposition in 2019, including Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and Zambia. 
347 Amnesty International, 2019, 11. 
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Amnesty International, 2019, 12-3. 




abolition may indicate that the administration of the death penalty, and not the 
punishment itself, is defective.’350 According to this argument, the reason why the use 
of the death penalty is called for suspension is that its application in practice is not 
appropriately and sufficiently regulated, rather than the death penalty per se is illegal 
in general international law. Namely, the problem is that those provisions in the 
Resolution are not fully observed by the retentionist states. It is deduced that if the 
regulation of the death penalty, particularly those are rules of customary international 
law, could be recognised by all states and coherently carried out in practice, the use of 
the death penalty should be allowed at this stage, regardless of worldwide trend on the 
abolition.351  
 
Lastly, unlike the death penalty execution, the trend of abolition or imposing 
momentum is not irreversible. The reintroduction in the global abolitionist movement 
indeed reflects the variability and uncertainty of states polices on the death penalty. In 
other words, neither de jure nor de facto abolition absolutely guarantee the death 
penalty permanently vanish in a particular country. Therefore, it is worth stressing that 
not all retentionist states are getting increasingly closer to the alleged ‘ultimate 
abolition’. A number of recent setbacks in the abolition trend are exceptionally 
noteworthy, and the reintroduction of the death penalty is indeed an issue that should 
 
350 Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide, ‘Moratoria’ <http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/mo
ratoria.cfm> accessed 9 May 2018.  
351 It also should be noted that there are differences of the imposition and execution in difference regions. While 
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African states. For full regional review, see Amnesty International, 2018, 13-45. This point will be looked at in 




not be ignored. Recalling paragraph 2 and paragraph 6 of Article 6 of the ICCPR,352 it 
is true that, theoretically, international law does not allow states to step back once the 
death penalty has been abolished.353  
 
However, state practice has run opposite to it. For example, in the United Kingdom, 
since its last execution in 1964 and completely abolished the death penalty in 1998, 
there have been several attempts to reinstate the death penalty.354  Although those 
attempts in the UK has thus far failed, we have already noted that several states either 
lifted their moratoria or reintroduced it. For example, Jordan and Pakistan resumed 
executions after a moratorium of eight and six years respectively. In 2015, Chad had its 
first execution since 2003.355 States including Sudan, Thailand and Botswana resumed 
execution in 2018 and six countries recommenced to impose new death penalty 
imposition.356 In 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice announced its resumption of the 
death penalty against ‘the worst criminals’ since the nearly two-decade moratorium.357 
Five death row prisoners have been confirmed of the scheduled executions,358 despite 
the intense condemnation.359 In October 2019, Indonesia’s new-appointed Attorney 
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General declared that execution would be resumed.360 Actually, according to Amnesty 
International’s calculation, 80 people had been sentenced to death in Indonesia in 
2019.361 It is intriguing to pay attention to Philippines, which is a State Party to the 
Second Optional Protocol,362 is also struggling to reintroducing the death penalty for 
certain crimes.363 At the time of writing, Sri Lanka, where there has been an execution-
free country since 1976, is experiencing the potential reintroduction of the death penalty 
executions of drug-related criminals.364 President Maithripala Sirisena announced he 
has signed the execution order for four drug criminals without further details. 
Furthermore, it is also reported that at least 1,299 prisoners were on death row in Sri 
Lanka.365  
 
To sum up, taking all these facts into account, we can by no means insist that we are on 
a positive trend toward the universal abolition of the death penalty, which will be 
realised in the near future. The answer is definitely not what it seems at first. There is 
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3.2 Controversial issues regarding the death penalty 
Having an overview of the global ‘progress’ of the death penalty abolition from two 
voices in opposite directions, we can now get that although the number of retentionist 
states has shifted from the overwhelming majority to a minority, the worldwide 
abolition of the death penalty may not be realised in a short period of time because quite 
a lot of obstacles are standing in the way of it. In this section, four particular issues will 
be discussed, including deterrence, discriminatory execution, miscarriage of justice and 
public opinion. The focus will be moved to the pro and con behind the death penalty 
per se. It is obvious that the death penalty raises serious unsettled debates in relation to 
not only the protection of specific human rights, such as the right to life, the right to a 
fair trial and the right to be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, 366  but also the penological concerns, including the necessity and 
effectiveness of this kind of punishment per se. In reality, the debate on either of the 
issues will result in the debate on the legality of the death penalty. Both the abolitionists 
and the retentionists have their own arguments. The reasons for supporting or against 
the death penalty are noticeably diverging in different places of the world. 
 
3.2.1 Deterrence 
In many states, the death penalty has been an indispensable part of the integrity of 
punishment in the penal system for a long time. Until today, in many places, the death 
penalty is still deeply rooted, and it is applied as a necessary punishment to protect the 
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fundamental interests of people. More importantly, the death penalty is linked to the 
social development in some sense and it plays a role in upholding the stability of the 
public order and governance in certain social conditions. That is to say, in many 
retentionist states, the existence of the death penalty is required for specific legal, 
cultural, political and social needs.367 For example, although the relevant statistics of 
the death penalty sentences and executions in China sometimes are not fully open to 
the public, it can still be deduced that China constitutes the biggest part of the 
worldwide capital execution.368 In spite of the fact that China is abrogating the death 
penalty step by step in the past decade, 369  the complete abolition is deemed as 
improbable in quite a long time.  
 
It is noteworthy that not all theories of punishment are dominated by deterrence and 
retribution. There are also rehabilitative and restorative functions of the criminal 
punishment that should also be considered.370 Nevertheless, deterrence might be the 
most frequently mentioned word when discussing the function of the death penalty and 
also, the argument for sustaining the death penalty has largely relied on the presumed 
deterrent effect.371 For the retentionists, this kind of extreme penalty directly penalises 
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the flagrant offenders, fights crimes and frightens the potential offenders against the 
commitment. From this perspective, taking the life of criminals is protecting the lives 
of many others. In Iraq, for instance, ‘because of the exceptional circumstances in Iraq 
and the prevalence of terrorist crimes targeting the right to life, the death penalty had 
been maintained as a means of deterrence and to provide justice to the families of 
victims.’372 For those in favour of the death penalty, it is argued that the death penalty 
gives rise to more fear and stronger deterrence than any other imprisonment, namely, 
more execution may result in fewer people commit the capital offences. This is because 
removing the death penalty for specific crime from the particular penal system would 
conceptually indicate that the seriousness of that crime is lessened, in other words, the 
crime cost is lowered.373  
 
However, whether deterrence can be sufficiently accepted as a justification for the death 
penalty has never reached a consensus. For those who oppose the death penalty, 
especially its effectiveness in the penal system, they insist the death penalty does 
nothing more than any other less severe punishment in preventing future perpetration. 
There is no scientific and persuasive evidence proving the existence of the death penalty 
directly affect the crimes rates, safeguard the public security and make the public feel 
safer. In this regard, the real figures of the criminal rates before and after the abolition 
of the death penalty in a particular state seem to be convictive in illustrating the role of 
the death penalty. For example, the empirical experience in Canada reveals that the 
homicide rate remarkably declined following the abolition, which can be seen as a 
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cogent example against the deterrence of the death penalty.374  
 
Similarly, according to the survey, within the United States, states that retain the death 
penalty do not keep lower crime rates than the abolitionist states and the fact that the 
reintroduction of the death penalty in a particular state does not give rise to change in 
crime rates. Both findings evidence the irrelevance between the death penalty and crime 
rates.375 Moreover, while evaluating the function of the death penalty, even if there are 
certain cases where the people count the benefits and costs of their commitment and 
thus, cease to commit crime out of the fear of the death sentence, what matters is not 
whether the death penalty per se works well, but whether it works significantly better 
than any other kind of punishment as well as any other means of criminal justice in 
deterring the potential perpetrator against committing serious crimes.376  Thus, the 
analysis on this issue should not only be comparative with the consideration of the role 
of the alternative punishments such as the life imprisonment,377 but also take into all 
relevant concerns especially the delay of execution in the death row, the inevitably 
wrongful conviction of innocents and the unfairness and discrimination of the death 
trial.   
 
Additionally, the deterring argument is refuted by the fact that, in some cases, the use 
of the death penalty sometimes may be counteractive to the original purpose, let alone 
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deterrence and prevention. For those who attempt to achieve their goals by atrocious 
acts and violent means, especially terrorists for example, the death may make them 
martyrs with honours that they desire. 378  For those people who do not rationally 
calculate the consequence of crime or even do not care about the probable execution, 
the deterrent role of the death penalty would not perform.379 The opponents also claim 
that the weight of punishment, inter alia, the death penalty should not be overstated in 
deterring or combating crimes. More emphasis needs to be rested on enhancing the 
effectiveness of the criminal investigation, ensuring a fair and objective functioning 
criminal system, rather than being confined to a single punishment. For example, 
quoting the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’s claim, ‘[i]t is the infallibility of punishment, rather than the severity of the 
sanction, which is the tool for retribution, stigmatization and deterrence.’380 The ICTY 
does not think it is the severity of a punishment that deters people, but the likelihood of 
being punished at all. This means, it is the people think they will be punished for their 
perpetration that has the deterrent effect.  
 
As can be seen from the above conflicting opinions as to the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty, there is no clear evidence pointing to one way or the other. It is well-found to 
say the discrepancies on this point between the abolitionists and the retentionists would 
still be considerable. In the meantime, I do admit that remaining the death penalty or 
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replacing it by lifetime imprisonment is only one of the aspects in deterring crimes. The 
role of a specific punishment in one’s penal system should not be so exaggerated. We 
should not expect to use the death penalty to resolve all crime-related issues, which is 
definitely not what the criminal law requires. In other words, when the retentionists are 
asked whether the death penalty works or why it is not working, the question just 
simplifies the complex problem and equates it with the role of the death penalty. 
  
3.2.2 Discriminatory execution 
The 15th anniversary of the World Day against the Death Penalty has paid particular 
attention to the issue of the discriminatory execution on impoverished and marginalised 
groups.381 It attempted to raise public awareness on the fact that in many cases, ‘poor 
and economically vulnerable persons and foreign nationals are disproportionately 
subjected to the death penalty […] and that persons belonging to religious or ethnic 
minorities are disproportionately represented among those sentenced to the death 
penalty.’382 According to the report of the International Commission against the Death 
penalty, for example, approximately 75% of people subjected to the death penalty in 
India belong to the economically vulnerable group, and the number in Malaysia 
amounts to 90%.383 Those disadvantageous people are much more vulnerable in a 
death penalty trial and their right to a fair trial are more risky, particularly in the country 
where the criminal system is not democratically and legitimately guaranteed. 384 
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Referring to the words of the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan 
Šimonović, ‘there is a correlation between the death penalty and discrimination and 
unequal treatment against vulnerable groups. In most cases, people who end up getting 
executed are poor, belong to vulnerable groups or socially disadvantaged minority 
groups or have mental disabilities.’385 The focus on the discriminatory use of the death 
penalty was brought to the Human Rights Committee. In its recently adopted General 
Comment No. 36 affirms that the death penalty is prohibited to ‘be imposed in a 
discriminatory manner contrary to the requirements of articles 2(1) and 26 of the 
Covenant….’386 In the latest Seventh Resolution on a moratorium on the use of the 
death penalty, the same problem is included: 
 
poor and economically vulnerable persons, foreign nationals, persons exercising their 
human rights and persons belonging to religious or ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately represented among those sentenced to the death penalty.387 
    
To a certain extent, the vulnerability of the indigent people in the death penalty case is 
attributed to the unavailability of legal knowledge and resources. This means, the 
procedural safeguards for those poor people cannot be guaranteed, particularly in 
support of the legal assistance. 
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The above paragraph reveals only one of the perspectives upon which the death penalty 
is alleged to be discriminatorily applied. In fact, in the death penalty proceedings, the 
factors of race, gender and social status all influence the outcome of the case; bias and 
discriminations are not uncommon.388 Nevertheless, those problems are not exclusive 
to the death penalty, albeit intolerable. Reduce and eliminate the discrimination and 
ensure equality before the law is not only the principle of criminal law, but also a 
fundamental right of all people.389 Specific safeguards to make sure the death penalty 
is impartially carried out is actually a universally acknowledged rule in international 
law, which will be discussed in the 4th section of this chapter.   
 
3.2.3 Miscarriage of justice 
Considering the finality and irreversibility of the death penalty, once executed, people’s 
life was deprived and there is no possibility of remediation. Therefore, this kind of 
punishment should have left no room for the miscarriage of justice. Any inaccuracy 
may result in unimaginable result for innocence and their families. However, the 
wrongful convictions are inevitable in practice, and there have been many cases that 
innocence was subjected to incorrect sentence or execution. The root causes could be 
attributed to a number of factors in almost every aspect of the criminal justice system.390 
For example, the lack of the access to the fair trial, misconduct of police in the 
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investigation process particularly the false evidence and confession, unequipped legal 
counsels, and the specific social context should also be considered.391 In reality, as the 
President of the International Commission against the Death Penalty Federico Mayor 
said, all criminal systems are designed and run by people who cannot get around the 
possibilities of making mistakes. It is effortless to find a case concerning the execution 
of innocents.392 The miscarriage of justice is unavoidable even in the most advanced 
criminal jurisdiction, and all potential injustices exacerbate the cost of wrongful death 
penalty imposition or execution.393 
 
In some cases, it took decades for the judicial authorities to correct the ‘irretrievable 
mistakes’, in which the innocents had been executed, and the posthumous pardon did 
nothing for their life. For example, in Huugjilt case,394 which is one of the most typical 
cases of wrongful execution in China over the past decades, Huugjilt was sentenced to 
the death penalty for rape and murder of a woman in a public toilet in 1996. He was 
executed in the same year. It took 18 years for the courts to correct the judgment and in 
2014, Huugjilt was eventually acquitted in a judicial review after the real murderer of 
this case confessed. Similar, in Nie Shubin case,395 the young man was wrongfully 
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executed for rape and killing in 1995. After his families’ successive appeals for reviews 
and investigations, the judgment was finally overturned and Nie was exonerated in 2016. 
The figures of the conviction of innocence are also persuasive. For instance, according 
to the project of Innocence Database of the Death Penalty Information Center, since 
1973, 166 wrongfully convicted people have been exonerated from the death row, 
where they had stayed for 11.3 years in average.396 Admittedly, it is not difficult to find 
the real story of those innocents’ experiences in death row and also their life after the 
exoneration.397 Being detained and waiting for the final execution, their physical and 
mental affliction is beyond imagination. These cases, in Hood and Hoyle’s words, 
‘disturb the public’s sense of injustice’, which also lead to the public’s reconsideration 
of the administration of the death penalty.398 The abolitionists argue that there will be 
innocents being sentenced to the death penalty or executed as long as the death penalty 
remains. The only or at least the best way to avoid those wrongful convictions is not to 
use the death penalty at all. In other words, the issue of the wrongful conviction/ 
execution has been taken as one of the primary concerns against the death penalty. 
 
We cannot deny the wrongful convictions that have already been made in the past and 
also, the potential risk of the wrongful convictions in the future, even in the most 
advanced criminal justice system secured with presumed sufficient procedurals. Life 
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imprisonment, which is often taken as the replacement to the death penalty. Even if the 
death penalty is abolished, the miscarriage of justice would still not be completely 
avoided. For an innocent person, spending decades in prison is by no means much better 
than wrongful execution. With respect to this problem, it is considered by the 
retentionists from a totally different perspective. Unlike the abolitionists, they attach 
more importance to the reasons that cause to the miscarriage of justice, the measures to 
prevent further wrongful convictions and also, the remedies for wrongful convictions. 
It is believed that the deep reform of the criminal justice system, particularly in regard 
to procedural safeguards, could reduce the possibility of wrongful conviction/ 
execution to the largest extent.  
 
3.2.4 Public opinion 
In many retentionist states, the death penalty is not only existing as a sort of punishment 
in the penal code, but also demanded, to a large extent, by the public. In those places, 
public support is a moral expression of people’s indignation to criminals and their 
conducts.399 Public support is quite an emotional and sensitive issue,400 which is often 
labelled as the functioning of an important shield of the states in favour of the death 
penalty. It might be easy to understand people’s desire for retaliation, abhorrence for a 
brutal crime, sympathy on victims and also the irritation on the insecure atmosphere. In 
fact, the death penalty is indeed profoundly entrenched in the traditional culture and 
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ethic of many states where the public opinion is antagonistic to abolition. This is largely 
dominated by the retributive culture where more or less, the death penalty is regarded 
as a ‘taken for granted result’ of certain outrageous crimes and also a way to show 
respect for those victims. In many occasions, people may think that it will be the shame 
of criminal law if the criminal who committed a serious crime could get impunity from 
the death penalty.401 Taking murder for example, when someone deprives the life of a 
person, which is the most fundamental right, only when the life of him is deprived is a 
proportionate or an equivalent punishment. In the above-mentioned India’s 2012 bus 
gang-rape case, in spite of oppositions,402 the execution was welcomed by the victim’s 
mother who said ‘[t]oday, justice has been done after seven years.’403 India’s Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi also commended that ‘it is of utmost importance to ensure 
dignity and safety of women.’404  
 
In addition, the death penalty is regarded as the most direct and effective means of 
punishment that incapacitate the serious criminals, which is able to not only enhance 
the public’s sense of safety, but also reinforce the rule of law in public’s awareness. For 
example, in China, this is peculiarly evident in corruption or bribery cases involving 
government officials where the public might indignant to the criminals, but also the 
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whole government functioning.405 In such a situation, this kind of harsh punishment is 
essentially required for conciliating the string resentment rather than punishing the 
individual criminal.406 The Japanese government also claims that  
 
whether to continue or abolish the death penalty should be determined by each country at 
its discretion based on public sentiment, actual conditions of crimes, criminal policies, 
and other factors. As to whether or not we should continue or abolish the death penalty, it 
is a critical issue… and therefore needs to be carefully examined… with the fullest 
attention given to the people’s opinion. Presently, the death penalty is believed to be 
unavoidable by a large number of Japanese people in cases of extremely malicious or 
atrocious crimes.407  
 
To a large extent, governments and politicians in retentionist states are likely to consider 
retaining the death penalty as a ‘political necessity’ 408  that reflects the value of 
democracy and legitimacy of their acts, which is in accordance with the so-called will 
and choice of the majority.409 However, it needs to concede that some would argue the 
whole point of human rights law is to prohibit popular but inhumane practices and by 
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Even in those countries where the death penalty has been abolished for many years, the 
public’s view on the death penalty is still positive, and a sizeable part of the population 
consistently want the death penalty back, which deserve a further exploration. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, according to the YouGov research in 2014, 45% 
people in favour of the reintroduction of the death penalty,410 and 42% British think it 
was a bad thing that the death penalty was abolished in the UK.411 The numbers of 
people support reinstating the death penalty in Australia and Brazil are 52.3% and 55% 
respectively. 412  In the states where the death penalty is lawfully used, Japan for 
example, a large majority of people (85.6%) advocate the death penalty.413  
 
In regard to the public opinion per se, a very important and disputable issue is whether 
and to what extent the public opinion concerning the death penalty is relevant to its 
abolition. Cousin Zilala, Executive Director of Amnesty International Zimbabwe, said, 
‘abolition is necessary to the protection of human rights, but human rights are 
independent of public opinion.’414 As to public opinion, Roger Hood and Carolyn 
Hoyle also mentioned an interesting point that is sometimes overlooked. It is that 
‘where abolition has come about it has not been as a result of the majority of the general 
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public demanding it’415, for this reason, whether or not all public or an absolute majority 
of the public are demanding to repeal the death penalty is not in direct relevance to the 
death penalty abolition. Many abolitionists allege that public opinion should neither be 
the reason for non-abolishment nor the justification for changes in criminal policy. The 
weight and strength of the public support are supposed to be tested prudently.  
 
On the one hand, the formation and reinforcement of public opinion are not always in 
accordance with the rule of law and justice. What is popular is not always the same as 
what is right. This is because the existence and emerging public opinion do not 
consistently and factually reflect the inherent attitude of the public. Instead, it is now 
and then shaped and affected by the mainstream advocacy and people are apt to follow 
what is popular rather than what is absolutely right.416  On the other hand, public 
opinion as a factor in favour of the death penalty has its limitations, particularly in the 
cases where the public’s preference is based on misguided or non-transparent 
information. The public may not know the reality of how the death penalty trials work 
or how the death penalty is carried out.417 As for the death penalty, people back it 
because they stand with the victims and those who are suffering the disastrous 
consequence of crimes. What they see is the evil of crimes and criminals, but the 
procedure of convictions as well as the aggravating circumstances surrounding the 
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crimes are often overlooked. That is to say, it is argued in some circumstances the public 
support for the death penalty is the real public opinion but, in some cases, it is not. 
There is also an argument that the more the people are truly informed of the real fact of 
the death penalty, for example, the conviction of innocents and arbitrarily or 
discriminatory uses, the less they will favour the death penalty.418 In those cases, the 
public’s will and psychology do have a shift from outrage and revenge to sympathy to 
the vulnerable people in the death penalty trial. 
 
In response, a kind of counter-majoritarian argument is often raised,419 albeit debatable. 
Where a (human rights) court or any other authorities prohibit a practice, either the 
imposition of the death penalty or extradition to retentionist states, that is supported by 
the public, it would put itself above and against the majority. The point is that striking 
down the death penalty might protect the human rights of certain people to a certain 
extent, but it is inherently undemocratic when the death penalty is popular and 
supported by the public. From this perspective, the will and perception of the public 
cannot be disregarded in assessing the legitimacy of the government’s policies and 
acts.420 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion to Chapter 3.2 
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Generally speaking, the above discussion presents a sketch about several most 
controversial issues regarding the death penalty. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the 
death penalty is a subject of complexity, and none of the above-mentioned perspective, 
can individually determine the remaining, abolition or resumption of the death penalty. 
On the other hand, the death penalty is not supposed to be debated in a purely abstract 
or theoretically way. It should be discussed in the light of the specific circumstances of 
particular states. It is not the exact purpose of this section and chapter to join the debate 
and take one’s stand in regard to whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, 
and the reasons backing those arguments, which have been explored in a wide variety 
of literature by scholars, politicians, governments and international organisations. 
Instead, it is acknowledged that there are strong arguments against the death penalty 
from different aspects, which is evidenced by the global movement toward the abolition. 
However, those voices from the abolitionists do not overwhelm the presumed 
rationality and benefits of the death penalty advocated by certain retentionist states. 
There are also legitimate arguments in favour of the death penalty. The paradoxical 
views regarding the death penalty, particularly on its deterrence and public opinion, 
indeed proves that a broader consensus or a shared understanding of the essence of the 
death penalty have not been established. 
 
It should be noted that no matter what reasons the death penalty is alleged to be 
remained or abrogated, and no matter what argument should be put forward in respond 




international law that should always be the primary concern in the debate. In other 
words, what matters here is to identify the status quo of the death penalty in 
international law, and its relation to the discussion on the European standard, which 
prohibits to extradite people to retentionist states. It is a non-universal value and thus, 
should be recalibrated to a certain degree. The lawfulness serves not only the 
precondition but also one of the main justifications for the argument in the whole thesis, 
which will be thoroughly expounded. 
 
3.3 The international lawfulness of the death penalty 
3.3.1 Reframing the death penalty in human rights law  
Before attempting to ascertain the status of the death penalty in international law, it 
should be noticed that there is an unsettled issue that is still frequently raised. Namely, 
whether and to what extent the death penalty is a human rights issue? There has always 
been an argument that the death penalty abolition is merely a matter of domestic 
criminal law that is exclusively subjected to the sovereignty of states. Each state should 
have the right to retain the death penalty for whatever grounds, such as ‘purported 
deterrent utility or the cultural preferences and expectations of its citizens.’421 For 
example, some states’ response to the General Assembly’s call for moratorium on the 
use of the death penalty shows their repulsion of being interfered with respect to the 
domestic use of the death penalty, which is a subject of legislation.422 It was alleged 
that the issue of the death penalty abolition had been politicised with a certain degree 
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of international political pressure.423 For example, the representative of the US insists 
that whether or not to retain the death penalty should be decided based on ‘domestic 
democratic practices within countries, consistent with international law’ that does not 
completely exclude the death penalty in all circumstances.424 China is standing firm 
against the international intervention in its use of the death penalty, which is deemed as 
the internal affair of China based on the specific social conditions and therefore, needs 
to be respected.425 The delegates from other retentionist states such as Japan, Singapore 
and Egypt also present similar opinion to justify their legitimate use of the death 
penalty.426 The argument for the death penalty as a matter of domestic criminal justice 
rather than international human rights is one of the main barriers against the global 
abolitionist movement. 
 
Indeed, there was a shift in the past decades for the debate of the death penalty being 
embedded in human rights course, along with ‘a broadening and deepening human 
rights consciousness that moved from marginality onto the center stage of international 
politics…’427 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have devised a phrase of ‘new dynamic’ 
to generalise the evolving process of the acceptance of reframing the death penalty 
abolition in human rights law.428 It is evidenced by the fact that increasing number of 
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international human rights treaties and protocols with the commitment to abolish the 
death penalty; the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and that of other 
regional human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
3.3.1.1 Some reflections on retentionist states’ practice 
The difficulty that retentionist states confront is mostly prominent not only in their 
international reputation on human rights records, but also the barrier in their attempt to 
cooperate with other abolitionist states in criminal matters. Taking China for example, 
it is putting every effort to negotiate and establish the full extradition relations with 
more states particularly the Western states so as to build an active international network 
with legally binding agreements to combat transnational crime. However, it did not 
progress swimmingly. The decision to sign or ratify an extradition treaty with China 
has aroused huge controversies.429 The practice of extradition with China has also been 
criticised. For example, in the China-Spain joint operation (Great Wall Operation) 
targeting 1.2 hundred million RMB telecom scam,430 the Chinese government made an 
extradition request to Spain in January 2017 based on their bilateral extradition treaty 
signed in 2005.431 In the following two years and a half until 07 June 2019, Spain has 
arrested 237 suspects and extradited 225 suspects to Mainland China. The Spanish 
government’s decision to extradite causes excessive denunciation. The UN High 
 
429 See Philip Wen, ‘Ratification of Extradition Treaty with China Delayed as ‘Real Doubts’ Emerge’ <htt
ps://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/ratification-of-extradition-treaty-with-china-delayed-as-real-doubts-emerge-
20161122-gsuu8p.html> accessed 24 December 2018; Jonathan Manthorpe, An Extradition Treaty with Chi
na is a Dangerous Idea (ipolitics 2016). 
430 For case details, see Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Success of the China-Spain 
Joint Pperation’ <http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2253534/n2253535/c6523928/content.html> accessed 10 August 2019.  
431 Furthermore, both China and Spain are state parties to UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 




Commissioner for Human Rights recently released a statement to urge the Spanish 
government to stop further extradition. A number of ‘human rights experts’ also 
commented that extraditing those suspects to China to face the fraud trial ‘contravenes 
Spain’s international commitment to refrain from expelling, returning or extraditing 
people to any State where there are well-founded reasons to believe that they might be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.’432 In practice, it is not difficult to find some 
Western human rights groups and legal scholars have long delivered condemnation and 
doubt to the Chinese legal system’s independence, transparency and impartiality. To be 
more precise, the human rights records,433 among which the high rate of death penalty 
execution and the associated human rights violations constitute the primary target of 
the denouncement.434 In spite of this fact, it is interesting and necessary to mention that 
China’s value of extradition has already been backed up by many of the European 
Union member states through ratifying the extradition treaty, including France, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria. More than 260 fugitives have been 
extradited to China from states in different regions, which ‘fully testifies to the 
international community’s confidence in China’s judicial system.’435 It goes out of the 
scope of this thesis to either savage or defend the judicial system of China, but only to 
 
432 See UNCHR, UN Human Rights Experts Urge Spain to Halt Extraditions to China Fearing Risk of Torture or 
Death Penalty (2018). 
433 For example, in above Spain-China extradition case, the UN human rights experts’ only concern is that the 
extradition would subject those suspects to the threat of torture and the death penalty. However, according to Article 
266 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, as for fraud, the maximum punishment for those 
involving extremely large amount money or property and in the most serious cases is ten years or life imprisonment, 
rather than the death penalty. And also, they do not provide any evidence to prove the risk of torture or other ill-
treatment in this specific case, where the burden of proof is on the fugitives concerned, rather than the Chinese 
government.   
434 It is beyond the purpose of this thesis to make comments on those appraisals about human rights in China. 
435 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng 




demonstrate that the human rights, inter alia, the death penalty dilemma of China’s 
effort to engage in international extradition.  
 
It is undoubtedly true that sovereign states are empowered with the right to determine 
their own legal system and policies, to retain and enforce particular kinds of 
punishments in their national criminal justice on the grounds of their discretion. 
However, as has been reaffirmed in Resolution on Moratorium on the Use of the Death 
Penalty, 436  such right is not unrestrained. It must be consistent with general 
international law, and the issues of the death penalty cannot be investigated at the 
national level only without considering states’ human rights obligations regarding the 
most fundamental human rights of criminals.437 The use of the death penalty implicates 
people’s fundamental human rights and human dignity with the backup of international 
human rights law, which is also the legal basis and driving force of the international 
campaign of the death penalty abolition. In such cases, those human rights treaties 
involving the prohibition of the death penalty, in essence, are limiting states’ internal 
power regarding criminal justice. In the meantime, the abolitionist states take the 
agreement of treaties prohibiting the death penalty as a sign that abolition is becoming 
an international obligation. However, even if it is becoming so, it has not yet. 
 
3.3.1.2 The death penalty in international human rights treaties 
 
436 UNGA, A/RES/73/175 (n 325) para. 1. It is the ‘sovereign right of all countries to develop their own legal 
systems, including determining appropriate legal penalties, in accordance with their international law obligations.’  




The death penalty and its application are clearly dealt with in a number of international 
conventions. In this section, international human rights treaties will be particularly 
focused. Recalling Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, ‘[e]very human being has the inherent 
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life.’ This paragraph unequivocally underlines the supreme and fundamental status 
of the right to life that is inherently conferred on all human beings.438 Its importance is 
not only embodied in the right per se, but also reflected in its association with all other 
human rights of every human being. Because the existence and guarantee of the right 
to life are ‘prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other human rights and whose content 
can be informed by other human rights.’439 Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the 
right imposes not only the negative but also the positive obligation on states parties to 
protect all individuals’’ right to life.440 However, Art 6(2) of the ICCPR indirectly lists 
the death penalty as a legitimate exception to the right to life so long as the protection 
of those facing the death penalty is fully ensured. That is to say, based on the Covenant 
per se, states are not obliged to completely abolish the death penalty although the use 
of it is supposed to be narrowly restricted.441  
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, as Martin Scheinin asserts, Article 6 of the ICCPR 
does imply its inclination to abolition and provides a ‘programmatic obligation’ for 
those retentionist states to abolish the death penalty.442 If we dig into the essentially 
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440 ibid, para.18-31. 
441 These limitations are categorised into the regulation of the death penalty, which will be discussed later.  




logical order and combine Article 6(2) and Article 6(6), we could find the existence of 
the death penalty exception is just an interim compromise and the abolition is suggested 
as the goal of the Covenant. ‘Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to 
prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present 
Covenant.’443 This paragraph is indicative. It expressly suggests that the restrictive 
requirements set out in paragraph 2-5 should only be referred in accordance with the 
goal of universal abolition, which is considered as a desirable course of the whole 
international community. It also serves as the guidance for those states where the death 
penalty is lawfully applied.444 In William Schabas’s view, it is this paragraph that 
affords the Human Rights Committee with a legal basis to engage in the abolition 
campaign. 445  Nevertheless, the willingness of the ICCPR or the Human Rights 
Committee toward the future worldwide abolition is not in relevance to this topic. What 
matters here is the ICCPR leaves space for retentionists states, or the ICCPR per se 
cannot be taken as an international human rights treaty which endorses the absolute 
death penalty abolition.   
 
Adopted 23 years after the ICCPR, the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights446 is by far the only universal human rights 
treaty which directly aiming at the death penalty abolition. The Protocol does not 
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exclude every possibility of carrying out the death penalty. Reservation on the use of 
the death penalty ‘in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a 
military nature committed during wartime’ is admissible. This means that even if the 
Protocol were universally ratified, it would not guarantee an absolute prohibition of the 
death penalty in all cases for all crimes. Moreover, it should be aware that while the 
ICCPR has 172 State Parties but the number of which to the Second Optional Protocol 
is only 88 with Angola ratified on 2 October 2019 and Armenia signed on 26 September 
2019 but has not ratified.447 From this aspect, it can be easily seen that the gap between 
the ultimate target at the complete abolition of the death penalty and the current progress 
is still apparent at the international level. The existence of the gap is the primary cause 
of the divided approach in dealing with the death penalty issues. In other words, if all 
states were to ratify the Second Optional Protocol or any other universally binding 
convention and utterly abolish the death penalty, the discussion in this research would 
be different. However, it is still premature to anticipate that. The Second Optional 
Protocol, as the ‘additional provisions to the Covenant’,448 does not play its role as 
what the abolitionists expected.  
 
It is also worth noting that regionally, the European Convention on Human rights,449 
the American Convention on Human Rights 450 and the Arab Charter of Human 
 
447 See UN Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter IV, 12’ <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-12&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 12 October 2019. 
448 Second Optional Protocol, Art 6. 
449 European Convention on Human Rights, Art 2. 




Rights,451 all initially admit the death penalty as a lawful exception to the right to life 
in spite of certain limitations.452 Admittedly, while we were examining these treaties, 
the background conditions at the time of adoption, as well as the considerable evolution 
on the death penalty abolition in each regional, have to be considered. More specifically, 
with the establishment of the Protocols to those treaties, including the Sixth and 
Thirteenth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1983 and 
2002 respectively, the 1990 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, as well as the other regional human rights treaties,453 the 
death penalty has become increasingly unfitted and incompatible. The death penalty 
abolition has been taken as a ‘legal reality’454 in certain regions, Europe and Latin 
America particularly. Nevertheless, taking into account the number of states ratifying 
the abolition Protocols455, we can neither draw a conclusion that the death penalty-
related provisions in those original human right treaties have been substituted, nor the 
death penalty has explicitly excluded de jure.  
 
At the present stage, it is clear to work out that the death penalty is not completely 
prohibited in international human rights treaties, although there are protocols do 
 
451 Arab Charter of Human Rights, Arts 5, 10-2. 
452 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights only recognises the right to life in Article 4 as ‘Human beings 
are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may 
be arbitrarily deprived of this right.’ It does not mention the death penalty nor its relation to the right life. It does 
affirm that children are protected against the death sentence in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child; The Resolution on urging the State to envisage a Moratorium on Death Penalty adopted by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2008 indeed gives a push to the abolition movement in African states. 
453 For example, Article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union stipulates that ‘[n]o one 
shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’. 
454 Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty (n 444) 368. 
455 Including one international treaty—Second Optional Protocol, and three regional treaties: Sixth and Thirteenth 




proscribe its application. In other words, there are certain international and regional 
treaties prohibiting the death penalty for their member states only, general international 
treaty law does not, in a legally binding way, prohibit the death penalty in all 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the death penalty’s applicability is largely restricted and 
regulated from different aspects, which will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
3.3.1.3 The death penalty in human rights case law 
If we put the death penalty into the international sphere, rather than solely focusing on 
its domestic application, it is a very fact that refusing to extradite a person to a 
retentionist state to face the death penalty trial or execution is a robust and prevailing 
approach by which the abolitionist states put pressure on retentionist states in the 
context of so-called global abolitionist movement.456 This is extensively reflected in 
the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, which looks at the death penalty 
and extradition both in its case law and its General Comments.457 Nevertheless, a 
particularly relevant point is that the Committee is not in consistency with its standard 
on extradition to the death penalty. As the Committee stated, ‘the Covenant should be 
interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in 
context and in the light of present-day conditions.’458 In this subsection, we will see 
 
456 Hood and Hoyle, The Death Penalty (n 373) 35. 
457  General Comments are issued by the Committee regarding its interpretations of contents of human rights 
provisions (the ICCPR), which are meant to be aimed at all states. Nonetheless, the Committee cannot bind states 
through General Comment, and it cannot necessarily change the status of law. For further details, see Nisuke Ando, 
‘General Comments/Recommendations’ (2008) MPEPIL 1730   
458 Roger Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998, (2003), para. 10.3. 
The phrase of ‘living instrument’ could also be found in the ECHR system, where the ECtHR recognised the 
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that it was move form more permissive to more restrictive. 
 
In Kindler v. Canada case,459 before he escaped to Canada and was arrested there, 
Kindler had been convicted of first degree of murder and kidnapping in Pennsylvania, 
the United States, where the death penalty was punishable. The US requested his 
extradition in July 1985, which was granted one month later. Canada extradited Kindler 
to the US on 26 September 1991 without seeking any assurance against the use of the 
death penalty, which led to Kindler’s claim of violation of his rights under the 
ICCPR.460 Under such circumstances, the case was about whether an abolitionist state 
(Canada), under its Covenant obligations, is legitimate to extradite a person to a 
retentionist state (the US) where he faces the death penalty. In such case, whether 
Article 6 ICCPR requires Canada to request an assurance against the imposition or 
execution of the death penalty.  
 
In this case, the Human Rights Committee observed that, as Article 6 does not prohibit 
the death penalty, albeit in limited circumstances for the most serious crimes, the only 
situation that engages Canada’s violation of Article 6(1) is that extraditing Kindler to 
the US would expose him to a real risk of a violation of Article 6(2).461 The Committee 
was of the opinion that the obligations under Article 6 do not definitely require Canada, 
which had abolished the death penalty with exceptions, to refuse the extradition request 
 
459 Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993) 
460 Before the case was brought to the Human Rights Committee, Kindler’s appeals against the Minister of Justice’s 
decision to extradition had been refused in domestic courts (the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada), see ibid, para. 2.4 




from a state where the death penalty is remained, or to seek assurances against the 
imposition or execution of the death penalty upon the requested individual’s return.462 
This means, as the Committee noted, the decision to extradite or seek assurances fall 
within State Parties’ discretion. As Canada’s decision on not to seek assurances from 
the US was not taken in an arbitrary or summary manner, there was no violation of 
Article 6 in this regard. 463  With respect to Kindler’s right under Article 7, the 
Committee observed the death penalty was permitted under Article 6(2), which did not 
contradict Article 7,464 and no other potential aspects of the death penalty in this case, 
constituted a violation of Article 7 by Canada.465   
 
However, in Roger Judge v. Canada case, the Human Rights Committee entirely 
overturned its own decision in Kindler case, which was made almost a decade ago and 
was deemed as cannot accommodate the evolving need of life protection.466  It is 
considered that abolitionist states have more obligations under Article 6 than the states 
where the death penalty is remained.467 As an abolitionist State Party to the ICCPR, 
Canada cannot invoke the exception to the right to life incorporated in paragraphs (2) 
to (6) of Article 6 to justify its decision to deport Judge to suffer the risk of the death 
penalty.468 In this case, before issued the deportation order, Canada did not take any 
measures to assure the non-execution of the death penalty upon Judge’s arrival at the 
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467 ibid, para. 10.5. 




United State,469 and thus can be seen as directly subjecting Judge to the foreseeable 
threat of the right to life. Under this circumstance, whether the death penalty was 
executed by Canada itself was irrelevant to its breach of the Covenant. According to 
the Committee’s statement, as a state had abolished the death penalty, Canada’s 
approval to deport Judge to the United States without obtaining the assurance that the 
death penalty would not be carried out, indeed ‘[…] established the crucial link in the 
causal chain that would make possible the execution of the author.’470 This is because 
that Judge’s life might not be in immediate threat or consequently deprived without 
Canada’s permission to remove. Namely, the deportation greatly facilitated the 
completion of the death penalty in this case. Against this background, deporting or 
removing by any other means a person to a retentionist state where he will face the 
death penalty can be simply understood as the breach of an abolitionist state’s obligation 
under Article 6, unless sufficient assurances are guaranteed to secure the execution 
would not be enforced. As the Committee observed: 
 
For countries that have abolished the death penalty, there is an obligation not to expose a 
person to the real risk of its application. Thus, they may not remove, either by deportation 
or extradition, individuals from their jurisdiction if it may be reasonably anticipated that 
they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death sentence would not be 
carried out.471 
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The Committee justified the discordance of its jurisprudence as ‘an inevitable 
consequence of the wording of the provision itself’472 by manifesting the exceptional 
changes concerning the death penalty since the judgment of Kindler case. On the one 
hand, there have been increasing global highlights on the right arising from Article 6 
and ‘a broadening international consensus in favour of the abolition of the death 
penalty’. On the other hand, the Committee recognised that Canada itself had 
experienced considerable legal developments in terms of the death penalty issue. It did 
make it clear the necessity to guarantee the people under the extradition or deportation 
order to any other retentionist states where the people concerned are subjected to the 
death penalty and in particular, sufficient assurances are required in most of the cases. 
 
From Kindler case to Judge case, it can be found that the substantial changes in the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee had exactly indicated an evolving or 
dynamic development of the mainstream attitude toward the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, this evolutive approach cannot settle down the doubt concerning the 
doubled standard that the Committee adopts in dealing with the death penalty cases. 
Namely, when the case is brought to the Human Rights Committee, the abolitionist and 
retentionist states are treated differently as regards their obligations under Article 6 and 
the gap is still there. Taking together with Article 6(1) and Article 6(2), the lawfully 
carried out the death penalty still remains a legitimate exception to the right to life, the 
 




Committee’s view in Judge case should only be taken as a compromise rather than a 
resolution to the problem. To be more precise, although the description on how 
international judicial authorities’ standpoints on this similar issue have changed can 
also be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,473 considerable 
distinctions should be noted. Unlike the European system, the legal basis for the Human 
Rights Committee to determine its State Parties’ obligation in extradition to the death 
penalty is primarily Article 6 of the ICCPR and the Second Optional Protocol. However, 
considering the latter’s insufficient number of State Parties, it is plausible to argue that 
the Human Rights Committee does not have a solid legal basis, as the ECtHR has, to 
prohibit its States Parties from extraditing to a retentionist state, at least not at this stage. 
 
3.3.2 The death penalty in international custom 
3.3.2.1 A brief note on customary international law identification 
This section will inquire the legal status of the death penalty in customary international 
law and demonstrate that it is not conclusively prohibited. Nevertheless, the use of the 
death penalty is strictly subject to regulation. Customary international law, with limited 
exception,474 ‘have equal force for all members of the international community, and 
cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will 
 
473 Since Soering case, the Court’s attitude to the death penalty has considerably changed until Al-Saadoon and 
Mufhdi case. Details concerning the European standard on the death penalty will be further discussed in the 
extradition context in Chapter 4. 
474 Unless a state is a persistent objector to a rule of customary international law. There are rigorous requirements 
for states to express the objecting arguments in terms of the timing and the way to object. See James Green, The 
Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (OUP 2018); Brian Lepard, Customary International Law: A New 
Theory with Practical Applications (CUP 2010) 229-42. It also should be noted that, unlike general customary 
international law, particular customary law might have limited scope of application to specific states only. See also 




by any one of them in its own favour.’475 For the purpose of this research, customary 
international law is highly relevant since if it were ascertained, the customary nature 
would equip the death penalty abolition with the most forceful and irresistible backup 
and also the driving force behind the international campaign against the death penalty. 
In the other words, at this stage, in the absence of a universally legal binding treaty that 
absolutely prohibiting the death penalty in all circumstances, it is very important to 
identify whether there is a plausible argument that the death penalty is prohibited in 
customary international law.476 The rules of custom would justify the abolitionists’ 
allegation against the retentionists’ use of the death penalty.   
 
As an important constituent of the sources of international law listed in Article 38(1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the rule of international custom is 
regarded ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’477 The wide recognition 
of this well-known extraction and the derived two-element approach has not helped to 
settle the huge debates. Identifying the existence and content of customary international 
law is still an area of great controversies and obscurities, with many other competing 
methodologies to do so.478 For the specific issue concerned in this thesis, it is disputed 
whether the two-element approach is applied to all fields of international law. Namely, 
 
475 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 63. 
476 Wouter and Others (n 9) 137. 
477 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, 
Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 184. 
478 For example, it is questioned that whether the approach is still valid today? Whether one element predominates 
over the other? Whether the two elements method should be replaced by the one element theory? See Hugh Thirlway, 
The Sources of International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019) 64-70; Maurice Mendelson, ‘The subjective Element in 
Customary International Law’ (1996) 66 British Year Book of International Law 177-208; Jörg Kammerhofer, 
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does it equally apply to the death penalty-related or other human rights norms?479 In 
response, Michael Wood has explained the point that the general two-element approach 
is applied to all fields of international law, without exception to human rights law.480 
Nevertheless, the specific context of different rules in cases may be varying and should 
be taken into consideration, which leads to a case-to-case analysis.481  
 
It beyond the purpose of this thesis to go that far to address all those controversies 
regarding the methodology itself. In this section, the orthodox and ‘conservative’ two-
element approach will be followed, with reference to the International Law 
Commission’s recent work on Identification of Customary International Law, which 
supplies abundant empirical experiences and theoretical elucidations in terms of this 
topic.482 Nevertheless, it has to admit that identifying the existence and content of rules 
of customary international law is extremely complicated and the application of this 
methodology also involves a large number of issues upon which the agreement is very 
hard to be reached.483 Before getting to the main argument, the section will start with 
a brief explanation of the methodology, which is also exemplified, for example, by the 
 
479 For example, see Hugh Thirlway, ‘Human Rights in Customary Law: An Attempt to Define Some of the Issues’ 
(2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 497-50; Steven Wheatley, The Idea of International Human Rights 
Law (OUP 2019) 130-3. 
480 Michael Wood, Distinguished Lecture of the Academy of European Law: Customary International Law and 
Human Rights (European University Institute 2016) 4, 11 (‘the standard approach…is perfectly possible in the fields 
of human rights just as it is in all other fields of international law.’; ‘both the two-element approach and the other 
considerations… are flexible enough to encompass the field of customary international human rights law.’) 
481 Hugh Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination of the Continuing Role of 
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482 See International Law Commission, Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael 
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International Committee of the Red Cross’s study of customary international law on 
armed conflict, albeit in dispute.484  
 
Based on the two-element approach, customary international law is generally accepted 
as being consist of general practice and opinio juris,485 which is a combination of 
objective and subjective requirements.486 In other words, a customary rule is only 
formulated by the ‘sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent 
practice’487 with indications that the practice is derived from a legally binding rule. A 
new rule of customary international law will not be created unless both two 
requirements are established. In the landmark North Sea Continental Shelf case, the 
interrelation between state practice and opinio juris is elucidated as  
 
[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, 
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., 
the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitua1 character of the acts is not 
 
484 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol I: Rules 
(CUP 2005) xxxvii-xlvii. 
485 ‘A rule of customary international law is one which is created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice 
of States and other subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international legal relations, in 
circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future.’ See International Law 
Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final Report of the Committee: 
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486 Crawford (n 13) 21-5. 
487 See ILC Draft conclusion 8 with commentaries. Technically, not only the practice of states, but also the practice 
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in itself enough.488 
 
In ascertaining and abstracting the general practice and opinion juris, various kinds of 
materials are of relevance and significance.489 In Michael Wood’s view, treaties and 
resolutions of international organisations are two types of materials that particularly 
relevant in relation to the identification of customary human rights rules. 490 
Nonetheless, it by no means say other materials such as judicial decisions are not 
important. The intricate relationship between treaty491 and customary international law 
is crucial. On the one hand, treaty and custom are two sources of international law listed 
in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. On the other hand, treaty plays a highly significant role 
in identifying the existence, content and evolvement of customary international law, 
particularly in human rights law. Nevertheless, treaty law indeed complicates the 
identification of custom. As Hugh Thirlway claimed, ‘acts by a party subsequent to, and 
consistent with, the treaty must be taken to have been performed pursuant to the treaty, 
and thus cannot constitute practice in support of an asserted costmary rule.’492  In 
contrast, in James Crawford’s opinion, ‘[n]on-parties may by their conduct accept the 
provisions of a convention as representing customary international law.’ 493  The 
response to the treaty norms from non-state parties or between parties and non-parties 
is relevant.494    
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Treaties are capable of reflecting or codifying the pre-existing rules of customary 
international law and more importantly, 495  treaties contribute to the creation and 
development of new rules of customary international law. According to the ICJ’s 
judgment in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta) case,  
 
‘[i]t’ is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked 
for primarily in the actual practice and opinion juris of States, even though multilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving 
from custom, or indeed in developing them.496  
 
Although treaty cannot by itself create customary rules, 497  states’ behaviours 
associated with treaties, such as negotiation, signature, ratification and implementation 
of treaties, not only provide evidence of general practice, but also manifest states’ 
underlying view of practice and identify the existence of opinio juris.498  
   
In spite of the importance of customary international law, sometimes it is argued that 
that along with the spread of the codified treaties, there may be less resort to the 
 
495 For a discussion on the codified treaties and their relevance to customary norms, see Theodor Meron, Human 
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Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 723. 




customary rules.499 For example, international human rights law is regarded as treaty 
law in essence. Issues discussed, controversies resolved, and violations determined are 
largely based on the applicable human rights treaties.500 Nonetheless, custom still plays 
its indispensable role.501  As Michael Wood explains ‘customary international law 
remains the bedrock of international law’.502 It will continue to be applied especially 
to the issues that are not regulated by treaties,503 to the relations and conflicts with and 
between non-parties. 504  While treaty norms and customary rules are concurrent, 
custom is referred in interpreting and applying the treaty provision.505  
 
Resolutions of international organisations and intergovernmental conferences alone are 
not capable of creating customary international law,506 which is still needed to identify 
that the contents of resolution are responding to the two-element standard. 507 
Nevertheless, resolutions, especially those adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly, are of values of evidencing the existence of customary international law.508 
In the situation where a unanimous consensus is reached and reflected in many 
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resolutions on the same topic, there is an argument that it will serve as evidence of 
states’ acceptance of a rule of conduct and a recognition that observing that rule of 
conduct is legally required. As the International Court of Justice stated in Nicaragua 
case, ‘[t]he effect of consent to the text of such resolutions…may be understood as an 
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by 
themselves.’509  
 
However, it also should be noted that while evaluating the weight of the resolution 
adopted either by international organisations or international conferences, the authentic 
and inherent motivation behind it is difficult to examine. This is primarily due to the 
political influence over the states’ decision on certain issues. That is to say, to what 
extent it is the legal concerns that result in the particular decision on the resolution is 
the question deserved to disclose in specific cases.  
 
Briefly speaking, in determining customary international law of human rights, what 
matters is still whether there is sufficient evidence presented and recognised as state 
practice and simultaneously, whether that practice implies the opinio juris of the state 
involved.510 For example, as Steven Wheatley observes,  
 
‘we have to point to its acceptance by the international community, invariably in the form 
of a law-making treaty or General Assembly resolution, we must be able to observe 
 
509 Nicaragua case, para. 188. 




repeated invocations of the norm in diplomatic communications or domestic measures of 
implementation, and show the norm is accepted as a benchmark for evaluating the conduct 
of states by other states.’511  
 
3.3.2.2 The death penalty in customary international law 
In order to demonstrate whether or not the death penalty per se is customarily prohibited, 
it is necessary to evaluate whether the issue concerned is backed by general practice 
that is accepted by law. However, referring to either the ILC’s long-term work on the 
identification of customary international law or the immense amount of literature on 
this topic, identifying whether a specific rule is of customary nature is neither 
straightforward nor unified.512 Prohibitive rules in particular,513 for example, the rule 
of prohibition of the death penalty, it is problematic either to establish an extensively 
general, uniform and consistent practice of the non-use of the death penalty, or to verify 
that any abstention or inaction is stemming from a sense of legal right or obligation, 
which will be explored in turn.  
 
With respect to the assessment of generality of the death penalty (abolition), a number 
of facts should be taken into account. Necessarily, it is required that the state practice 
on death penalty abolition needs to be ‘sufficiently widespread and representative, as 
 
511 Wheatley (n 479) 158. 
512 For example, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Erik Voeten, ‘Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary 
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well as consistent’ 514 . To be more precise, although universal participation is not 
necessary, the state practice still needs to be extensively general, particularly 
concerning those ‘specially affected States’515. Considering the nature of the death 
penalty in criminal law, it should be equally relevant to virtually all states, who may 
have a legal interest to use or not use the death penalty domestically. Nevertheless, a 
qualitative method does place much importance upon the size of the population that 
those retentionist states represent rather than the number of abolitionist states.516 Under 
such case, although the number of abolitionist states has outweighed that of retentionist 
states, and an increasing number of states are adopting the moratorium on the death 
penalty, it is very important that the number of people living under the threat from the 
lawful death penalty in those minority retentionist states is overwhelming. 517  By 
calculation, at least 4.85 billion people are living in 56 retentionist states,518  not 
including those who live in de facto abolitionist states and are still suffering the risk of 
potential resumption.  
 
Furthermore, in contrast to Europe 519  and Americas 520 , Asia notably remains a 
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retentionist region with the largest number of executions.521 Many other executions are 
recorded in African and Caribbean states as well. In total, there are still 56 retentionist 
states. In 2019 only, according to the statistics given in the above section, the numbers 
of the use of the death penalty, either death sentences or executions, were still 
remarkable. For the above reason, it is fair to say current state practice on the death 
penalty abolition does not qualify itself as extensively widespread and representative.       
 
In regard to the consistency of the death penalty (abolition), a pertinent issue is that 
breaking a rule does not necessarily negate it. It is saying that the non-observation of a 
particular rule does not necessarily imply the non-existence of the customary nature or 
the emergence of a new rule, which is unequivocally explained by the International 
Court of Justice in Nicaragua case: 
 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order 
to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct 
of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of 
that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.522 
 
373) 70-4. 
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It is true that ‘completely uniformity of practice’ is not required for ascertaining the 
customary status, but ‘virtual and substantial uniformity’ is necessary. 523  For the 
subject of this chapter, while ascertaining the general practice in the matter of the death 
penalty abolition, it is a question that whether and to what extent retaining the death 
penalty is qualified as a breach of a rule, the non-existence of that rule or the creation 
of a new rule. That is to say, states’ practice ‘should have been both extensively and 
virtually uniform’ in the death penalty abolition. If the opposition or non-observation 
of a particular rule (prohibiting the death penalty) were found in the practice of 
numerous states, the requirement for being a rule of customary international law would 
not be satisfied. Obviously, as analysed in the above section, it has not been the fact. 
This is further defended by the ‘setbacks’ of the death penalty abolition trend, as 
revealed in Section 3.1. Many de facto or de jure abolitionist states had reintroduced 
the death penalty, lifted the moratorium or made some attempts to that. In those states, 
it has always been a debated issue that whether the death penalty should be taken as an 
option in responding to the extremely notorious crimes,524 particularly in the context 
of globalised criminality. 
 
Treaties, which have been explored as regards the death penalty and its abolition in the 
previous section, largely demonstrate the status of the death penalty in international 
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human rights law. Several points related to those treaties are worth mentioning for the 
purpose of custom identification. At first, the only universal treaty prohibiting the death 
penalty, Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR plays a very limited role in 
demonstrating the rule of custom. On the one hand, considering the ‘degree of 
ratification’,525 the Protocol itself has not been widely accepted based on the number 
of State Parties. Furthermore, the practice outside the Protocol is undoubtedly 
contradictory, which could be easily proved by the number of the death sentence and 
execution in different states. On the other hand, the Protocol per se does not absolutely 
prohibit the death penalty in all cases, unlike Protocol No.13 to the ECHR, the Protocol 
set out the exception which allow State Parties to make a reservation for the use of the 
death penalty ‘in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a 
military nature committed during wartime.’ 526  Although reservations do not 
necessarily mean the non-existence of customary rule, it indeed lessens the weight to 
this abolitionist treaty in the identification of customary international law.527  
 
More importantly, it is not difficult to find that the number of treaties or legal 
instruments concerning the regulation or restriction of the use of the death penalty is 
much more than that of treaties or legal instruments on the death penalty prohibition. 
While assessing the prohibition of the death penalty in customary international law, its 
relevance to the regulation of the death penalty, which will be discussed later, is worthy 
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of being noted, which directly manifests the status quo of the death penalty. Simply put, 
the existence of a great deal of regulation on the death penalty is indeed the persuasive 
evidence that it has not been customarily prohibited, at least yet. Because if the death 
penalty were absolutely prohibited, there would be no such regulation to limit its 
application and safeguard those people subjected to the death penalty. Nevertheless, I 
would advocate in favour of those retentionist states abiding by the regulation to the 
greatest extent if they are to remain retentionist. 
 
As examined in Section 3.1, although the successive Resolutions on Moratorium on the 
Use of the Death Penalty, do not themselves create a rule of customary international 
law, they have often been taken as the important evidence supporting the death penalty 
abolition and its legitimacy. However, from the perspective of customary international 
law, they are not so decisive as to whether there is a universal customary norm to the 
same effect. To be more precise, considering the negative votes and abstentions,528 as 
well as the practice of those states that did not vote in favour of the resolutions, there 
were not any persuasive evidence arising out of those resolutions.  
  
Admittedly, it is the fact that no contemporary international criminal court and tribunal 
uses the death penalty as a possible punishment,529 irrespective of the jurisdiction and 
the crime concerned. The major international criminal tribunals, including the 
 
528 As for the 7th Resolution, 35 states voted against, 32 states voted abstentions and 5 states did not present. 
529 The death penalty was applied in the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials against war criminals in World War II. See 




International Criminal Court,530 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia,531 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,532 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon533 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,534 all preclude the death penalty. From William 
Schabas’s view, the exclusion of the death penalty from the statute of the international 
criminal courts and tribunals indicates that this kind of punishment is in contradiction 
with contemporary values of international criminal law where human rights has been a 
critical concern. 535  To a limited extent, the above fact delivers a message of the 
inappropriateness of the death penalty. In other words, it runs counter to the 
international criminal justice, especially in the development of international criminal 
cooperation including extradition. 536  The death penalty is prohibited by the 
international criminal courts even for most hateful and outrageous crimes, a fortiori for 
a less serious petty crime.537 However, evaluating the weight of this exclusion, which 
can also be taken as the decision of international courts, should be in keeping with the 
methodology adopted in identifying the customary international law. That is to say, this 
exclusion can only be accepted as one relevant factor in determining whether the death 
penalty is prohibited in customary international law while many other elements are 
required for evidence. Nevertheless, the non-use of the death penalty by the 
international courts also raises the problem of the double standard. As Carsten Stahn 
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points out, while the high-level criminals are exempted from the death penalty before 
the ICTR, the mid- and lower-level prisoners are still suffering the death sentence or 
execution in Rwanda before the domestic court.538  
 
With respect to the subjective element of opinion juris, even in those de jure or de facto 
abolitionist states, it needs to evaluate the extent to which their decision is stemming 
from a sense of legal obligation. For example, considering the relevance of the death 
penalty in extradition and deportation cases, the receiving state’s undertaking against 
the use the death penalty is undoubtedly attributed to the requirement or precondition 
set by the extraditing or deporting state, rather than the rule of law, which are two 
different beliefs that should be distinguished. Besides, the fact that European states have 
chosen to sign the regional treaty prohibiting the death penalty cannot necessarily 
indicate that they are under a wide international legal obligation, as it is required as a 
precondition for joining either the Council of Europe or the European Union, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
In a similar vein, it is not convincing that all abolitionist states who abolished the death 
penalty because they think they are legally binding to do it. Instead, various reasons 
might be taken into account. For example, some states abolish the death penalty because 
they think it is not useful or effective in deterring serious crime. Some states might care 
more about their international reputation and retaining the death penalty will bring more 
 




difficulties to their attempts to international relation and cooperation. Furthermore, 
from the economic perspective, many states might merely think the application of the 
death penalty is not necessarily a cheap option. Simply put, in many jurisdictions, 
criminals may spend a very long time on the death row. Because of the finality of this 
kind of punishment, there will typically be a protracted process of appeals and judicial 
reviews, which is very expensive to get through and cost a lot of money. 
 
To sum up, taking all above factors together, it does not suffice to demonstrate that there 
is ‘sufficiently widespread and representative as well as consistent practice accepted as 
law’ that the death penalty is prohibited in all circumstances, at least not at this stage. 
In other words, lawfully carrying out the death penalty remains an exception to the right 
to life in customary international law. Until the complete abolition is realised all over 
the world, or the abolition qualifies as a rule of customary international law, the 
application of the death penalty is still a topical issue and the regulation of the death 
penalty is essential. Therefore, the primary issue is not whether international law 
unequivocally prohibits granting extradition to a retentionist state, arguably it does not, 
but instead, whether rules regulating the death penalty are observed by the state seeking 
extradition. Simply put, it is imperative to address the international regulation of the 
death penalty in those retentionist countries, rather than merely to oblige them to 
abrogate the death penalty which has been proved unrealisable in the short term. 
 




The death penalty is not an isolated issue, which is not just about the death and the right 
to life. More importantly, it associates with a wide range of collateral rights, for 
example, the right to a fair trial and the right to be free from torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.539 These rights from various perspectives are well 
incarnated in the international regulation of the death penalty, which is a concept put 
forward to determine the legitimacy of the use of the death penalty in specific cases or 
to qualify the death penalty as ‘lawful application’.  
 
As discussed above, the death penalty is neither prohibited in universal treaty law nor 
prohibited in customary international law. In practice, it is not universally abolished by 
all states in law or practice. Nevertheless, states’ power to impose and execute the death 
punishment is not unconfined. It has to be substantively regulated by a number of 
requirements. International law does explicitly set out various restrictions on the use of 
the death penalty and prohibitions for certain categories and situations. That is to say, 
it is required to guarantee that ‘all the procedures for applying the death penalty from 
arrest to final appeal’540 are consistent with the minimum international substantive and 
procedural safeguards for people facing the death penalty. Against this background, this 
thesis claims that the issue of the death penalty per se and the issue of the international 
regulation of the death penalty are intertwined. The necessity of the regulation is 
primarily attributed to the status of the death penalty in international law. While the 
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former also justify the fact that, as discussed above, the death penalty is not yet 
prohibited in international law.   
 
International regulation of the death penalty has been a prevalent subject in a number 
of treaties. Article 6 of the ICCPR, which leaves a room for the application of the death 
penalty in limited cases as ‘a quite exceptional measure’541. In spite of a view of total 
abolition, Article 6 sets out a variety of strict restrictions only under which the death 
penalty could be carried out in those countries the death penalty still lawfully exists. 
The regulation of the death penalty embodied in Articles 6 and 14 of the ICCPR is 
further specified and extended in the UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 
1984/50, the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the 
Death Penalty (hereinafter the Safeguards).542 The Safeguards is deemed as one of the 
most significant instruments, which provides the procedural protection of people who 
are subjected to the death penalty in current retentionist states.543 The Safeguards is 
composed of a set of internationally recognised standards. It incorporates almost all 
related aspects of the regulation of the death penalty, from the fundamental procedural 
safeguards of the criminal trial to the exemption of specific categories of offenders, and 
the most controversial issues regarding ‘the most serious crimes’ to which the death 
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penalty is allowed to be applied. Furthermore, it is applied to all Contracting Parties, 
including those are not state parties to relevant treaties.544  
 
In fact, regulation deals with a large number of issues and involves almost every aspect 
of the death penalty case. This section is intended to briefly examine some of the most 
important regulation, which is primarily categorised into three aspects: the type of 
crimes punishable by the death penalty; protected categories of offenders against the 
death penalty; procedural safeguards of the people facing the death penalty. 545 
Unequivocally, many other aspects of regulation are involved in the death penalty, 
which might not fit into these three categories but are equally important. For example, 
the legality of the death penalty is often appraised in the context of the right to be free 
from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 7 of the 
ICCPR, albeit under heated debate. The regulation in relation to Article 7 also takes 
place in the whole process of the death penalty trial, the pre-trial investigation and 
obtaining evidence for example, but with particular significance in the following two 
areas: the condition of the death row detention and the execution methods.546 Besides, 
it has always been a contentious issue on whether the death penalty per se constitutes 
torture or other ill-treatment, which will be analysed in Chapter 4, with an evolutive 
standard interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
544 UNCHR, ‘Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of 
Those Facing the Death Penalty’, UN. Doc. E/2015/49 (13 April 2015), para. 61. ‘That the safeguards may be 
considered the general law applicable on the subject of capital punishment, even for those States that have not 
assumed any treaty obligations whatsoever with respect to the imposition of the death penalty…’ 
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3.4.1 The most serious crimes 
It is the general principle of criminal law that the penalty must not be disproportionately 
imposed.547 As for the death penalty, it should only be applied to crimes that are severe 
enough so as to qualify the most extreme punishment. The principle is definite, but the 
scope to which the death penalty can be used in practice is always contentious. The 
most commonly used phrase ‘the most serious crimes’ is summarised without any 
explicit definition or enumeration and thus has not reached an agreement on it 
application.548  Nevertheless, it is accepted that this standard is established for the 
purpose of progressively restricting the application549 from the nature of the offence or 
namely, the gravity of the offence, with a view to eventually abolish the death penalty. 
Ideally, this is supposed to be the most straightforward way to limit the use of the death 
penalty by reducing the number of death penalty-punishable offences. However, it does 
not settle the dispute upon capital punishable crimes in different jurisdictions.  
 
This standard per se has been long accepted by the international community and widely 
embodied in a number of human rights treaties, General Assembly Resolutions, 
decisions of human rights bodies and retentionist states’ domestic legislation. For 
example, both Article 6(2) of the ICCPR and Article 4(2) of the ACHR restrict the death 
penalty to the most serious crimes only, without any further clarification on either the 
 
547 For details, see ‘retributive justice’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Retributive Justice’ <https://
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meaning or the scope of the standard. The Safeguards did a bit more in this regard as 
stating that the scope of the most serious crimes ‘should not go beyond intentional 
crimes with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.’550 Furthermore, the Human 
Rights Committee stresses that retentionist states have an obligation to make sure their 
domestic use of the death penalty is only for the most serious crimes,551 which ‘must 
be read restrictively and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity, involving 
intentional killing.’552 Crimes that do not directly and deliberately lead to the loss of 
life would not warrant the death penalty. Therefore, certain offences are automatically 
excluded based on this criterion, including but not limited to corruption and other 
economic crimes, political crimes, abduction, drug and sexual crimes.553 The scope of 
capital offences is also remarkably shrinking, which could be seen in China, the number 
of the death penalty punishable crimes in its criminal law has declined from the highest 
73 in 1995 to the current 44.554 In Vietnam, the number of capital crimes was declined 
from 44 to 29 in 1999, and further seven types of crimes were repealed in 2009, which 
resulted in 22 death-eligible crimes in total in the Vietnam Penal Code.555 
 
However, the above observation does not mean crimes other than intentional murder 
are not publishable by the death penalty. Substantial differences in punishment for the 
same or similar crime in different states is an undeniable fact. In practice, crimes are 
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551 General Comment No. 6, para. 6. 
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still understood and interpreted differently in varying time and places.556 What crimes 
fall into this range of crimes is different in places with various cultural, religious, 
political and social grounds. Therefore, in some cases, ‘what may seem by some to be 
a disproportionate penalty in such serious offences and odious conduct may be seen by 
others as appropriate and just punishment.’557 For example, as regards some categories 
of offence, particular terrorism that is lack of a definitive scope and may contain a 
number of different specific ‘collateral’ crimes, to what extent a terrorism-related crime 
qualifies ‘the most serious crime’ cannot always reach an agreement. Besides, in some 
states, the result of the crime is not the only way to decide whether the death penalty 
should be applied. As maintained by Martin Scheinin, the attention should not be 
merely placed on the gravity of the consequence, in practice, the evaluation of the 
severity of a crime can be determined by the intention and means of commitment and 
the consequence followed the perpetration.558  
 
Although international law explicitly prohibits the death penalty for specific categories 
of crimes, which has not been fully complied with and responded at the domestic level. 
For many retentionist states, they do not go along with the suggested threshold and 
applying the death penalty based on their own discretion. For instance, the application 
 
556 Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty (n 444) 106-7. 
557 See Nigeria’s response to the Report on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, submitted by Philip 
Alston, delivered by Joseph U Ayalogu, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of Nigeria. UNCHR, ‘Report by the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution, Philp Alston’, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.3 
(14 May 2008), para. 77. 
558 Martin Scheinin, ‘Capital Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Some Issues 
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of the death penalty in Sharia law is quite different from that of the others.559 The extent 
of violence or the consequence of crimes, namely the loss of life is not the sole criterion 
in determining the serious nature. In Muslim majority states, such as Afghanistan, Iran, 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia, adultery committed by married men or women which is 
otherwise not so serious to qualify the death penalty, is one of the Hudud crimes in 
Islamic legal traditions that is serious enough to be punishable by the death. 560 
According to the report from the Hands off Cain, there is an instance that a woman was 
sentenced to death for adultery in December 2017 in Tehran, Iran.561 A very recent 
example about the introduction of the death penalty to non-fatal crimes could be found 
in Brunei, a South-East Asian state with the labels of ‘Muslim majority’ and ‘de facto 
abolition since 1957’. Brunei brought into effect a Sharia-based Islamic penal code in 
2013 and in April 2019, it implemented the second phase which prescribed gay sex and 
adultery publishable by stoning to death.562 Unsurprisingly, the new enactment since 
proposed has been hugely and consistently condemned by the international community. 
For example, the UN High Commission for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet states 
that the new law, if implemented, ‘would enshrine in legislation cruel and inhuman 
punishments that seriously breach international human rights law…[and] mark a 
 
559 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Death as a Penalty in the Sharia’ in Peter Hodgkinson and William Schabas (eds), 
Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition (CUP 2004); Penal Reform International, Sharia Law and the Death 
Penalty: Would Abolition of the Death Penalty be Unfaithful to the Message of Islam? (2015).  
560 ibid. See also, UNCHR, ‘Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of 
the World, Situation of human rights in the Sudan’, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/38/Add.1 (17 May 1999), para. 91; 
UNCHR, ‘Report by the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir, 
UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/39/Add. 1 (6 January 1999), para. 103. 
561  See Hands Off Cain, ‘Iran: Another Women Sentenced to Death for Adultery in Tehran’ 
<http://www.handsoffcain.info/notizia/iran-another-women-sentenced-to-death-for-adultery-in-tehran-30316090> 
accessed 15 March 2018.  
562 Under the global pressure, the Brunei authorities have announced publicly that the new revised law would not 
be enforced. See BBC News, ‘Brunei Says It won’t Enforce Death Penalty for Gay Sex’ 




serious setback for human rights protections for the people of Brunei…’ 563 
Unquestionably, the Brunei example may not turn the global abolition tendency around, 
but it still reflects the fact that the death penalty has not lost its popularity in some 
places. Just as the Sultan of Brunei defended, once the misperceptions about the new 
law are clarified, ‘the merit of the law will be evident’.564  
 
It is beyond the purpose of this section to dig into the crimes and penalties under the 
Sharia law. The example is purported to explain the differences in understanding and 
implementing the standard of the most serious crimes. In this case, it might be difficult 
to come to an agreed list of crimes that are punishable by the death penalty. In contrast, 
certain specific crimes are discussed and determined to be excluded according to the 
criterion of intention, means and consequence of the offence. This can be demonstrated 
in multiple aspects.  
 
Apart from adultery, another noteworthy example of the non-observance of the standard 
of the most serious crimes is ‘drug offence’. It is not unfamiliar to find that states resort 
to the death penalty for those serious drug-related crimes. According to the report from 
the Harm Reduction International, the death penalty is used for drug offences in at least 
35 states, and over the last decade, there were at least 4,366 people being executed for 
 
563 UNCHR, Bachelet Urges Brunei to Stop Entry into Force of “Draconian” New Penal Code (2019). Other 
example can be seen at Amnesty International, ‘Brunei Darussalam: Heinous Punishments to Become Law Next 
Week’ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/brunei-darussalam-heinous-punishments-to-become-law-
next-week/> accessed 13 July 2019. 
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drug offences, among which Iran represented the majority (3,975).565 The commitment 
of drug-related offences such as manufacturing, importation, possessing or trafficking 
certain large amount of drugs is subjected to the death punishment in many countries, 
Iran, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and China for example.566 In 2018, at least 149 people 
were sentenced to the death penalty for drug offences in at least 13 states, among which 
not less than 91 were executed. 
 
The death penalty for drug offences is alleged to be a violation of international law.  
The international community has always taken a firm stand against it as the drug-related 
offences do not meet the threshold of the most serious crimes. 567  This has been 
acknowledged by the UN Secretary General, the Human rights Committee and the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime have stressed the exclusion of drug offences from the death 
penalty.568  Dating back to 1984, successive Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions have raised this issue. For example, Bacre Waly 
Ndiaye did conclude that economic crimes and drug-related offences do not belong to 
the most serious crimes and thus should be free from the death penalty.569 Christof 
Heyns, in his report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, claimed that the use of the death penalty must be justified to be 
 
565 Harm Reduction International, The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2018 (2019). For the full 
report, see Giada Girelli, The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2018 (Harm Reduction 
International 2019).  
566 ibid  
567 UNCHR, ‘Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Manfred Nowak, UN. Doc. A/HRC/10/44 (14 January 2009), para. 66. 
568 UNCHR, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Thailand’, CCPR/CO/84/THA (8 July 
2005), para.14; UNCHR, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sudan’, CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3 
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proportionate to punish the most serious crimes that involve intentional killing.570 As 
regard combating drug offence, all state efforts should be human rights based.571 This 
conclusion has also been reaffirmed by the UN Secretary General in the state where the 
death penalty is still lawfully remained, ‘it should not be imposed for drug-related 
offences and any other ordinary crime that does not meet the threshold of most serious 
crimes.’572  
 
To sum up, as to the ‘most serious crimes’ phrase, which indicates a trend moving 
towards the death penalty abolition through restrictions. Although it is not indisputable, 
the concept per se is virtually the most frequently adopted standard to express the strong 
argument to strictly limit the use of the death penalty by reducing the number of crimes 
to which the death penalty is applicable. However, there has not been a clear and 
universally recognised scope of crimes. As can be seen from the above findings, 
although the threshold of ‘intentional killing’ is suggested, it has not been uniformly 
observed. The drug offence and adultery are just two highlighted examples.573 Until 
the scope of the most serious crimes is widely agreed, it cannot come to a conclusion 
that the principle of the most serious crimes is universally accepted.  
 
Under such circumstances, it has shown that customary rules are limiting the types of 
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573 Further examples of the violations of the most serious crimes standard could be found in UNCHR, ‘Concluding 
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crime for which the death penalty is appropriate and legitmate. Namely, the most 
serious crime. Yet the problem is that beyond that there is some disagreement on those 
crimes themselves. Therefore, it might not indicate sufficient evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris in ascertaining ‘detailed customary rules’ in this regard. Nevertheless, 
it has to admit that the driving force behind the most serious crime regulation is to ‘lead 
retentionist countries along the path to the last stage before complete abolition is 
achieved.’574 
  
3.4.2 Protected categories of offenders 
In addition to defining the scope of the death penalty-punishable crime, prescribing 
certain categories of criminals against the imposition of the death penalty or its 
execution is another essential aspect of the death penalty regulation. It not just promotes 
the restrictive application of the death penalty pending the ultimate abolition, but also 
provides the vulnerable people with specific protections in criminal justice.575 Children 
and juvenile offenders are widely accepted as a category of people that are protected 
against the death penalty. There has been a consistent practice of both the threshold of 
the age and the timing of assessing the age. In general, people under 18 years old at the 
time of commitment of the crime is broadly recognised as the threshold, while the 
person’s age ‘at the time of sentencing or at the time foreseen for carrying out the 
sentence’ is irrelevant in this context.576 
 
574 Hood and Hoyle, The Death Penalty (n 373) 154. 
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The prohibition of imposing the death penalty on people under 18 years old has been 
acknowledged in major international human rights treaties. Recalling Article 6 (5) of 
the ICCPR, ‘sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age…’ A similar provision can also be found in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by all states but the United States.577 
It contains the provision that goes along with the above standard. It stipulates that 
‘[…]Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without the possibility of release 
shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.’578 
The Contracting Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights are also obliged 
to refrain from imposing the death penalty for crimes perpetrated by people who are 
under 18 years old.579 The acceptance of this standard can also be found in several UN 
General Assembly Resolutions where a universal consensus has been established. The 
18 years old threshold has been reaffirmed in the General Assembly’s successive 
Resolutions on moratorium on the use of the death penalty.580 Paragraph 3 of the 
Safeguards also states that ‘persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission 
of the crime shall not be sentenced to death…’  
 
In practice, states consistently adhere to this prohibition, although it cannot be denied 
 
577 See Un Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter IV, 11’ <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtd
sg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 3 March 2019.  
578 UNCRC, Art 37(a). 
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that there are reports of juvenile execution in some jurisdictions, especially where 
Sharia law is applied.581 For example, in Iran, Abolfazl Chezani Sharahi, who was 
sentenced to death for the convictions of murder committed when he was 15 years old, 
is due to be executed.582 This is definitely a breach of the death penalty regulation and 
also international human rights law. However, the fact that some states may 
occasionally violate the rule of this prohibition will not affect the status of this rule per 
se in customary international law, as the majority of states have been consistently 
observed this rule. In brief, there is a strong argument that it is a rule of customary 
international law that children under 18 years old at the time of committing crime are 
protected against the death penalty. 
 
Another category of person that is incontestably exempted from the death penalty is 
pregnant women. It is not defensible to say that the death penalty on pregnant women 
is utterly wiped out. For example, there was a case that a pregnant woman was accused 
of armed robbery and sentenced to death by a military court in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, which was recorded almost 20 years ago.583 In the Democratic Republic of 
North Korea, it is speculated and believed that some pregnant women are compelled to 
 
581 According to the report from Amnesty International, compared to the total number of executions, the use of the 
death penalty upon the crimes committed by people below 18 years old is much fewer, there are still some countries 
imposing or executing. Since 1990 more than 100 children or juvenile offenders were recorded being executed in 
states including Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and so forth. See Amnesty International, ‘Executions of 
Juveniles since 1990 as of March 2018’ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5038322016ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 11 October 2018.  
582 For further disclosure of the execution of children and juvenile offence in Iran, see UNCHR, UN Rights Experts 
Call on Iran to Halt Execution of Second Juvenile Offender in as Many Weeks (2018); UNCHR, Zeid Urges Iran to 
Stop Violating International Law by Executing Juvenile Offenders (2018); Amnesty International, Growing Up on 
Death Row: The Death Penalty and Juvenile Offenders in Iran (2016); Amnesty International, ‘Iran: 17-Year-Old 
Boy at Risk of Imminent Execution’ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/iran-17-year-old-boy-at-
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have an abortion before the execution. 584  Despite the reported cases, in most 
retentionist states, it is indeed rare for pregnant women or mothers with a newborn baby 
to be sentenced to the death penalty or executed. 585  This has been widely 
acknowledged as a legally binding rule.  
 
However, as pregnant is only a provisional status, which would be changed once the 
pregnant women delivered the infant, this point has been indicated from the difference 
of wording used concerning pregnant women, compared to the protection of children. 
For example, both the ICCPR and the ACHR specify that the death penalty shall not be 
‘imposed’ on people under 18 years old when the crime is committed, while as to 
pregnant women, they use ‘carried out’ and ‘applied’ to pregnant women.586 This leads 
to an ambiguous understanding as to whether the same ‘prerogative exemption’ should 
be given to the women just have given birth. The Safeguards No. 3 extends this category 
to mothers with newborn baby, which is gaining wide recognition, albeit the 
interpretation of the new mother is different in varying treaty bodies. For example, the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights provides new mothers with two years from the date of 
delivery with the protection against execution.587  
 
 
584  International Federation for Human Rights, ‘The Death Penalty in North Korea: In the Machinery of a 
Totalitarian State’ (2012)   
585 See Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide, ‘Women’ <http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/
women.cfm> accessed 17 June 2017.  
586 See ICCPR, Art 6(5) and ACHR, Art 4(5).  
587 See Art 7 (2) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights: ‘The death penalty shall not be inflicted on a pregnant 
woman prior to her delivery or on a nursing mother within two years from the date of her delivery; in all cases, the 
best interests of the infant shall be the primary consideration.’ Furthermore, similar provisions are found in Article 
76(3) of the Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Convention and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts and Article 6(4) of the Protocol Additional II to the 1949 Geneva Convention and 




In addition to the above two types of persons, there are also debates regarding whether 
mental disable or insane people and person over contain age at the time of commitment 
should be categorically excluded from the potential death penalty. 588  Generally 
speaking, it seems that while considering the death penalty exception based on the 
personal status of the criminal, divergences inevitably come out in implementing and 
interpreting the above international rules. What is undoubtedly tenable is that certain 
categories of vulnerable persons are safeguarded against the death penalty, which is 
guaranteed in customary international law. 
 
3.4.3 Procedural safeguards 
There is no doubt that states that lawfully retain the death penalty have an obligation to 
ensure that the minimum procedural safeguards are properly complied within the 
administration of the death penalty. The observance of the procedural safeguards 
differentiates the lawful application of the death penalty from arbitrary deprivation of 
life.589 This is not only required in capital trials but also the fundamental principle of 
criminal justice and is expected to be applied to all cases.590 Procedural safeguards for 
those people facing the death penalty is particularly significant, given the irrevocable 
nature of the death penalty. Any absence of them or error at any stage of the death trial 
may lead to the irreparable consequence for all people involved. For such reasons, 
procedural safeguards, especially the right to a fair trial,591  is one of the primary 
 
588 See Hood and Hoyle, The Death Penalty (n 373) 237-63. 
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590 Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms (n 495) 96, ‘the core of a number of the due process guarantees 
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concerns of international regulation of the death penalty, particularly considering the 
human rights protection of those people facing the capital trials. 
 
The procedural safeguards have been long recognised. As confirmed in common Article 
3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which has been universally ratified,592 in the case 
of armed conflict of an non-international character, it is prohibited to pass sentences 
and carry out executions ‘without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as 
indispensable by civilised peoples.’593 There is no doubt that the above standard also 
applies to the international armed conflict and peacetime as ‘a minimum yardstick’.594 
The details of these ‘judicial guarantees’ or procedural safeguards have since then been 
reiterated in a number of UN instruments and regional human rights treaties.595 For 
example, Article 6 of the ICCPR does not set up provisions directly related to the right 
to a fair trial under Article 14. However, the Human Rights Committee has recognised 
that a series of guarantees under Article 14 are incorporated into Article 6 and applied 
to the death penalty cases.596 For this reason, and by which the fair trial guarantees 
under Article 14 have attained the nature of non-derogation.597 This means, it triggers 
 
commutation of sentence and non-execution pending appeal or pardon.  
592 See ICRC, ‘Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries’ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vw
Treaties1949.xsp> accessed 20 July 2019. 
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594 Nicaragua case, para. 218.  
595 For example, See Art 6 of the ECHR. The ECtHR confirmed in Öcalan v. Turkey App no 46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 
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an implied obligation that the procedural guarantees prescribed in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR must be complied with in the imposition of the death penalty otherwise Article 
6 of the ICCPR would be breached.598  
 
It is virtually all UN Member States have accepted that the right to a fair trial should be 
respected in all death penalty cases as a matter of law, as clarified in the Safeguards: 
 
Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair 
trial, at least equal to those contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a crime 
for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of 
the proceedings.599 
 
In the Implementation of the Safeguards, the protection of the rights of those facing the 
death penalty is required to be strengthened, particularly in terms of defence and appeal. 
The Safeguards 1996 further reaffirms that the retentionist states should ensure the 
people facing the death penalty with a fully guaranteed fair trial.600 In the Resolution 
2005/59 adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights, all retentionist states are 
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asked to impose the death penalty ‘only pursuant to a final judgement rendered by an 
independent and impartial competent court, and to ensure the rights to a fair trial…’601 
The Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment states that  
 
[u]nder international law, the death penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgement of a competent court and only applied to the most serious crimes. The possible 
safeguards given during legal process to ensure a fair trial in cases in which the death 
penalty might be imposed should be at least equal to those contained in article 14 of the 
Covenant.602 
 
In the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, which reiterates the procedural regulation on applying the death penalty as 
the strict and non-derogable guarantee of those people facing the risk of the execution:  
 
[t]he death penalty is only lawful if imposed after a trial conducted in accordance with 
fair trial guarantees, including judicial independence, the right to counsel, an effective 
right to appeal, and the right not to be coerced or tortured to give evidence 
(A/HRC/11/2/Add.5). When a State’s judicial system cannot ensure respect for fair trials, 
the Government should impose a moratorium on executions (A/HRC/11/2/Add.4, paras. 
 
601 See E/CN.4/RES/2005/59, para. 7(d). 
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65 and 89).603 
 
It has to admit that this is an extremely complicated issue since it involves the protection 
at all stages of the death penalty case, including a large variety of pre- and post-trial 
safeguards until the execution-related problems. Furthermore, it is normally very 
difficult to observe the explicit violation of these safeguards in the practice of those 
retentionist states. As Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle allege, no state would ‘blatantly 
admit’ that its failure to meet the universal standards while carrying out the death 
penalty.604  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, the procedural flaws of the criminal systems, 
even the ‘most advanced retentionist democracy in the world’605, cannot be completely 
circumvented, which directly give rise to miscarriage of justice and many innocents 
being sentenced to death and executed. The gap between what is essentially required in 
international law and what retentionist states undertake in practice is distinctly 
apparent.606 The non-observance of the procedural safeguards or inconsistencies of 
state practice in this regard are indeed relevant in determining the nature of those rules. 
To be precise, in practice, retentionist states’ failure to adhere to the international 
standards of due process of law in terms of applying the death penalty is not uncommon. 
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A list of states including Cuba, Japan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was recorded 
in the breach of obligations under the fair trial provisions in the death penalty 
imposition.607 Amnesty International also continually warns the seriousness of these 
issues and call for the cease of violations. For example, Ramin Hossein Panahi, an 
Iranian who was sentenced to death for his association with the armed Kurdish 
opposition group after an unfair trial on 16 January 2018, including being interrogated 
by torture and a number of breaches of procedural safeguards. 608  According to 
Amnesty International’s annual report, in 2018, there were numerous recorded cases 
where the death penalty was imposed after an unfair trial.609  
 
In summary, to a certain extent, procedural safeguards of those people facing the death 
penalty have been universally recognised, and it may reflect customary international 
law in general. As it has been repeated in various human rights agreements that have 
established the universal consensus as a legal requirement, and states have made 
successive commitment to undertake the protection in applying the death penalty and 
condemn violations of those rules by any others. However, since procedural safeguards 
entail a large number of requirements in the death penalty trials, a uniformed state 
practice could not be ascertained in every aspect of safeguards in detail.  
 
 
607 A/HRC/24/18 (n 572) paras. 45-7.  
608 For the merits of the case and analysis, see Amnesty International, ‘Kurdish Man Sentenced to Death 
Penalty after Unfair Trial’ <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1378272018ENGLISH.pdf> a
ccessed 3 October 2018.  
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As Nigel Rodley explicitly suggested, ‘to the limited extent that the death penalty may 
still be permitted, human rights are central to the legitimacy of its application in 
practice.’610 It has to be admitted that there has been a growing trend toward the 
restriction of the death penalty, and international law has established an increasingly 
higher and more rigorous standard on the application of the death penalty both 
substantively and procedurally. Furthermore, international awareness of the death 
penalty abolition is on the rise, and international human rights law has made its attitude 
very clear as prohibiting the death penalty. Nevertheless, at this time, it is not hard to 
say that while an ever-greater number of states have abrogated the death penalty either 
in law or in practice, a majority of the world’s population is potentially subject to it. 
More importantly, as well can see, the death penalty remains lawful in international law, 
albeit subject to regulation. Taking together the facts that the death penalty is still 
regularly carried out in a large number of states; there has not been a universal binding 
agreement that absolutely prohibits the death penalty, and there is no customary rule on 
the death penalty prohibition. In such situations, it is speculated that states hold their 
sovereign right to decide their criminal system, namely, whether to retain or abolish 
certain types of punishment, in the light of their own social circumstances.  
 
However, it is essential to underline that such discretion of states is not unlimited. To 
be precise, the use of the death penalty should be in keeping with states’ human rights 
 




obligations derived from regional or international human rights treaties and those 
guaranteed by customary international law. 611  It is acknowledged that with the 
evolution of international law, especially international human rights law, states 
remaining the death penalty have increasing obligations with respect to the use of the 
death penalty in many ways. Although there are universal standards existing in 
international law, at least in international human rights treaties, the regulation of the 
death penalty is interpreted diversely from one retentionist state to the other, and the 
respect and adherence to the requirements of those safeguards are far from consistent. 
Under such circumstances, it is undoubtedly impractical to ask all retentionist states to 
abolish the death penalty. Instead, the critical point at this stage should be how to 
guarantee the application of the death penalty is sufficiently regulated. What the 
retentionist states are required is to improve the way they impose and carry out the 
death penalty substantively and procedurally and ensure the international minimum 
standard of procedural safeguards is secured to the largest extent. For example, 
abolishing the death penalty for those non-violent crimes or crimes do not meet the 
‘most serious crime’ standard. This would partly circumvent the death penalty—
extradition dilemma, particularly involving economic crimes in the global anti-
corruption campaign initiated by the Chinese government. 
 
Based on these accounts, it is conclusive to say that the argument proposed in this thesis 
for the revision of the ECtHR’s standard is not inhibited by general international law. 
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It would seem to be perfectly compatible with international law that extraditing 
individuals to retentionist states should not always be unlawful, so long as the discussed 
regulation could be guaranteed. This brings about the concept of the lawful application 
of the death penalty or the qualification to the death penalty in international law. 
Against this context, next chapter will look at the European standard on extradition to 
a retentionist sate in a more critical way and then argue that standard should, and could 



















4. Reconsidering the ECtHR’s Standard on the Death Penalty in 
Extradition 
 
It has been over two decades since the death penalty was last used within the Council 
of Europe where the abolitionist campaign has gained prevailing concerns. However, 
the controversy is continuing both in and outside of the Council of Europe. Chapter 3 
has looked at the lawfulness of the death penalty per se in international law as well as 
its regulation, and this chapter will target at the impact of the conclusion that has 
reached in the context of requesting extradition by retentionist states. As has been 
discussed earlier, the death penalty is not prohibited by any universal treaty nor by 
customary international law—although there was clear evidence of restrictions 
regulating its imposition and execution. That is to say, lawful application of the death 
penalty still remains a customary international law exception to the right to life. 
Therefore, in the view of this thesis, the death penalty should not be an absolute barrier 
to extradition as long as the requesting state observes the rules regulating its application.  
 
Given that Chapter 3 has shown that there is no universal international legal prohibition 
on the death penalty, when the ECtHR prohibits extradition of people to face the death 
penalty without any exception, the Court is in effect exporting a non-universal standard. 
This chapter argues that a more flexible approach could be adopted so as to promote 
transnational criminal cooperation. The most detailed analysis in this chapter will be on 




international law and other regional instruments. The overall purpose of both this 
chapter and the whole thesis is to enhance the international judicial cooperation by 
finding a way in which the discord between abolitionist states, particularly the European 
states, and retentionist states may be dealt with. In other words, extraditing to 
retentionist states where the extraditee may face the death penalty should, and could be 
possible. While the main emphasis in this chapter will be placed on the Council of 
Europe and the European Court of Human Rights, nonetheless, that is not to say the 
role and contribution of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to the abolition in the European continent can be overlooked.612 
 
4.1 Exportation of the European standard 
4.1.1 The prohibition of the death penalty in the Council of Europe 
It is demonstrated that while the Council of Europe was founded and the ECHR was 
drafted and open for signature over half a century ago, the death penalty was not 
prohibited by the majority of states. Article 2 of the ECHR indeed left room for ‘the 
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.’613 It is thus argued that, as have been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the death penalty was accepted as a lawful exception to the right to 
life within the ECHR framework per se at that certain period of time. However, along 
with the evolution of human rights law as well as the state practice of the de facto and 
 
612 For example, see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 2(2), and Article 19(2) provides 
that ‘[n]o one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be 
subjected to the death penalty’. 




de jure abolition within the Council of Europe and beyond, the abolition of the death 
penalty has become one of the Council’s top priorities. A series of significant cases and 
the establishment of Protocols have gradually pushed forward the death penalty to be 
completely abolished in all circumstances. 614  It should acknowledge that the 
continuing efforts made by the Council of Europe and its Member States to the abolition 
have made the death penalty prohibition being an accepted legal rule and political 
policy, 615  which enshrined one of the most important values that underlying the 
construction of the Council of Europe. Namely, human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law. 616  There is little doubt that the Council of Europe makes significant 
contributions to the abolition in Europe. It has indeed achieved the goal of making a de 
facto death penalty-free area covering 47 Member States in total and approximately 830 
million people. More specially, from the legal perspective, Protocols No.6 and No.13 
to the Convention have in effect amended the Article 2 as prohibiting the death penalty 
in all circumstances so that there is no longer any room for considering the use of the 
death penalty under the Convention framework.617 Specifically, Protocol No.6 was the 
first international legally binding instrument with the obligation to abolish the death 
penalty in peacetime. All Member States of the Council of Europe but Russia618 have 
ratified the Protocol. About twenty years later in 2002, the Council of Europe made the 
‘final step’619 toward the ultimate abolition by adopting the Protocol No.13 to the 
 
614 See Council of Europe, ‘The ECHR and the Death Penalty: A Timeline’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/p
ortal/death-penalty> accessed 7 July 2019.  
615 For a full discussion on the abolition of the death penalty in European human rights law, see Schabas, The 
Abolition of the Death Penalty (n 444) Chapter 7. 
616 Council of Europe, Death is not Justice (n 400). 
617 Council of Europe, Guide on Case-Law of the European Concention on Human Rights: Immigration (2020) 21. 
618 The Russian Federation actually has implemented a moratorium on executions since 1996. 




ECHR in which the death penalty was required to be abrogated in all circumstances 
‘including for acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war.’620 The 
Thirteenth Protocol has to date been signed by 45 Contracting Parties and ratified by 
44 except Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.621  
 
Furthermore, the Council of Europe has promoted the death penalty abolition by 
imposing political pressure on the third states where the death penalty is possible. On 
the one hand, the Parliament Assembly has declared its unswerving stance against the 
death penalty by making the abolition of the death penalty or establishing an immediate 
moratorium on execution as the prerequisite for gaining the membership of the 
organisation since 1994.622 This is particularly influential on those states which are 
keen to join the organisation for the political and economic benefits.623 On the other 
hand, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has restated its opposition 
to the death penalty through stimulating the complete abolition or moratorium on 
executions upon the Observer States,624 particularly the United States of America and 
Japan where the death penalty is still in lawful application.625 Those Observer States 
are expected to share the same ideals and values with the Council of Europe and make 
 
620 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, 2002. 
621 See Council of Europe, ‘Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 187’ <https://www.coe.int/en/w
eb/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/187/signatures?p_auth=aj0dVuFz> accessed 7 October 2019.  
622 Renate Wohlwend, ‘The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’ in The Council of 
Europe (ed), The death penalty: Abolition in Europe (Council of Europe Publishing 1999) 55, 83. 
623 Hood and Hoyle, The Death Penalty (n 373) 30. 
624 Including Canada, the Holy See, Japan, Mexico and the United States of America. For example, ‘the Council of 
Europe has made numerous resolutions critical of Japan, even threatening to take away its observer status. However, 
Japan has… openly and without much (if any) political damage continued to carry out execution.’ See Sato, Vox 
Populi (n 420) 251. 
625 The Death Penalty in Council of Europe Member and Observer States: A Violation of Human Rights, Report on 




commitment to respect for human rights, uphold democracy and the rule of law.626 Till 
today, Europe’s unshakable adherence to the death penalty abolition has been expressly 
clarified in different legal and political occasions, despite the existence of disputes and 
disagreements especially in the context of international cooperation with the states 
outside Europe.     
 
4.1.2 The development of the ECtHR’s standard on the death penalty in extradition  
Currently, the absolute objection to the death penalty is not only embodied in various 
legal instruments, but also, we shall see in this section that the contemporary 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights recognises that extradition to a 
retentionist state implicates the requested state’s human rights obligation under both 
Article 2 and Article 3, in relation to not only the death penalty itself but also various 
aspects of its application.  
 
Nevertheless, the European standpoint on the death penalty in extradition was not 
invariable. While the ECHR was drafted and came into force seventy years ago, and in 
its early stage of development, the death penalty was neither a breach of international 
law nor European human rights law. The death penalty was shielded within the explicit 
exception in Article 2(1) and thus, was not an absolutely proscriptive issue in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Since then, the ECtHR’s case law in this regard has 
developed in such a way from very permissive to very prohibitive, endorsed by a 
 
626 Statutory Resolution No. (93) 26 on observer status, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 May 1993 at 




number of landmark cases. However, there is a way of relaxing it in theory. That is to 
say, there is room for some flexibilities that could, although probably will not be 
accepted, to permit extradition to the death penalty. 
 
In Ernest Major Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom case, 627  which concerns the 
extradition of the applicant from the United Kingdom to the United States. Kirkwood 
was requested on murder charges that would be punishable by the death penalty in 
California, the US. Although the US government provided an assurance against the 
death penalty, it was argued that such assurance was not sufficiently enforceable upon 
the local authorities who were competent to determine the imposition of the death 
penalty. Thus, Kirkwood claimed that if extradited, he was highly likely to be convicted 
and punished by death. Although he did not directly argue the possible death penalty 
itself violated the Convention (Article 3), he claimed that ‘circumstances surrounding 
the implementation of such a death penalty’ constituted the breach of Article 3, 
including the unexceptional delay of the death penalty cases in California and the 
suffering in the death row.  
 
At the time around Kirkwood case, it was not explicit that extradition of a person to a 
state to face the death penalty would in itself violate Article 2 or Article 3. As the UK 
government maintained, ‘the second sentence of Article 2(1) of the Convention 
expressively provides for the imposition of the death penalty by a court, following 
 




conviction for a crime for which that penalty is provided by law.’628 The European 
Commission on Human Rights set out that Article 2(1) ‘expressly recognises the ending 
of life through the death penalty following appropriate criminal conviction’.629 As for 
the assurance against the imposition or execution, the Commission held that it ‘cannot 
be expressly or implicitly required by the terms of Article 3.’630 Despite the above 
concession, the Commission firstly held that the way that the death penalty is carried 
out could raise issues under Article 3 regarding the prohibition of torture and other ill-
treatment.631 This case was eventually declared inadmissible because of the lack of 
sufficient evidence upon the death row constituting the mistreatment outlawed by 
Article 3. Therefore, the extradition was not prohibited either on Article 2 or Article 3 
grounds. However, it certainly proved that it could, while Soering case made this a step 
further by substantiating it in the Court’s judgment.  
 
As Cherif Bassiouni described, starting from the adoption of the aforementioned 
Protocol No.6 in 1983, the death penalty has been ‘continually scaled back’,632 and the 
Court’s standard on extraditing fugitives sought for capital offences has evolved with 
particularly increasing rigour since the Soering case in 1989. Soering v, the United 
Kingdom case633 was deemed as one of the most important cases in extradition law as 
 
628 ibid, para. 183. 
629 ibid, paras. 188-90. 
630 ibid. 
631  The Commission stated that ‘notwithstanding the terms of Article 2(1), it cannot be excluded that the 
circumstances surrounding the protection of one of other rights contained in the Convention might give rise to an 
issue under Article 3.’ ibid, para. 184. 
632 Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 601. 




the first milestone in the evolving relationship of extradition and the death penalty.634 
It expressly opened the ‘Pandora’s box’ 635  for the discussion on State Parties’ 
responsibility of extraditing an individual to another state where there is a foreseeable 
risk of violations of his Convention rights. As Matthew Bloom asserts, ‘the legacy of 
the Soering case is that a requested state should take into account the human rights 
practices of the requesting state, as well as its own obligations under international 
human rights law, when deciding whether to extradite.’636 
 
This case has been richly analysed in literature and only a very brief summary will 
suffice the purpose of depicting the evolvement of the Court’s stance regarding 
extradition and the death penalty. Soering, a German national, who was charged with 
killing his girlfriend’s parents in Virginia, the US in March 1985 and then fled to the 
UK where he was detained in custody. The extradition request upon him from the US 
was contested by the applicant mainly based on Article 3 of the ECHR. He argued that, 
as the crime with which he was charged was punishable by the death penalty, the 
extradition would unavoidably expose him to a long-term death row in extreme 
conditions in Virginia, which would constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment in breach of Article 3. The ECtHR finally endorsed this claim and stated 
that upon extradition, Soering would be subjected to a six to eight years suffering in 
death row, where the threats of homosexual abuse, physical attack and other extremely 
 
634 Van Der Wilt, Après Soering (n 277) 54-5; Dugard and Van Den Wyngaert (n 3). 
635 Van Den Wyngaert (n 47) 757-79. 
636 Matthew Bloom, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the United States’s Response to Extradition Requests from China 




inhuman and degrading treatment were also highly possible,637 which was by no means 
compatible with Article 3. 
 
It is noteworthy that in this case, it was not the death penalty per se that violated the 
UK’s Convention obligation, for which the extradition should be prohibited. At this 
time, although Protocol 6 had entered in force, the death penalty was not totally 
abolished within the Council of Europe, at least not de jure.638 In this case, it was not 
about Article 2 and the death penalty. Instead, it was a series of auxiliary factors to 
carrying out the death penalty that amount to the breach of Article 3 and thus made the 
extradition unlawful in the context of the Convention.639  
 
Since Soering case, substantial reforms have taken place and twenty years later in the 
case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, the Court’s attitude toward the 
same issue was completely changed. We have already seen, particularly in the above 
two cases, that Article 3 of the ECHR may be brought to bear on the regulation of the 
death penalty, including the so-called ‘death row phenomenon’ and inhumane means of 
execution. As for the Article 2, in the following discussion, we shall see that the ECtHR 
has now expressly found that imposition of the death penalty, in principle, is no longer 
accommodated by the provision of the right to life under Article 2. The essential point 
 
637 This claim was opposed by the UK because it believed that the assurance it gained from the US was capable to 
prevent those risks from happening. However, similar to the situations in Kirkwood case, the possibility of 
enforcement of such assurance given by the US government was doubted and debatable. 
638 At the time of the final judgment of Soering case (01 July 1989), only 13 Contracting Parties (Austria, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, 
Germany ratified on 05 July 1989 but it came into force on 01 August 1989) had ratified the Sixth Protocol not 
including the UK. 




of this issue is that the death penalty exception to Article 2 is obsolete and should be 
interpreted to be replaced by the abolitionist provision, considering the above-
mentioned considerable ‘progress’ toward abolition since 1950 and the fact that Europe 
has been an abolitionist region in law and in practice. In this regard, one of the landmark 
cases from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United 
Kingdom case, which is far-reaching because it is the first case that confirms the 
exception clause in Article 2 is no longer able to justify the death penalty. The second 
sentence of Article 2 (1) is no longer to stand in the way of interpreting that the death 
penalty is in breach of Article 3.640 Nevertheless, it should be stressed that prohibiting 
the death penalty within the Council of Europe (the ECHR) is one thing, but the case 
law on non-extradition to retentionist states is quite another, which is particularly 
problematic in this new context of globalised criminality. The examination in this 
regard will be expanded in the rest of this chapter. Before doing so, I will look in more 
details at Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case. 
 
In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case, the Court explicitly stressed the prohibition of the 
death penalty in all circumstances. More importantly, the Court clarified that states are 
engaged with the obligation not to extradite or expel people from their jurisdiction to 
states where they are facing a real risk of the death penalty.641 It expressly held that the 
above obligation is based on the Article 2 of the ECHR per se, unlike it did in Soering 
case by focusing on whether the risk of suffering the death row phenomenon would 
 
640 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case, para. 120. 




breach the protection given under Article 3. Against this background, it is indicated that 
in such extradition or deportation cases where the individual concerned is subjected to 
the death penalty in the receiving state, the requested or deporting state’ responsibility 
under both Articles 2 and 3 are directly engaged.642  
 
This case mainly concerned the issue of whether the transfer of two Iraqi nationals from 
the British-run detention Centre to Iraqi authorities would amount to the violation of 
their Convention rights. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi were arrested by British forces and 
detained under the British control, for the charge of killing two British soldiers stationed 
in Iraq in 2003. The case was subsequently transferred to the Iraqi criminal courts (the 
Basra Criminal Court and the Iraqi High Tribunal) where the offences constituted war 
crimes and were punishable of the death penalty. The applicants complained that their 
transfer to the Iraqi authorities from the British forces without obtaining binding and 
sufficient assurances would put them at the foreseeable risk of the death penalty,643 
which ran counter to the Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR as well as Article 1 of Protocol 
No.13 that the UK had ratified in 2003.  
 
Concerning the progress toward the complete de jure or de facto abolition of the death 
penalty within the Council of Europe, the Court established that  
 
the right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 not to be subjected to the death penalty, which 
 
642 ibid, paras. 123-5. 




admits of no derogation and applies in all circumstances, ranks along with the rights in 
Articles 2 and 3 as a fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.644 
 
Against this background, the Court put forward the ‘right to be free from the death 
penalty’ at first and then further established that the death penalty inevitably 
 
involves the deliberate and premeditated destruction of a human being by the State 
authorities. Whatever the method of execution, the extinction of life involves some 
physical pain. In addition, the foreknowledge of death at the hands of the State must 
inevitably give rise to intense psychological suffering.645  
 
Therefore, the Court notably established that the death penalty per se is inhuman and 
degrading, which contravenes the protection under Article 3 of the Convention. That is 
to say, the death penalty is prohibited on the grounds of both Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention.646 
 
The UK government argued that it referred the case to the Iraqi courts was primarily 
attributed to the fact that the UK forces were physically presenting upon the territory 
 
644 ibid, para. 118. 
645 ibid, para. 115. 
646 It should be noted that according to the Court’ final decision (paras. 144-5), as there was a violation of Article 3, 
it was not necessary to decide whether there was a violation of Article 2. Namely, the Court in this decision held the 
provision in Article 2 no longer permit the death penalty but did not go as far as to explicitly state that death penalty 
violates Article 2. In Marko Milanovic’s opinion, it can only implied that the death penalty in this case constituted a 




of Iraq and it ‘had no option other than to transfer the applicants. It was operating in 
foreign sovereign State which was demanding the applicants’ return.’647 In response, 
the Court declared that the UK should not ‘enter into an agreement with another State 
which conflicts with its obligations under the Convention.’648 In other words, states’ 
obligation in the context of international judicial cooperation should be in accordance 
with their human rights obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR and Article 1 
of Protocol No. 13. In the present case, before the referral decision was made and the 
physical transfer of the applicants was taken, the UK government did not attempt to 
secure the applicants’ Convention rights by either purposing an alternative agreement 
or seeking any assurances from Iraq against the death penalty upon the applicants. The 
latter was not deemed as infringing the sovereign interests of Iraq.  
 
Consequently, as concluded from this case, the evolution in the past decades since 
Soering case in 1989, evidenced by the fact that the death penalty is virtually eradicated 
from the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe, strongly indicating that the European 
consensus against the death penalty in all circumstance has been built up, and Article 2 
of the ECHR was no longer appropriate to justify the lawful application of the death 
penalty. European states refusing to extradite to states where the death penalty is still 
potentially imposed is regarded as an approach to deliver a strong message that the 
death penalty is firmly opposed in Europe.  
 
 
647 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case, para. 112. 




However, no matter what basis upon which the UK government decided to refer the 
case to the Iraqi courts without seeking any assurances, it shown that the UK felt it was 
obliged to cooperate with the sovereign authorities of Iraq to surrender the prisoners, 
whatever the UK’s view of the death penalty. This is indeed the powerful evidence that 
even within the Council of Europe, some Member States’ views on the death penalty 
are not aligned with those of the Council of Europe itself or the European Court of 
Human Rights. More specifically, the UK authorities were aware of the availability of 
the death penalty in Iraqi law and the possibility of the imposition against the applicant 
upon their transfer and conviction.649 Nevertheless, it did not make any attempt to 
eliminate the risk of the death penalty; no assurances were sought or given against the 
use of the death penalty upon the applicants.650 In the opinion of the UK government, 
although itself had put an end to the death penalty, its application by Iraqi authorities 
was not prohibited in international law.651 Therefore, it cannot be taken as justification 
for ‘refusing to comply with its obligation under international law to surrender Iraqi 
nationals, detained at the request of the Iraqi courts, to those courts for trial.’652   
 
The reconstruction and confirmation of the ECtHR’s approach in Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi case made the Court’s standard on assessing the States Parties’ obligation to 
protect the people against the death penalty in extradition cases much clearer and more 
straightforward. Nevertheless, the above standard is not in compliance with general 
 
649 ibid, paras. 133-5. 
650 ibid, paras. 141-2. 
651 ibid, para. 110. 




international law discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
In the recent case of A.L. (X.W.) v. Russia,653 the applicant A.L.654 was arrested and 
detained in Russia in 2014 and wanted by the Chinese government for his suspicion of 
murdering a Chinese police officer in 1996 and thus, facing a capital trial if he was 
returned to China. China was intended to file an extradition request to Russia at first, 
but eventually withdrew the request.655 Nevertheless, having considered several related 
factors, 656  Russia determined that his presence was undesirable due to his 
dangerousness to the public order and security. He was thus subject to an exclusion 
order,657 and the threat of deportation in the event of non-compliance with that order 
within a certain time limit.658 Although this case was essentially about deportation 
rather than extradition, the issues are of particular relevance for this thesis.  
 
A.L. complained that although China had withdrawn the extradition request for 
bringing him back, the exclusion order issued by Russia was a de facto deportation 
order or disguised extradition, considering his passport had been seized by the Russian 
authorities, and he had no other valid identification to get to another country other than 
China once leaving Russia. A.L. claimed his potential risks of human rights violations 
 
653 A.L. (X.W.) v. Russia App no 44095/14 (ECtHR, 29 October 2015). 
654  The nationality of the applicant was in dispute as the applicant claimed his is Russian, while the Russia 
government affirmed that he was a Chinese national with a real name of X.W., and his Russian passport was 
unlawfully obtained. 
655  The withdrawal was attributed to the fact that the Chinese government’s failure of submitting the official 
extradition request within the time limit set in the bilateral extradition between China and Russia came into force in 
1997, but further information on the reason is difficulty to obtain. See A.L. case, para. 9.  
656 ibid, paras. 21,59 
657 ibid, paras. 21, 49, 59. 




upon return to China had never been assessed by the Russian authorities, which was in 
breach of Russia’s obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.659  The Court 
followed and reiterated its decision in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom 
case that the death penalty clause under Article 2 of the ECHR has been amended by 
Protocols Nos. 6 and 13 and the death penalty was not acceptable and lawful within the 
Convention.660 This decision unequivocally applied to Russia as the member of the 
ECHR, even though it had not ratified Protocols Nos. 6 and 13.661 Considering Russia’s 
undertaking to abolish the death penalty as the precondition on becoming a Member 
State of the Council of Europe, and a de facto moratorium on the execution which was 
affirmed constitutionally, Russia is, according to the Court, under ‘an obligation not to 
extradite or deport an individual to another State where there exist substantial grounds 
for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty 
there.’662   
 
In this case, the Court observed that Russia did not sufficiently assess the applicant’s 
risk of the death penalty in China followed by the exclusion order. The Court agreed 
with the applicant that, under the circumstances, the exclusion order would actually 
result in his forcible return to China, where he was almost certain to stand trial for the 
crime that is punishable by the death penalty. Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
applicant’s forcible return to China would give rise to Russia’s violation of its obligation 
 
659 There was also an alleged violation of Article 3 regarding the conditions of Mr. A.L.’s detention. See ibid, paras. 
68-91.  






under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.663  
 
It is important to point out that this case again shows that, in practice, there are state 
governments and authorities not committed to preventing the exposure of people to the 
death penalty. More specifically, the Court found that the Russian courts simply did not 
consider whether A.L. would be exposed to the death penalty in China.664 Instead, they 
presented a flimsy argument that A.L. could have used his Chinese passport to move to 
a third state.665 In other words, whilst the Russian authorities may not have been 
particularly enthusiastic about sending A.L. to potentially face the death penalty they 
were at least ambivalent about it. This can be seen from the facts that the final exclusion 
order against A.L. was actually issued after the failure of extraditing A.L. to China, and 
the attempt to send A.L. to China was via administrate manner.666 
 
In addition to this conclusion, there is another notable issue in this case, which is likely 
to be overlooked. The A.L. case indicates and actually materialises the difficulty that 
the Chinese authorities are facing in the context of international criminal cooperation. 
As rendered in the Court’s judgment, A.L. did not deny the facts that give rise to the 
exclusion order, which includes the suspicion of murder.667 In order words, China’s 
interests in pursuing A.L.’s return was convincing, appropriate and lawful. However, 
 
663 ibid, paras. 64-6. 
664 ibid, para. 65. However, the Russian government claimed the domestic courts had made the assessment of A.L.’s 
potential ill-treatment upon return to China but it was not accepted. See ibid, para. 58.  
665 ibid, para. 24. 
666 ibid, paras. 7-24. 




even if the Chinese authorities make a legitimate extradition request on time, they 
would not bring the suspect back to China. In fact, in this case, no matter what methods 
were taken, his return to China would be impeded on human rights grounds, specifically 
the right to life under Articles 2 and 3. This can be understood that prioritizing A.L.’s 
human rights protection against the death penalty would directly make China’s interests 
of pursuing justice and combating crime into a deadlock until certain assurances could 
be provided and accepted. 
 
To sum up, what we can get from the above development path is that, under the current 
framework, the States Parties are not allowed to put any individual at a foreseeable risk 
of the death penalty in any territorial, irrespective of the legitimacy of the death penalty 
in general international law and the criminal system of the receiving state. Nonetheless, 
while these cases show that the ECtHR has become very clear in its standard, the cases 
would never have arisen in the first place if all European states at all times had an 
absolute commitment to preventing people from facing the death penalty. It has to 
concede that these two cases are outliers but significant nonetheless, as they reinforce 
that there may be different opinions between the Member States and the Council of 
Europe and its organs, which will be further discussed in this chapter. However, before 
doing that, we shall first examine the use of assurances about non-implementation of 
the death penalty. It is argued that the Member States are under an implied obligation 
to request sufficient and enforceable warranty against the death penalty. That is to say, 




from the Council of Europe and the retentionist states beyond the jurisdiction of the 
ECHR. 
 
4.1.3 The use of assurances  
Considering there is not usually a margin of appreciation given to the abolitionist state 
to assess the extradition request from a retentionist state, seeking an assurance that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or executed upon the fugitive’s return has become a 
generally accepted approach.668 Notably, it is the only ‘workable’ approach at this stage. 
From this perspective, resorting to the assurances itself indicates that the precedence of 
human rights concerns over extradition whenever the conflict arises. Actually, the role 
of assurances is not limited to the death penalty cases. Instead, it is one of the 
conventional approaches by which the requested state responds to the potential risk of 
human rights violation in the requesting state so as to circumvent its human rights 
obligations. 669  It should be noted that the European standard on prohibiting the 
extradition to states where the death penalty is available should not be understood as 
the Council of Europe refuses or is unwilling to participate in the international judicial 
cooperation via transfer criminals to retentionist states. In essence, the use of assurances 
is for the purpose of facilitating the extradition process in combating crime without any 
 
668 It should be noted that the use of assurances cannot bridge the gap between abolitionist states and retentionist 
states in all circumstances in international criminal cooperation. Taking China for example, the death penalty has 
been one of the preliminary barriers to China’s negotiation of the extradition treaty with some of the Western states, 
which means, there is no such legal basis to consider whether or not the assurance would be provided by China in 
extradition case, because there is no such extradition case at all. In this section, we only consider the situation in 
which the abolitionist state is willing to conclude extradition treaty with retentionist states and proceeding to 
individual cases to seek for assurances. 
669 For example, the use of assurances in cases involving either Article 3 or Article 6 is more complicated and 
controversial than the use in relation to the death penalty, as they are very hard to monitor. See Van Der Wilt, On the 




concerns about the extraditee’s human rights risks. As a matter of fact, the use of 
assurance is regarded as a means which follows that European policy on the absolute 
exclusion of the death penalty by expressly clearing any risk that the person could be 
sentenced to death or executed upon extradition. That is to say, obtaining assurances 
and ensuring it will be well fulfiled is a way by which the European states to circumvent 
their obligation under the ECHR, preventing from either applying the death penalty on 
their own or assisting the use of the death penalty by extraditing individuals to other 
retentionist states to face the death penalty. For this reason, such assurances, in specific 
extradition cases, are not only considered as a compromise from the retentionist states, 
but also often seen as a win-win solution which meets the demand of both the European 
values and the enforcement of the international criminal cooperation. 
 
Coming down to the rationale and role of the assurance, which are undoubtedly 
profound. In essence, the use of assurances enables the requested state to fulfil its treaty 
obligation to extradite without engaging with its obligations stemming from human 
rights treaties.670 In other words, it is a kind of undertaking that guarantees the conflict 
would not substantiate in the context of extradition. Harmen van der wilt regards the 
use of assurances as a technique of ‘conflict avoidance’. 671  Since the inevitable 
conflicts between extradition and human rights obligations would compel states to give 
up one of its obligations, which is states attempt to avoid in practice.  
 
 
670 Yves Haeck and Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi, ‘Diplomatic Assurances’ (2018) MPEPIL 2174. 




In the case of Rrapo v. Albania,672 based on the bilateral extradition treaty,673 an 
Albanian and American national Almir Rrapo was requested to be extradited from 
Albania to stand trial at the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, where he had been charged with the capital offence.674 Rrapo complained 
that his right under Article 2 would be infringed as a direct consequence of extradition 
to the US and the assurances provided via diplomatic notes could not sufficiently 
guarantee his protection against the foreseeable death penalty. 675  Considering the 
assurances provided by the United States Embassy via diplomatic notes on 8 November 
2010, 24 February 2011 and 18 May 2011,676 the Court held that the death penalty 
would not be sentenced or carried out against Rrapo on his extraditable charges. 
Therefore, his right to life would not be in danger upon extradition.677 The ECtHR 
reiterated its standpoint in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom case that 
 
Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 prohibit the extradition or 
deportation of an individual to another State where substantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty 
there.678 
 
Concerning the authorisation of the detention from Albanian domestic courts including 
 
672 Rrapo v. Albania App no. 58555/10 (ECtHR, 25 September 2012). 
673 ibid, para. 56. 
674 ibid, para. 11. 
675 ibid, para. 66. 
676 ibid, paras. 19, 27-8. 
677 ibid, paras. 70-4. 




the Tirana District Court, the Tirana Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the ECtHR 
stated that  
 
[…]for whatever reason, it should not detain individuals with a view to extraditing them 
to stand trial on capital charges or in any other way subjecting individuals within its 
jurisdiction to a real risk of being sentenced to the death penalty and executed (reference 
omitted), unless sufficient and binding assurances were sought and obtained from the 
responsible authorities of the requesting State.679   
 
In other words, in the present case, there would have been a violation of Article 2 and 
3 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No.13 by extraditing people to face the death 
penalty. It was the non-execution assurance that circumvented the Albanian authorities 
from the breach of its Convention obligation under Articles 2 and 3. Regarding the 
assessment of the credibility and enforceability of the assurances given by the US in 
this case, a number of factors should be taken into account, particularly the context of 
the reinforced use of extradition. The ECtHR found that 
 
the assurances given by the United States Government were specific, clear and 
unequivocal. […] In the context of an extradition request, there have been no reported 
breaches of an assurance given by the United States Government to a Contracting State. 
The United States long-term interest in honouring its extradition commitments alone 
 




would be sufficient to give rise to a presumption of good faith against any risk of a breach 
of those assurances.680  
 
On the whole, there is strong evidence to affirm that the risk of being subjected to the 
death penalty would be cleared up and Rrapo’s right to life could be well safeguarded 
based on the given undertaking.681  
 
Similar points could also be drawn from the case of Harkins and Edwards v. the United 
Kingdom,682 which concerned two applicants who were accused of murder and other 
violent offences683 and arrested in the UK. The two applicants complained against their 
extradition to the United States,684 where they both alleged that the extradition would 
put them to the risk of the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole for the 
crime they were accused.685 Both of the complaints with respect to the death penalty 
were rejected as ‘manifestly ill-founded’.686 According to the Court’s assessment, the 
assurance given by the United States had sufficiently removed the applicants’ risk of 
being subjected to the death penalty upon extradition to the United States. More 
importantly, in the context of international judicial cooperation, a presumption of good 
faith should be taken considering the United States’ ‘long history of respect for 
 
680 ibid, para. 73. 
681 Nevertheless, there was a violation of Article 34 of the ECHR for Albania’s non-observance of the interim 
measure, see ibid, paras. 75-88. 
682 Harkins and Edwards v. The United Kingdom App nos 9146/07, 32650/07 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012).  
683 ibid, paras. 6, 23-4. 
684 Based on the bilateral extradition treaty (para. 33), the US requested the extradition of Harkins and Edwards 
from the UK in 2003 and 2007 respectively, providing a series of assurances that the death penalty would not be 
applied in the two cases. See ibid, paras. 7, 9, 12, 14, 25-6, 28. 
685 For the purpose of this thesis, only the alleged risk of the death penalty upon extradition to the US is discussed. 




democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has longstanding extradition 
arrangements with the Contracting States’.687 
 
Conflicts between a state’s treaty-based obligation to extradition and obligations under 
human rights treaties ‘emerge whenever the requested person, after been surrendered, 
faces a real risk that his or her rights will be impaired in the requesting sate.’688 Whilst 
sometimes assurances facilitate extradition to retentionist states, there are times when 
the requesting state finds the demand for an assurance against the death penalty to be 
unreasonable. To be specific, there are cases in which a state with a jurisdictional basis 
may not get the fugitive back to its territory to face the capital trial or the death sentence 
because the state is not willing to relinquish the death penalty and undermine its 
criminal system for the sake international judicial cooperation.  
 
The Moroccan national Mounir el Motassadeq is a high-profile terrorist associated with 
Al-Qaeda and he was accused of being involved in planning, financing, preparing and 
perpetrating the 9/11 terror attacks.689 Motassadeq was arrested in Germany soon after 
the attack and after years of trials in Germany, he was sentenced to 15-year 
imprisonment for his role in the terrorist organisation and the 9/11 attack.690 The US 
did have an extradition relationship with Germany, 691  but it is interesting that 
 
687 ibid, para. 85. 
688 Van Der Wilt, On the hierarchy (n 274) 172. 
689 See UNSC, ‘Mounir el Motassadeq’ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/
summaries/individual/mounir-el-motassadeq> accessed 10 October 2019.  
690 Motassadeq was under a deportation order to Morocco in October 2018, but since then, no further updates have 
been obtained. 




Motassadeq had never been requested by the US since he was arrested in Germany in 
2001, considering the catastrophic damages to the US particularly the death of 
thousands of people caused by the suicide hijackers as well as the US’s resolute and 
intensive tactics of fighting against terrorism.692 In fact, the US government’s decision 
to not request the extradition of Motassadeq was primarily based on the concern that 
Germany, as an abolitionist state, would not extradite people to states where there was 
a real risk of the death penalty unless sufficient assurance was provided. In this case, 
the US was ‘unwilling to compromise their justice standards and accept something less 
than the worst-case punishment.’693  
 
Apart from the situation when the requesting is unwilling to provide assurances, as 
Torstein Stein states, there are many other cases in which resorting to the assurances is 
not possible.694 What we get from this case is that the protection of an individual’s 
human rights comes before the state interests served only by bringing criminal to justice. 
In other words, it provides a clear evidence that the strict approach to Article 2 and the 
death penalty in the Council of Europe may impede international judicial cooperation 
and, in this case, has led to the US not even requesting the extradition.695 
 
 
692 James Finsten, ‘Extradition or Execution-Policy Constraints in the United States’ War on Terror’ (2003) 77 
Southern California Law Review 835-37. 
693 Sadoff (n 23) 311. 
694 For example, ‘in cases where capital punishment is the only punishment prescribed by law and where under the 
law of the requesting state the power of pardon lies with the parliament or the Head if State.’ Torsten Stein, 
‘Extradition’ (2011) MPEPIL 797 para. 24. 
695 Although this is an individual case and admittedly, in the situation where the requested state is unwilling or 
unable to extradite, there may be other alternatives available to avoid the safe haven and impunity. For example, the 
application of aut dedere aut judicare or surrendering the fugitive to the third state or competent international 




4.1.4 Criticism of assurances 
It is widely acknowledged that seeking assurances is currently one of the most common 
methods by which extradition to retentionist states could be achieved, at least better 
than the fugitive going totally unprosecuted or unpunished. However, in some cases, 
even though it could help the retentionist state get the wanted person back, the use of 
assurances is indeed problematic. What makes the matter worse is that in many other 
cases, the assurances are not effective at all. 
 
From the perspectives of retentionist states, the use of assurances is criticised for it 
would affect the retentionist state’s sovereignty and control over its own legal system.696 
In the meantime, its applicability and effectiveness on eliminating the risk of the death 
penalty has also been challenged by some abolitionist states.697 To be more precise, for 
a retentionist state to request extradition from a European state, in order to get the 
fugitive back to its jurisdiction, it has to make concessions regarding the use of the 
death penalty. Providing such a non-execution assurance is the most direct and also 
within the current framework, the only way to bring the fugitive back to stand for trials 
or sentences. In other words, the requesting state that remains the death penalty has no 
alternative but to comply with the prerequisite for the completion of the transfer. The 
retentionist state is compelled to waive the use of the death penalty in particular cases 
where the suspects flee abroad to the territory of the Council of Europe after the 
 
696 Boister (n 16) 381. 





perpetration or in cases where the suspects commit crimes abroad which cause harmful 
effect on the interests of the requesting state.698 The consequence of extradition based 
on the non-execution assurance is apparently a disruption of the integrity of the penal 
system and enforcement jurisdiction of the forum state where the death penalty still 
legally in the domestic legislation.699 For these reasons, meeting the condition of non-
execution is a restriction of the supreme sovereignty of the state as well as its 
independent criminal jurisdiction.700 In other words, as the retentionist state protests, 
its criminal policy on punishment is disrupted and it has to be compromised in specific 
cases due to the request of the other sovereign state, or rather, the requested state 
indirectly interferes or exerts its own policy on the death penalty to the other state.701  
 
In addition to the damage to the retentionist states’ criminal justice system, the use of 
and the reliance on such assurances to meet the difference between states’ policy on the 
death penalty are also criticised for giving rise to different categories of criminals based 
on where they have been extradited from. This is because the exemption from the death 
penalty is only available in individual cases, rather than being applied generally around 
the state. In specific cases, the isolated death penalty bar to extradition serves as an 
approach to help criminals escape from the death execution by fleeing to an abolitionist 
state. In other words, different punishments may be applied to different criminals who 
 
698 States are able to request extradition for extraterritorial offences on the basis of passive personality or protective 
jurisdiction.  
699 Mingkai Zhang, The Standpoint of Criminal Law (China Legal Press 2002) 372. 
700 Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (n 203) 100. 
701 Amnesty International, ‘United States of America: No Return to Execution – The US Death Penalty as a Barrier 




commit similar offence; criminals who are extradited from abolitionists states are 
unduly exempted from the otherwise deserved death sentence due to the premised 
assurance. For example, this approach is advantageous to the wealthy who can buy 
themselves out from the death penalty. Indeed, it is likely to be the fact that the wealthier 
criminals that escape to an abolitionist state, and poorer people who have committed 
the same crime which is eligible for the death penalty are in disadvantaged position 
because they cannot travel abroad, would be more likely to be executed. Admittedly, it 
has to concede that this double standard could be addressed by a universal abolition 
which, in the view of this thesis, could not be realised. 
 
The credibility and enforceability of the assurances are also doubtful, particularly in 
cases where the requested person has not been convicted. For some states, it is not 
practical to provide an assurance, in the pretrial stage, that a particular punishment other 
than the death penalty would be applied. This is far from a sufficiently irrevocable and 
enforceable decision for the abolitionist state to accept. In other words, the credibility 
upon those assurances is slightly different in cases involving the extraditee who is 
convicted or merely accused of committing a crime. In many circumstances, the weight 
and role of the assurance in extraditing cases are not sufficient enough to eliminate the 
extraditee’s risk of the death penalty.702  
 
To sum up, the Member States of the Council of Europe have built up an unequivocal 
 




standard on the issue of the death penalty, which has been explicitly confirmed in 
various legal instruments, including human rights treaties as well as the successive 
Resolutions against the death penalty, and persistently reiterated by the ECtHR in its 
jurisprudence. They expanded the standard via political measures to the new members 
that wishing to join the organisation as well as its Observer States. When a state 
abolishes the death penalty, it is obliged to prevent from put anyone to the risk of facing 
the death penalty in all circumstances. It has to be admitted that the European approach 
to deal with the extradition request from retentionist states is based on its own identities 
and values. More precisely, within the Council of Europe, the death penalty is absolute 
prohibited as the beach of human dignity and human rights, and it contradicts the 
principle of democracy and civilisation. For states that are neither the Member States 
of the Council of Europe nor the signatory state of other abolition treaties, it might be 
unfair for them to abolish the death penalty so as to abide by the requirement in a 
particular extradition case given that, as we saw in Chapter 3, there is no universal 
international legal prohibition of the death penalty. 
 
4.2 Reconsidering states’ irreconcilable interests 
The previous section showed that the use of assurances is not an adequate solution for 
retentionist states. The following two sections elaborate a different, albeit controversial, 
approach, which is, however, rooted in existing European jurisprudence. 
 




as a prohibition on extradition to the death penalty, alongside Article 3. However, the 
recent developments in the UK have brought this issue to a new phase, which has 
reinforced that some European states are not content with this principle. In the ongoing 
ISIS Beatles case,703 disclosed from a leaked letter to the US Attorney General,704 the 
Home Secretary said the UK government would not seek a diplomatic assurance against 
the death penalty of the two high-profile ISIS Beatles suspects Alexanda Kotey and El 
Shafee Elsheikh, upon their removal to the US.705 The decision was condemned for 
undermining the UK’s longstanding absolute opposition to the death penalty as well as 
the long-held policy of seeking assurance against the death penalty in extradition or 
other means of international judicial cooperation. The then Home Secretary Sajid Javid 
justified that there are strong reasons for not setting the precondition against the 
application of the death penalty to cooperate with the US in this specific case for the 
consideration of the determination to fight against terrorism and secure the national 
interests. Although he had admitted that the suspects would face a potential risk of the 
death penalty, such risk should be outweighed by the risk of impunity. The then Security 
Minister Ben Wallace asserted that the assurances would not be necessary when that 
impedes the attempt to uphold criminal justice.706 
 
703 The ISIS Beatles are four notorious terrorists who are responsible for a series of brutal torture and public 
beheading of many Western hostages including journalists and humanitarian aid works in Syria and Iraq. They have 
frequently been referred to Beatles, although some people reject the label for trivializing their conduct. 
704  See Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Sajid Javid Tells US: We Won’t Block Death Penalty for ISIS ‘Beatles’’ 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/22/uk-drops-death-penalty-guantanamo-opposition-opens-door-
execution/> accessed 10 October 2019.  
705 Although both of the two suspects were physically present in Syria, and therefore apparently outside the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR. By extension of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998, the case in respect of them was 
proceeded on the basis of the common law. 
706  See Jamie Grierson, ‘UK Government Criticised over Change in Death Penalty Stance on ISIS Pair’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/23/uk-will-not-oppose-us-death-penalty-for-isis-beatles> 





This decision had been criticised by human rights activists and some British 
politicians,707 on the basis that it would undermine the UK’s long-standing opposition 
to the death penalty, and it would set a precedent and ‘pave the way for further 
assurances to be abandoned’708. Even the mother of journalist James Foley, who was 
murdered by ISIS, opposed to putting them into death trial. Diane Foley said it is 
important that the suspects are tried in an open trial where all would know the crime 
they committed and the death penalty would ‘make them martyrs in their twisted 
ideology’ and is too easy for them.709  In spite of this, the legal challenge to the 
government’s decision in the High Court was rejected in January 2019. The Court stated 
that  
 
‘there is no general, common law duty on Her Majesty’s Government to take positive 
steps to protect an individual’s life from the actions of a third party and that includes 
requiring particular undertakings before complying with an MLA request.’710  
 
 
707 See Parvais Jabbar, ‘Sajid Javid has Betrayed Our Values by Giving Way on the Death Penalty’ <http
s://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/25/sajid-javid-death-penalty-human-rights?CMP=Share_iOSAp
p_Other> accessed 17 May 2019; Yasmeen Serhan, ‘ISIS is Shaking Britain’s Anti–Death Penalty Resolv
e’ <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/britain-beatles-death-penalty/565928/> accessed 1
7 May 2019; Lizzie Dearden, ‘Isis Beatles: UK ‘Must not Let Standards Slip’ in Face of Terror, Ken Cl
arke Warns’ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-fighters-death-penalty-beatles-law-human-
rights-standards-us-slip-ken-clarke-a8460676.html> accessed 17 May 2019.  
708 Jamie Grierson, ‘Is the UK Government’s Stance on the Death Penalty Shifting?’ <https://www.theguar
dian.com/world/2018/jul/23/is-the-uk-governments-stance-on-the-death-penalty-shifting> accessed 17 May 201
9. 
709 Lizzie Dearden, ‘UK Government Should not Let Isis ‘Beatles’ be Made Martyrs through US Death   Penalty, 
says Former Hostage’ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-beatles-us-death-penalty-james-
foley-uk-sajid-javid-trial-jeff-sessions-a8459751.html> accessed 17 May 2019.  




As Richard Walton stated,711 it was a right decision, and the judgment of the High 
Court indicated the priority for combating terrorism on behalf of the national interest, 
which was 
 
‘welcomed with relief by the detectives working on the case at the counter terrorism 
command at Scotland Yard, the CPS lawyers and ministers at the Home Office. Had the 
Government lost, the Home Secretary’s decision not to seek assurances on the death 
penalty from the US would have handed a propaganda victory to Islamic State. It would 
also have emboldened foreign terrorist fighters across the world and seriously undermined 
the UK’s strategy of tackling terrorism through the rule of law.’712  
 
While the case was still awaiting to be heard in the Supreme Court of the UK, the result 
of which could be further reviewed by the ECtHR, in October 2019, the two terrorists 
had been transferred to the US custody. This means, they were getting one step closer 
to be prosecuted by the US court where they are likely to be sentenced to death.713 The 
revelation of this case could be interpreted distinctively. According to the High Court’s 
judgement, ‘the death penalty remains too widespread around the world to make 
credible a submission that customary international law treats the death penalty per se 
 
711 Richard Walton is the former head of counter terrorism command at New Scotland Yard. 
712 Richard Walton, ‘Sajid Javid Made the Right Call on the Isis ‘Beatles’ <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/20
19/01/sajid-javid-made-the-right-call-on-the-isis-beatles/> accessed 3 March 2019.  
713 Dan Sabbagh, ‘US Moves Two British ISIS Fighters from Syria to Iraq’ <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/oct/10/isis-britons-held-hostage-in-syria-moved-by-the-us> accessed 2 November 2019; Andrew B
uncombe, ‘ISIS ‘Beatles’ Moved from Syrian Prison to Face Trial in US’ <https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/isis-beatles-uk-islamic-state-united-states-custody-trial-trump-a9149801.html> accessed 2 




as a cruel or inhuman punishment.’714 As demonstrated in Chapter 3, which is also 
indicated in this case, the absolute condemnation of the death penalty is not found in 
either customary international law or general principles of international law. There 
should have been no absolute prohibition of the death penalty so long as it is ‘properly 
carried out’715. In such cases, it could be argued that there is no legal support for the 
prohibition of providing mutual legal assistance in circumstances where the individual 
concerned is at a risk of the death penalty.716 
 
Furthermore, this case set another very clear example of the fact that the Member State 
of the Council of Europe does not, in all circumstances, oppose extradition to states that 
impose the death penalty. Since Soering case, the ECtHR has always attempted to 
interpret in favour of the death penalty bar to extradition. However, even take that point 
of view, it might be too far to say that the dispute has been settled. Perhaps there is a 
difference between the stated aims of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and the practice of certain ECHR Contracting Parties. The Council of 
Europe, which is matched by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, requires a high level of 
guarantees against inter alia flagrant denial of a fair hearing, infliction of torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and the imposition of the death penalty. However, it 
is quite clear that even within the Council of Europe, not all Member States equivalently 
share the identical standard of the Council of Europe on the death penalty issue at all 
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time in practice. There are some states that do not completely share this view, especially 
when national interest and public security are at serious risk.  
 
The UK has been one of the leading critics of the ECtHR’s high standards on the 
absolute and non-derogable protection under Article 3 of the ECHR. It considered the 
Court’s rigorous interpretation of Article 3 unduly interfered with the UK’s public 
policy in safeguarding national interests, particularly involving people who are suspects 
of representing a security threat. In fact, successive UK governments have argued that 
it should be allowed to qualify Article 3 in expulsion cases since Chahal case. In Chahal 
v. the United Kingdom case, the applicant claimed that his deportation from the UK to 
India would expose him to the risk of torture and other ill-treatment contrary to Article 
3. The UK government justified its decision to deport Chahal based on his involvement 
of a series of criminal offences.717 For this reason, ‘his continued presence in the 
United Kingdom was unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security 
and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against 
terrorism.’718 In addition, the UK argued that the protection under Article 3 should not 
be absolute in cases where states are intended to expel individuals on the grounds of 
national security.719 In other words, the national security threat posed by the individual, 
including the degree and nature of the threat, should be accepted as relevant factors in 
evaluating the risk of torture and other ill-treatment and whether states’ removal would 
 
717 Chahal case, paras. 23-4, 30. 
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engage the responsibility under Article 3.720 
 
In response, the Court clarified the confusion resulting from its earlier judgment in 
Soering case.721 It reaffirmed that Article 3 absolutely prohibits torture and other ill-
treatment with no exception or derogation, which is equally applied in expulsion 
cases722 where no ‘room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for 
expulsion in determining whether a State’s responsibility under Article 3 (art 3) is 
engaged.’723 For these accounts, the Court held that the UK government’s argument on 
taking the absolute protection of Article 3 into the test of the balance of interests was 
not acceptable. The priority should be placed in the unqualified protection of an 
individual’s right under Article 3 in its conflict with extradition or national interests 
concerns. Nevertheless, the Court did explicitly acknowledge in Chahal and the 
following cases that the States Parties are facing growing difficulties in protecting the 
national security and public interests, particularly in the context of ‘war on terror’.724 
It certainly indicates that the Court recognises ‘the force of security considerations but 
declines to give way to them.’725  
 
Furthermore, it is intriguing to observe that the Court’s conclusion was not reached 
unanimously.726  Although the UK’s arguments were not accepted by the majority 
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(twelve out of nineteen), there were still judges giving a different opinion regarding the 
threshold of assessing the ill-treatment under Article 3. 727  More specifically, the 
possibility or nature of the risk of torture and other ill-treatment in the receiving state 
is varying in cases and should have an impact on the determination of states’ 
responsibility of expelling individuals on national security grounds. The joint dissenting 
opinion, particularly referred to the situation in Soering case, where the applicant was 
requested on the basis of bilateral extradition agreement to face a death penalty trial 
involving the ‘death row phenomenon’. The potential treatment upon extraditing to the 
US was much straightforward as no national security threat was concerned.728 As the 
UK government stated that the alleged violation of Article 3 is an ‘uncertain prediction 
of future event in the receiving state’729 and includes ‘varying degrees of risk of ill-
treatment’730. A balanced and proportionate approach should be adopted in defining the 
threshold of what does or does not amount to the mistreatment prescribed in Article 3, 
which should be weighed against the threat and danger posed by the person concerned 
if he were not removed.731 
 
The Court’s decision of Chahal case was deemed to exert a profound effect and imialr 
issue was also raised in the subsequent Saadi v. Italy case,732 Ben Khemais v. Italy 
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Gotchev and Levits in Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], (15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V). 
728 ibid, paras. 3-5. 
729 Chahal case, para. 76. 
730 ibid 
731 ibid 




case,733 and Ramzy v. the Netherlands case.734 Based on the observations of these cases, 
it had to admit that while the ECtHR consistently remains committed to the Chahal 
approach, it is clear that several European states have increasingly grave concerns about 
its impact upon national security as well as international judicial cooperation. That is 
to say, the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments is frequently challenged by its States 
Parties. It is these states, and also those that have been found in violation of Article 2 in 
relation to extradition and expulsion cases, that would be most likely to support greater 
recognition of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
 
This chapter so far has shown that there are some dissatisfactions with the way that the 
human rights law is currently restraining states’ attempts to extradite or deport people. 
This is particularly important, taking into account the ever-changing global context. 
The very recent developments in the ISIS Beatles case,735 suggest that it has brought 
the controversies into the death penalty cases, which could be viewed to weaken one of 
the core values of the Council of Europe: the European abolitionism. This section does 
not intend to exaggerate the impact of this case. However, it indeed shows that the UK 
has compromised its policy and principle against the death penalty, which could be seen 
as an unprecedented departure from the British government’s longstanding practice of 
insisting on assurances that an extraditee will not face the death penalty. It might send 
 
733 Ben Khemais v. Italy App no 246/07 (ECtHR, 24 February 2009). 
734 Ramzy v. The Netherlands App no 25424/05 (ECtHR, 20 October 2010). 
735 As a matter of fact, prior to this case, it was revealed from the letter of the then Security Minister 
Ben Wallace to a Green Party MP that there had been two more cases where the assurances against the 
death penalty were waived, although he did not provide any further details. See Adam Lusher, ‘UK Drop
ped Death Penalty Assurances in Two Previous Cases before ISIS Jihadis, Home Office Admits’, <https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/death-penalty-jihadi-beatles-assurances-dropped-other-cases-sajid-javid-




a message that the absolute objection to the death penalty in international judicial 
cooperation is not uncompromised. It is irrefutable to argue that the ECtHR’s 
abolitionist policy is not universal and not required by wider international law. More 
importantly, even its own States Parties do not fully share it. 
 
4.3 Recognising the margin of appreciation in extradition law  
If the previous discussion explains the dissatisfactions with the current approach to deal 
with the death penalty—extradition dilemma and why the ECtHR should make the 
suggested change, this section aims at setting up a mechanism to meet the particular 
need for either non-European retentionist states to get their fugitives extradited from 
the European state without the use of assurances, or the European states to extradite for 
their own national interests. That is to say, the margin of appreciation doctrine could, 
in theory, be adopted as the approach.  
 
It should not be omitted that the overall prerequisite for the argument made here is not 
only the relevant political arguments and the limitations of extradition law illustrated 
in the first two chapters, but more importantly, as adequately demonstrated in Chapter 
3, the lawful application of the death penalty is not prohibited in general international 
law, notwithstanding its prohibition in certain regional human rights treaties such as 
Protocol 13 to the ECHR. On this basis, it has a more realistic possibility and 
significance to conduct on further analysis with respect to reconsider the applicability 




flexibility, and the margin of appreciation could be brought into extradition cases to 
deal with the death penalty, where at present it does not seem to fit.  
 
In general, there are significant reasons defending this argument. It could be justified 
by the rationale of the doctrine per se and more importantly, it has been observed that 
states usually had a relatively wider margin of appreciation their responses to 
transnational criminality and international terrorism so as to protect the national 
security and public interests, which were not subjected to the strict scrutiny.736 While 
looking at the likelihood of the proposed approach being adopted, there are some, albeit 
isolated and minimum, instances of European politicians appearing to support this point 
of view; and there seems to be a greater willingness to try to restrain the ECtHR, as 
indicated by the reference to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity in the Brighton 
Declaration and then in Protocol No. 15. The margin of appreciation, in this thesis, is 
discussed within the ECHR system only, although its application is arguably beyond 
the ECHR.737 
 
4.3.1 What the margin of appreciation is 
 
736 Paul De Hert, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty within the European Human Rights Framework. A Critical 
Reading of the Court’s Case Law in the Light of Surveillance and Criminal Law Enforcement Strategies after 9/11’ 
(2005)1 Utrecht Law Review 72-3. 
737  For further analysis, See Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: 
Deference and Proportionality (OUP 2012) 3-6, 31-6; Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?’(2006) 16 European Journal of International Law; Dominic McGoldrick, ‘A Defence 
of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 65 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 21-60; also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social 




The doctrine of the margin of appreciation in human rights law is a crucial legal 
construction established and has been widely and explicitly recognised by the ECtHR 
in its abundant jurisprudence for decades. It provides ‘a middle ground’ to reconcile for 
the diversities or ‘local variation’738 of the different States Parties without sacrificing 
the commitment to protect human rights,739 especially reflected in cases involving 
difficult or sensitive legal, political, cultural and social issues in the context of human 
rights protection. In those cases, it has been proved that states are likely to be conferred 
a relatively wide margin of appreciation, and thus, the Court’s standard of review is less 
strict.740  
 
Nevertheless, neither the ECHR nor the ECtHR gives an explicit definition of the 
margin of appreciation. The essence of the doctrine has been broadly recognised from 
the academic perspective. For example, James Sweeney refers it to be applied by the 
ECtHR to ‘measure and police states’ discretion to interfere with or otherwise limit 
human rights in specific instances.’ 741  He further explains that ‘[i]n essence it 
expresses that Contracting Parties have some space in which they can balance for 
themselves conflicting public goods’. 742  Steven Greer defines the margin of 
appreciation as ‘the room for manoeuvre the Strasbourg institutions are prepared to 
 
738 Andrew Legg, ‘Human Rights, the Margin of Appreciation, and the International Rule of Law’ in Machiko 
Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestations 
and Deference (Bloomsbury Publishing 2016) 267. 
739  ibid; Douglas Lee Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory International Law Review 91. 
740 See McGoldrick (n 737) 26-7. 
741 James Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the 





accord national authorities in fulfiling their obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights.’743 In Andrew Legg’s view, ‘[i]t is a doctrine of deference according 
to which international human rights tribunals grant a degree of latitude to a respondent 
state’s conception of its international human rights obligations in a particular case.’744 
George Letsas put forward an argument that the margin of appreciation has two 
different uses: the substantive concept and the structural concept.745 He claims that the 
limitability of the Convention rights implies an inherent conflict between the interests 
of individuals and that of the collective, which is what the margin of appreciation and 
the proportionality test address.746 Howard Charles Yourow provides a more detail 
explanation: 
 
The national margin of appreciation or discretion can be defined in the European Human 
Rights Convention context as the freedom to act; manoeuvring, breathing or ‘elbow’ room; 
or the latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to national 
legislative, executive or judicial bodies before it is prepared to declare a national 
derogation from the Convention, or restriction or limitation upon a right guaranteed by 
the Convention, to constitute a violation of one of the Convention’s substantive 
guarantees.747   
   
 
743 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Council of Europe 2000) 5. 
744 Legg, Human Rights, the Margin of Appreciation, and the International Rule of Law (n 738) 247. 
745 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705-
32. 
746 ibid 
747 Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 




Broadly speaking, the effect of the margin of appreciation is regarded to be far-reaching 
since it opened the door to look at the human rights’ relations to state’s general interests 
and we get a sense that the public benefits are concerned in assessing the threshold of 
the violation of states’ human rights obligations. It is a ‘tempting’ tool designed to 
coordinate the relationship between the Court and State Parties by conferring the latter 
the ‘room for maneuver’, which is a reasonable breadth of leeway or flexibility in 
carrying out their Convention obligations. Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, reflected by the 
agreement reached upon the Brighton Declaration,748 introduced a precise reference to 
the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation to the Preamble of the ECHR 
as follows,   
 
‘[a]ffirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in 
this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights established by this Convention.’749 
 
By doing so, the doctrine has been framed in the Convention in the way of prominence. 
It is worth pointing out that according to the above provision and as illustrated in the 
 
748 See para. 12(b). 
749 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 




Explanatory Report, 750  the margin of appreciation is not limited to particular 
Convention rights. The reference to it in the amended Preamble appears to apply to all 
rights in the Convention, even those in respect of which it has not traditionally played 
a role.751 For this reason, it indeed enlarges the width of the margin of appreciation in 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. However, it needs to notify that this view is still 
challenged by commentators, which will be looked at later, and that Protocol No. 15 
has not yet come into effect. 
 
It has been extensively acknowledged that the ‘tripartite requirements’752 approach is 
adopted to justify the interference within the margin of appreciation doctrine, among 
which the test of proportionality is the final stage of the assessment and often regarded 
as the predominant one.753 The test is essential to delimit the margin of appreciation in 
specific cases and determine the legality of the interference,754 which most commonly 
refers to the requirement of a ‘reasonable relationship’ or a ‘fair balance’755 between 
 
750 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 
Explanatory Report, para. 9. 
751 For example, see Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law 
Review 184; McGoldrick (n 737) 23. 
752 The interference should be prescribed by law, be justified by the pursuance of a legitimate aim and be limited to 
appropriately necessary to the aim. The set of requirements are sometimes described as ‘legality’, ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’. Notably, those different stages of test are not clearly delineated, which overlap each 
other.   
753  The principle of proportionality is regarded as ‘a yardstick for evaluating whether the national authorities 
overstep the margin or not.’ See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) 14; Letsas, Two Concepts of Margin of 
Appreciation (n 745) 711. 
754 Arai-Takahashi (n 753) 190-205, Janneke Gerards, General Principles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (CUP 2019) 229-69. 
755 It should be noticed that the use of the term ‘balanced’ or ‘balancing’ to deal with the conflicts between two 
Conventions rights or between individuals’ rights and collective goods or public interests is controversial and ‘raises 
deep theoretical problems’. For example, Steven Greer concludes ‘while it is not inappropriate for the Court and 
others to use the balance metaphor when considering, or referring to, the resolution of conflicts between Convention 
rights and the collective good, a much clearer understanding is needed of the different ways in which the Convention 
requires priority to be given to rights in reaching an appropriate result.’ Steven Greer, The European Convention on 
Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP 2006) 203-213, 227-8. Andrew Ashworth states that 
both the methodology of the balance approach and the outcome of striking a balance are problematic, which are too 




the interference of the Convention rights (the means) and the reasons justifying that 
interference (the aims). For example, in Osman v. the United Kingdom case, the Court 
provided a brief explanation on how the proportionality works in the context of the 
margin of appreciation: 
 
[in cases where] the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although 
the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the 
Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access 
left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right 
is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible…if it does not pursue a 
legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.756  
 
However, the balance between the conflicts of the general interests and the interests of 
the individual is not ‘something that is amenable to scientific determination. It is, rather, 
a matter of judgment, in the fullest sense of the word.’757 The decision-making process 
is understood in various forms and applied with different interpretations according to 
‘the applicable Convention provision, the circumstances of the case, the nature of the 
 
reasonable compromise.’ See Ashworth (n 74) 207-10. Janneke Gerards holds that it ‘does not always imply an actual 
choice to be made between conflicting rights and interests, in the sense that one interest or right has to prevail over 
another one. Instead, it may be important to look for reconciliation or for a middle ground.’ See Gerards, General 
Principles of the ECHR (n 754) 247. For the subject of this thesis, a balanced viewing does not, in its strict sense, 
require the weight and value given to the interests of the individual and the collective to be exactly same in all cases. 
756 Osman v. The United Kingdom App no 87/1997/871/1083 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998) para. 147. 
757 Fiona de Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Great Debates on the European Convention on Human Rights 




complaints and the positions of the parties.’758 For example, in the approach proposed 
by Andrew Legg, the assessment is composed of two different types of reasons, namely, 
‘first-order reasons’ and ‘second-order reasons’, both of which involve a combination 
of various complex factors.759 
 
4.3.2 Controversies of the margin of appreciation 
The margin of appreciation is not without its controversies and objections. While some 
commentators oppose its existence at all, most people held that the doctrine is 
problematic in regard to a number of aspects. A number of the most frequently claimed 
points will be briefly expounded in this subsection.  
 
To be precise, many commentators contend that it injects too much uncertainty, 
flexibility, inconsistency, unpredictability and confusion in human rights law.760 In 
particular, the scope of applicability of the margin of appreciation is varying in different 
circumstances, and no clear and consistent standards have been established to 
regulating the scope, which accounts as one of the most critically debatable issues.761 
Even though the margin of appreciation is established in one case, it does not guarantee 
the same standard or level of deference is equivalently applied to other cases involving 
 
758 Gerards, General Principles of the ECHR (n 754) 231. 
759 For details, see Legg, Human Rights, the Margin of Appreciation, and the International Rule of Law (n 738) 254-
6; Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (n 737) 194-7. 
760 For discussion on criticisms, see Anthony Lester, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 European 
Human Rights Law Review; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 
31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843; Letsas, Two Concepts of Margin of 
Appreciation (n 745) 705; George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP 2007); Jan Kratochvíl, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights; Janneke Gerards, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Incrementalism and 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 498-506. 




similar issues. For example, Steven Greer describes its characteristics as ‘casuistic, 
uneven, and largely unpredictable’.762 In Jeffrey Brauch’s opinion, the case-specific 
analysis of particular rights would give rise to the inconsistency, undermining the 
authorities and quality of human rights law and also eroding the legal certainty.763 In 
Janneke Gerards claims that the margin of appreciation per se is of ‘flexibility and 
variability’764.  
 
The width of the margin of appreciation not only determines the Court’s intensity of 
review or the extent of deference afforded to states, but also affects whether the state 
involved deals with the conflicting interests proportionately or comes up with a fair 
balance.765 However, the breadth of margin conferred to the state in different cases 
cannot be recapitulated into an explicit and normative criterion. This gives rise to a 
great deal of scepticism as determining whether the state is overstepping the margin of 
appreciation, namely, whether the individuals’ rights and public interests have been 
proportionately dealt with. 766  The unclear scope of an applicable margin of 
appreciation results in the uncertain level of the Court’s review. More specifically, the 
words that are commonly used to describe the deferred margin, including ‘wide’, 
‘narrow’ and ‘certain’, are neither explicit nor consistent. For example, in many cases, 
a declared wide margin did not necessarily result in actual flexibilities or lenient 
 
762 Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights (n 754) 223. 
763 Jeffrey A Brauch, ‘The Dangerous Search for and Elusive Consensus: What the Supreme Court Should Learn 
from the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 52 Howard Law Journal 277. 
764 Gerards, General Principles of the ECHR (n 754) 172. 





scrutiny by the Court.767 Even in some cases, invoking a wide margin did not give rise 
to any apparent deference at all.768 That is to say, the Court makes its own assessment 
irrespective of the applicability of the doctrine, which does not ‘bear any real 
significance for the Court’s review of reasonableness, in that it does not have any 
measurable impact on the standards it uses in assessing that reasonableness.’ 769 
Furthermore, it has been accepted that a number of factors are relevant to determining 
the scope of the margin, which will be discussed in the section below. However, how 
those factors work in the assessment has never unambiguous, particularly when the 
factors involved pull in the opposite direction.770   
 
Secondly, relativism and local variation versus the universality of human rights has 
been one of the principal debates since the doctrine was introduced. The deference of 
the margin manifests that the Court has accepted ‘human rights obligations can, in 
certain circumstances, be implemented in different ways in different places.’771 For 
such reason, the doctrine is alleged to undermine the universality of human rights 
law.772 For instance, Eyal Benvenisti insists that  
 
The juridical output of the ECHR and other international bodies carries the promise of 
setting universal standards for the protection and promotion of human rights. These 
 
767 Kratochvíl (n 760) 337-42; Gerards, Incrementalism (n 760) 502-6. 
768 ibid 
769 Gerards, Incrementalism (n 760) 505. 
770 ibid, 502-3. 
771 Legg, Human Rights, the Margin of Appreciation, and the International Rule of Law (n 738) 247. 
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universal aspirations are, to a large extent, compromised by the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation.[…] Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral 
relativism is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights.[…]Moreover, 
its use may compromise the credibility of the applying international organ.[…]773 
 
In his partly dissenting opinion in Z v. Finland case, Judge De Meyer held that ‘it is 
high time for the Court to banish that concept from its reasoning. It has already delayed 
too long in abandoning this hackneyed phrase and recanting the relativism it implies.’774  
 
However, James Sweeney believes that the objection in this regard is ill founded. In his 
opinion, the universality concept per se is questionable. Universality is not equivalent 
to uniformity, and the application of this doctrine does not ‘necessarily amount to 
relativism’775 or weaken the level of universal human rights.776 Instead, this doctrine 
‘plays an important role in mediating between universality and particularism in the 
Convention system.’ 777  James Sweeney states that ‘while maintaining ‘universal’ 
human rights, there may be some defensible local qualification.’778 It is undoubted that 
different places of the world would have different views and understandings of human 
rights, which is the fact that human rights law needs to recognise in order to be realistic 
and vibrant. ‘It would be highly undesirable to impose the same interpretation of 
 
773 Benvenisti (n 760) 843-44. 
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universally shared values on all peoples. It would also be problematic to insist on a 
uniform protection of such rights in all the world’s many different legal systems.’779 
As Eleni Frantziou states, the margin of appreciation ‘ensures that a minimum level of 
human rights protection is met in all contracting states, while at the same time allowing 
some scope for differentiation in light of the particularities of each jurisdiction.’780  
 
Thirdly, in many cases,781  the use of the margin of appreciation is alleged to be 
‘rhetorical’.782 There is an argument that ‘the idea of the margin of appreciation is not 
used to express a general point about the limitability of rights but to express a final 
determination as to whether the state has violated a right in some particular case.’783 
According to Jan Kratochvíl’s observation, in cases where the margin of appreciation 
is unrelated to the Court’s analysis, the doctrine is redundant. It would get worse if the 
doctrine actually plays a role in the Court’s decision-making process but without 
explaining what the role exactly is in a specific case.784 
 
In summary, in light of the above undeniable problems and criticisms, two specific 
points need to be stressed here. On the one hand, most of the problems of the margin of 
appreciation are about its application, rather than the essence or underlying value of the 
doctrine. As Steven Greer concludes, ‘most commentators maintain that greater clarity, 
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coherence and consistency in its application are required instead.’ 785  From this 
perspective, it should and could be reformed to serve its designed role of serving as an 
‘instrument to negotiate between the interests concerned with national and 
supranational decision-making and the interest of protecting fundamental rights on a 
sufficiently high level.’786 On the other hand, it is not the purpose of this thesis or 
chapter to conduct the research on how the doctrine could be reconstructed so as to 
achieve its target. In contrast, it is worth mentioning that the reference to the margin of 
appreciation is to prove that it could be used in an extradition case to circumvent the 
death penalty exception for the sake of combating transnational crimes. In other words, 
the ultimate purpose here is not just to defend the margin of appreciation against its 
critics. In contrast, it is about the need to combat transnational crime via international 
cooperation, while the margin of appreciation is advocated as a vehicle for meeting the 
difference in the death penalty policies. 
 
4.3.3 Justifications of the margin of appreciation 
The margin of appreciation, especially several principal reasons that justify and 
underpin this doctrine, has been substantially discussed in the literature with critical 
comments and suspicions at the same time.787 Nevertheless, a few points in relation to 
 
785 Greer, The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 81) 5. 
786 Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 107. See also, Greer, The Margin of Appreciation (n 743) 5. 
787 For example, John Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1993); Yourow (n 747); Arai-Takahashi (n 753); Sweeney, Margins of 
Appreciation in the Post-Cold War Era (n 741) 459-74; Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights (n 754); 
Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation (n 737) 907-40; Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International 
Human Rights Law (n 737); Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (4th edn, OUP 
2017); Pieter Van Dijk and Others (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (5th 




the main argument of this thesis are still worthwhile to be precisely underlined.  
 
The margin of appreciation, as a judicial self-restraint doctrine,788 is defended based 
on the ‘subsidiarity principle’789 and the ‘better position’790 of national authorities. To 
be specific, the doctrine is the expression of one of the underlying principles of the 
ECHR system, which is ‘subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at the national 
level and that national authorities are in principle better placed than an international 
court to evaluate local needs and conditions.’791 The principle of subsidiarity has been 
accepted by the ECtHR in its case law dating back to the Belgian Linguistics case. It 
delineates the respective roles of the national authorities and the Court in maintaining 
effective operation of the Convention, while the primary responsibility lies with the 
Contracting Parties in both substantive and procedure aspects. 792  Against this 
background, the interplay and dialogue between national authorities and the Court is a 
significant issue, albeit contentious regarding interpretation.793 It is often argued that 
subsidiarity indicates a certain extent of judicial deference, 794  and the margin of 
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appreciation is deemed as a vehicle for achieving that purpose by assessing the 
proportionality of limitations on certain Convention rights.795 
 
The adoption of the margin of appreciation largely helps the Court to deal with its 
relationship with State Parties.796 It is alleged that the State Parties are increasingly 
demanding respect for their national values and democratic legitimacy in the decision-
making process,797 which was expressed in the successive declarations on the Future 
of the ECtHR and finally codified in Protocol No. 15.798 The doctrine makes the 
Court’s scrutiny upon domestic authorities ‘tolerable and politically acceptable’,799 and 
makes it possible for the Court to counterbalance its primary role of safeguarding the 
minimum standard of fundamental human rights protection, with the respect for its State 
Parties’ sovereign interests,800 and to a certain extent, the value of democratic decision-
making.801 There is little doubt that the latter is also an essential condition of the 
effective implementation of the Convention as well as the guarantee of the compliance 
of the Court’s judgment at the national level.802 In other words, the legitimacy of the 
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Court and its judgments could be enhanced through this way.803   
 
Furthermore, the better position rationale also underpins the doctrine. The deference of 
the margin ‘directs the ECtHR to make decisions that are substantively good’ as the 
national authorities often have the knowledge, the expertise and resources that the Court 
and its judges do not have.804  Those qualities equip the national authorities with 
competence to make a right decision. For example, with regard to some domestic affairs, 
it is accepted that national authorities are better placed than international courts and 
judges to make assessments of both the overall situations and the specific issues since 
the former is ‘likely to be more closely acquainted with national problems, 
(constitutional) traditions, sensitivities and debates.’ 805  In other words, states 
authorities have better knowledge of what kind of measures and policies are needed in 
different times, and what level of restrictions of individual human rights are required 
for the sake of the specific national interests.806  
 
By distinguishing a wide or narrow margin of appreciation, albeit abstractly, the 
doctrine provides states with flexibilities in reconciling the value of effective protection 
of human rights and necessity of the limitation of these rights to a certain degree. 
Janneke Gerards asserts that the strength of the doctrine lies in the given flexibility,807 
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805 Gerards, Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine (n 786) 85. 
806 Yuval Shany considers that ‘national authorities enjoy comparative institutional advantages over international 
courts with regard to fact-finding and fact-assessing exercises, but not in relational to norm-interpretation projects.’ 
Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation (n 737) 911.  




which could embrace the differences without compromising the essence of human 
rights protection. The flexibility is directly affected by the width of the margin deferred 
to the state. A number of relevant factors may determine the scope of the margin of 
application in diverse circumstances. The Court has tried to explain those factors, for 
example, in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom case, the Court explained that  
 
A margin of appreciation must be left to the competent national authorities in this 
assessment. The breadth of this margin varies and depends on a number of factors, 
including the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual, the 
nature of the interference and the object pursued by the interference. The margin will tend 
to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment 
of intimate or key rights…Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted… Where, 
however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either 
as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to how best to protect it, the 
margin will be wider…808  
 
Although the above general concerns have neither completely clarified the issue nor 
provided a set of explicit guidance on the extent of applicable margin in practice, we 
cannot deny the existence and value of the flexibility and adaptability that the doctrine 
 
808 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008) para. 102. 
Similar description could also be found in Evans v. The United Kingdom App no 6339/05 (ECtHR, 10 April 2007) 




affords. What it needs is an in-depth interpretation of those factors and consistent 
applications by the Court.  
 
There has not been a straightforward criterion on how the doctrine works. Nevertheless, 
in theory, a range of factors are relevant to determining the width the margin of 
appreciation, three of which will be discussed as they are mostly relevant to the purpose 
of this thesis. At first, the nature of rights is an important factor directly affecting the 
application of the margin of appreciation.809 It differentiates the width of the margin or 
namely, the weight of justification required for restrictions. For example, when the case 
concerns the fundamental right to life, compared with qualified right under Article 8-
11, a stronger level of reasons is needed to justify the interference and more 
sophisticated circumstances are getting involved.810  
 
The doctrine was initially applied to cases referred to derogations in time of 
emergency,811 but its relevance has evolved to all substantive Convention rights.812 
‘The jurisprudence of the Court makes clear that the States Parties enjoy a margin of 
appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, depending on the 
circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged.’813 However, this view 
is not universally agreed. It has in the past been observed that the margin of appreciation 
 
809 Nevertheless, it is still debatable regarding which is the most dominant factor determining the applicability of 
the margin of appreciation.  
810 Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights (n 754) 241-4. 
811 Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘The Emergence of Diversity: Diferences in Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (1995) 19 
Fordham International Law Journal 112; Kratochri, 329; Greer, The Margin of Appreciation (n 743) 8-9. 
812 Yourow (n 747) 15-24; Arai-Takahashi (n 753) 5-8.  




does not normally apply to Article 2 and its role in Article 3 cases is particularly 
controversial and complicated.814 This is indeed a misunderstanding as to the law as it 
stands today.815 In regard of Article 2, for example, when defining the scope of life 
including when it begins and when it is ended, and also when assessing the justification 
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war according to Article 15 of the ECHR, the 
margin of appreciation is undoubtedly conferred from the Court. Concerning the 
absolute right under Article 3, although there is no express recognition of a margin of 
appreciation, it is not to say that contextual factors never play a role, especially when 
interpreting the threshold of the violation of Article 3. Namely, the ‘minimum level of 
severity’ or the ‘likelihood’816 that any alleged ill-treatment would indeed substantially 
materialise.817 For example, in Harmen van der Wilt’s opinion, the importance of the 
value served by extradition should be considered in evaluating the threshold of whether 
a treatment amount to the violation of Article 3.818 Nonetheless, a stronger justification 
is required for states to restrict those fundamental rights, including Articles 2 and 3.819 
For the purpose of this thesis, the doctrine’s application in Article 2 cases would be 
 
814 For example, there are scholars claiming that this doctrine plays no role in relation to them or at least there is no 
explicitly mentioned practice of the margin of appreciation in these areas. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘The Evolving 
Jurisprudence of the European Convention Concerning the Right to Life’ (2001) 19 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 31; and also in two of the leading monographs on this doctrine written by Yutaka Arai-Takahashi and Howard 
Charles Yourow, there is no evidence for the margin of appreciation to Article 2 and 3. 
815 For example, in his recent work, Andrew Legg explicitly expounds that the right to life falls with the applicable 
scope of the margin of appreciation. See Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (n 
737) 204-10; Janneke Gerards clarifies that ‘on rare and very sensitive occasions, the Court has even afforded a 
margin of appreciation to States on core Article 2 issues.’ For Article 3, ‘the Court has applied the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in relation to certain aspects of sentencing policies…’ See Gerards, General Principles of the 
ECHR (n 754) 169-70. 
816 Strictly speaking, it is not just on the likelihood of the alleged treatment, the Court has admitted that the threshold 
is judged according to the circumstances. It examines the threshold of the treatment against the context of the case, 
so that treatment that would be inhumane in one context might not be in another. 
817 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (3rd edn, Routledge 2002) 44-5; Londras and Dzehtsiarou (n 
757) 95, 109. 
818 Van Der Wilt, On the hierarchy (n 274) 157. 




specifically focused, the discussion on which will be continued in the next section. 
  
Secondly, the aforementioned better position account is also linked to the factor that 
affects the scope of the margin of appreciation, namely, ‘the type of case’. In Andrew 
Legg’s words, ‘[t]he type of case is […] an acknowledgement that certain sorts of cases 
often give rise to stronger reasons for deference than others.’820 This point is significant 
not only because it exactly reflects the practical needs of the discretion to restrain 
certain individual human rights, but also because it explicitly pinpoints the situations in 
which state parties are more struggling with their human rights obligation in the context 
of national governance.  
 
Thirdly, the consensus is another indispensable aspect that is closely related to the scope 
or the existence of the doctrine. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou contends that looking for 
consensus is a legitimate way of judging whether a social trend has become established 
by the majority of the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. Furthermore, ‘a properly 
identified and coherently applied European consensus is a criterion that determines the 
breadth of the margin of appreciation in a more objective, transparent and predictable 
manner than achieved through the application of other criteria…’821 As a general rule, 
the existence of widely acknowledged rules or practice leaves a rather narrow margin 
of appreciation. Conversely, a lack or no consensus justifies a wider margin with a 
 
820 Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (n 737) 216. Legg lists several types of 
expertise in which national authorities are believed to be a preponderant position, including national security, 
policing and civil service, economic matters and so forth. 




higher degree of deference to states. Nevertheless, the application of the consensus has 
its limitations. The Court has clarified that lack of consensus is not always decisive as 
it does nor ‘automatically leave the issues within the area of state discretion.822 More 
importantly, states are still able to defend the inconformity with the established 
consensus in some instances.  
 
4.3.4 Reconsidering the margin of appreciation under Article 2 of the ECHR 
There are circumstances in which even the most important rights may need to be 
considered in the light of other factors. For example, in Andrew Ashworth’s points, 
human rights are both ‘fundamental and contestable’, which should not be seen as 
absolute.823 There are many ways in which public interests can be taken into account 
to limits human rights. Furthermore, although the anti-majoritarian nature of human 
rights means that it needs to ‘defend the interests of individuals or minorities against 
those of the majority or the collective’,824 it is imperative to ‘capture the true value of 
human rights’ and to draw attention to the interests deriving from ordre public.825 
 
There are, in legal terms, some signs, albeit very limited, that the margin of appreciation 
could be applied to Article 2 in the death penalty in the same way as it has applied in 
relation to other types of end of life decisions. Therefore, the argument raised in this 
thesis could not be taken as entirely fanciful or unrealistic. To be specific, the ECtHR’s 
 
822 Hirst case, para. 82. 






jurisprudence has sustained the doctrine’s relevance to Article 2 in different aspects of 
the right to life. Two specific cases will be examined as follows. In Vo v. France case,826 
which was about the involuntary medical termination of the pregnancy of a Vietnamese 
French Thi-Nho Vo. Vo attended to hospital for her six-month pregnancy regular check, 
where she was mixed up with another woman with same surname Vo, who was expected 
to remove the contraceptive coil. The doctor pierced her amniotic sac, causing the loss 
of a substantial amount of amniotic fluid, and after further examination, the pregnancy 
had to be terminated for safety concerns.827 It was advised by the expert report that at 
the time of abortion, the baby was between 20 and 21 weeks old.828  
 
Vo lodged a criminal complaint against the doctor before the French court on the ground 
of unintentional injury for herself and unintentional killing of her baby.829 After her 
claims were rejected by the French Court of Cassation, the case was finally brought to 
the ECtHR by Vo against French authorities for their failures to protect the unborn child. 
Namely, the failure to classify taking the life of the unborn foetus as unintentional 
killing, and the failure to criminalize such act as a violation of its obligation under 
Article 2 of the ECHR. For these reasons, the issue of whether France was obliged to 
ensure, in its criminal law, a foetus could be taken as the victim of unintentionally 
killing and considered as a human being with the protection of the right to life was a 
bone of contention.830 
 
826 Vo v. France App no 53924/00 (ECtHR, 08 July 2004). 
827 ibid, paras. 10-2. 
828 ibid, para. 14. 
829 ibid, paras. 13-22. 





The Court held that when the life begins should be a question determined at national 
level with certain endemic factors.831 Furthermore, ‘it is neither desirable, nor even 
possible as matters stand, to answer in abstract the question whether the unborn child 
is a person for the purposes of Article 2…’832 In this case, the margin of appreciation 
was explicitly recognised in relation to Article 2, concerning the start of ‘life’ or rather, 
whether the unborn foetus is entitled to the protection of the right to life under Article 
2. The Court states that 
 
[…] the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation 
which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere...The reasons 
for that conclusion are, firstly, that the issue of such protection has not been resolved 
within the majority of the Contracting States themselves, in France in particular, where it 
is the subject of debate and, secondly, that there is no European consensus on the scientific 
and legal definition of the beginning of life.833 
 
In the case of Lambert and Others v. France,834  Vincent Lambert was in chronic 
vegetative status after a traffic accident. One of the main controversies was raised with 
respect to whether the decision to withdraw the life-sustaining medical treatment 
 
remedy for unintentional homicide of unborn foetus. The Court held that there was no violation of Article 2 on the 
hypothesis that Article 2 was applicable to unborn foetus. See also Aurora Plomer, ‘A foetal right to life? The case 
of Vo v France’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 311-38. 
831 Vo case, para. 82. 
832 ibid, para. 85. 
833 ibid, para. 82. 




(artificial nutrition and hydration) of Vincent Lambert was incompatible with the 
French domestic legislation and its positive and negative obligations835 under Article 
2 of the Convention.836  
 
In regard to states’ negative obligation to refrain from the intentional taking of life, it 
was accepted that there was a distinction between the intentional taking of life (either 
euthanasia or assisted suicide) and the therapeutic abstention (withdrawal or 
withholding the life-sustaining treatment). In this case, as the Court observed, the issue 
concerned in relation to Lambert was defined as therapeutic abstention, which was 
legitimate in certain specific cases demonstrating unreasonable obstinacy. The doctor’s 
intention behind the decision to discontinue the treatment was not ending the patient’s 
life. Instead, ‘when there is nothing more to be done’, it was to ‘allow death to resume 
its natural course and to relieve suffering’837 ‘when there is nothing more to be done’. 
For these concerns, the Court believed state’s negative obligation under Article 2 was 
not engaged.838 As for the assessment of whether there was a violation of the positive 
obligation in relation to the withdrawal of medical treatment resulting to the death of 
Lambert,839 a number of factors were considered.840 By referring to Article 8, the 
Court held that it was an issue subjected to state’s margin of appreciation.841  
 
835 ibid, para.117. 
836 ibid, para.113. 
837 ibid, para. 122. 
838 ibid, para. 124. 
839 ibid, para. 140. 
840 ibid, para. 143. Briefly, the absence of the common approach in this regard among the States Parties; the patient’s 
interests and wishes in the process of decision making; the existence of domestic legislation regulating the 
withdrawal of treatment in consistence with Article 2 ECHR.    





Compared with the above-mentioned Vo v. France case, the issue concerned in this case 
was the opposite to the beginning of life, namely the end of life. Taking the two cases 
together, which involve two different aspects or directions of the right to life under 
Article 2, fall within the applicable scope of the margin of appreciation. As the Court 
observed,  
 
in the sphere concerning the end of life, as in that concerning the beginning of life, State 
must be afforded a margin of appreciation, not just as to whether or not to permit the 
withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining treatment and the detailed arrangements governing 
such withdrawal, but also as regards the means of striking a balance between the 
protection of patients’ right to life and the protection of their right to respect for their 
private life and their personal autonomy.842 
 
In summary, as the Court opined, in most occasions, the issues raised in relation to the 
right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR, including abortion, euthanasia and the death 
penalty, are complicated with unsettled legal, cultural ethical debates among different 
States Parties. Indisputably, the domestic authorities are better equipped to investigate 
and make a decision. The argument proposed here is that while it may have been said 
in the past that there is never a margin of appreciation in relation to Article 2, that is not 
the case now. On this basis, the argument made in this section is only taking one step 
 




further to one of the specific aspects of Article 2 (the end of life), namely the death 
penalty. In other words, if it can be shown that neither Article 2, nor even Article 3, is 
actually absolute in practice, then there is no good reason for rejecting the relevance of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine in relation to them. Notably, I am not trying to 
overstate the significance of these kind cases indicating the potential for flexibilities in 
Article 2. I am merely showing that it is possible to ‘open the door’, rather than 
decisively claiming that the current cases absolutely show that there can or should be 
flexibilities in Article 2. Whether or not the Court would recognise the margin of 
appreciation in relation to extradition to the death penalty, it nevertheless could. More 
importantly, this would not disrupt the abolition of the death penalty within the Council 
of Europe as mandated by Protocols No. 6 and No. 13. As shown above, the emerging 
margin of appreciation regarding Article 2 cases could be used to facilitate the change 
of approach that this thesis advocates, the discussion of which will be continued.   
 
4.3.5 Applying the margin of appreciation to extradition involving the death penalty 
As has been examined in Section 4.1.2, European human rights law has, in the past 
decades, become very restrictive and prohibitive against the death penalty and 
extradition of people to retentionist states to face the death penalty in view of the 
increasing protection of the Convention rights. It has been argued that the death penalty 
prohibition had conceptualised as a European consensus and there is a minimum 




with the ‘universal abolitionist trend’.843 However, such consensus definitely has not 
been endorsed via international legal prohibitions on the one hand. On the other hand, 
an absolute consensus against extradition to the death penalty has far from being 
universally complied with in state practice. From this perspective, although the 
established standard has narrowed the scope of the margin of appreciation, it is still 
applicable subjected to strong justifications. 
 
With respect to how the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, to a very limited degree, 
could work specifically to accommodate the suggested flexibilities that this thesis 
argues, the essence does not depart from the existing norms regarding the application 
of the doctrine. Nevertheless, a number of factors needs to be particularly stressed here.  
 
Briefly speaking, in the attempt to attain a balanced relationship in the decision-making 
process, the general interests of the public should be a focus compared with the right of 
individuals, on a case-specific basis.844 More specially, various factors are relevant, 
including ‘the weight of the individual interest affected, the seriousness of the 
interference, the importance of certain government aims and the need for the 
interference to achieve such aims.’845 For the subject of this thesis, the assessment of 
either the value attached to the requested person’s human rights, or the severity of the 
 
843 Jon Yorke, ‘The Right to Life and Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Council of Europe’ in Jon Yorke (ed), 
The Right to Life and the Value of Life: Orientations in law, Politics and Ethnics (Routledge 2016) 233-64. 
844 As was affirmed in Soering case, ‘…a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights [is inherent in the whole 
of the Convention.]’ Soering case, para. 89. 




harmful consequence of the failure of the extradition is variable in different cases. 
 
It is possible to argue international criminal cooperation is an exercise in pursuit of 
legitimate aims, albeit subjected to further assessments under the margin of 
appreciation. The driving force behind the restriction are generalised as the collective 
interests in combating transnational crime, protecting the requesting state’s integrity of 
criminal jurisdiction as well as the requested state’s national security and public 
interests. All of those interests or values could be largely served by a delicate operation 
of extradition, including those cases where individuals would be extradited to 
retentionist states in which the death penalty is lawfully carried out, guaranteed by 
sufficient international regulation. In that sense, in cases when extradition from the 
European state to a state where the death penalty is a kind of legitimate punishment, the 
potential death penalty should not be the straightforward ground for refusing the 
cooperation. Instead, a proportionality test is supposed to be applied to assessing 
whether placing extraditee to the risk of the death penalty is entirely necessary for the 
sake of extradition or the interests realised via extradition. In other words, for either the 
national authorities or the ECtHR, making a proportionate decision and finding a 
balanced approach are required. 
 
It has been accepted that the realisation of the greatest good for the greatest number, in 
practice, may inevitably bring about the harm to the few.846 For example, in those 
 




‘national security’ cases, the rights and interests protected by human rights law are often 
subjected to limitations in governments’ concern.847  From this perspective, certain 
compromise of the extraditee’s human rights, regardless of the qualified or presumed 
absolute ones, are acceptable. More importantly, the proposed assessment should be 
conduct in the specific context of globalised criminality, and various surrounding 
circumstances should be taken into account, in particular considering the threats from 
terrorism and other severe transnational crimes. To be more precise, if the ECtHR defers 
its contracting parties a margin of appreciation within which they are able to make their 
own judgment proportionately and grant the extradition to a non-European state. The 
proportionality perspective here could be construed as that the repression of 
transnational crime on behalf of many people outweighs the rights of the one person to 
be extradited. For example, this would especially fit in the case where the extraditee 
poses a national security threat to the requested state. In the absence of the ability to 
allow extradition, the host state may be forced to spend vast sums of public money to 
incarcerate the person over a long period or have to cumbersomely find out another 
approach to prevent him from jeopardising the wellbeing of citizens. Under such cases, 
extraditing the individual to a retentionist state where the death penalty is lawfully 
carried out would be a proportionate choice that maximises the collective interests of 
the requested state, in which the dangerous fugitive resides and poses a threat. That is 
to say, the rights of one person should not be allowed to be more important than the 
rights of many people to be safe in the expelling state.  
 





It is worth mentioning that, in this section, while we are addressing the ‘number’ of 
people in the assessment, it is not the literal meaning of counting the exact number of 
people from both sides and weighing up. It is not saying that any interference with one 
extraditee’s human rights is allowed whenever two or more people would benefit from 
his extradition. On the contrary, it is the scale and quality of benefits for both 
participating countries in the extradition process that should be valued.  
 
It should also be noted that there a qualitative difference between the ‘normal’ 
extradition case when someone whose extradition is sought for a transnational crime; 
and one where the extraditee sought also poses a national security threat to the requested 
state. In the latter case, the requested state may have more desirability to comply with 
the extradition request not only based on its treaty obligation but also for its own state 
interests of securing its territory. Therefore, at a minimum, extradition to face the death 
penalty where the extraditee also poses a significant national security threat to the 
requested state should not be banned without any exception. This might be a stimulative 
leading to further exceptions in non-national security cases. The above different types 
of interests at play are also relevant in the decision-making process regarding whether 
and to what extent the extradition is necessary for the ‘press social need’. 
 
In the application of the margin of appreciation in relation to the death penalty—




occasions where one state may overstep the boundary of the afforded margin of 
appreciation in dealing with the extradition request from the abolitionist state. At first, 
it is principal to find out the direct necessity of the restrictions, which means whether 
extradition is the only way to achieve the purpose and there should be no less intrusive 
means that could secure same objectives. In other words, it is important to evaluate to 
what extent the refusal of an extradition request would undermine the criminal justice 
of the requesting state and whether the failure of extradition would lead to the impunity 
of criminals.848 That is to say, it is essential to confirm if there are entirely effective 
and sufficient alternatives to extradition to ensure the extraditee being prosecuted or 
facing punishment. While evaluating the alternatives, not only the availability of 
jurisdiction and evidence for example, in the requested state should be taken into 
account, but also its willingness to prosecute and punish is also important. The latter 
will, to a large extent, be determined by whether or not the extraditee poses substantial 
threats to the national security or other specific national interests of the requested state 
per se. As it was framed in Chapter 1, the alternatives to extradition, including but not 
limited to prosecuting in the requested state or in a third state and surrendering to an 
international tribunal, are rarely available or sufficient. This means, unlike in Soering 
case where there was a third option to hand over the applicant to Germany,849 in many 
cases, a less intrusive way of reaching the same result does not exist. In other words, 
extraditing to a retentionist state is the best choice for the requested state to clear up the 
 
848 At this stage, the interest of the requested state is also an aspect needs to be considered concurrently. For example, 
whether the presence of the person concerned in the requested state is ‘conducive to the public good’. 
849 Soering case, para. 111. ‘A further consideration of relevance is that in the particular instance the legitimate 
purpose of extradition could be achieved by another means which would not involve suffering of such exceptional 




potential security risk in its territory in the national security cases, and the only way for 
the requesting state to bring the fugitive back to perform the criminal justice based on 
the rule of law. Both of which, in the view of this thesis, would be proportionate.  
 
Secondly, it is absolutely significant to determine that, upon the fugitive’s extradition 
in the retentionist state, whether or not the potential death penalty would be lawfully 
carried out, namely, in breach of the international regulation as discussed above. 
Conducting the proportionality test means it does not preclude the result of prohibiting 
extradition to places. In other words, the justification for the restriction of the 
individual’s right cannot be sufficiently accepted if those procedural safeguards are not 
fully guaranteed, even in the name of defending the collective interests. Because in such 
case, the use of the death penalty itself may give rise to the violation of rules of 
customary international law. More specifically, the requested state is responsible for 
ensuring that the requesting state abides by rules recognised as regulating the death 
penalty. The key point here is that the only criterion on deciding whether or not the 
extradition should be approved is if the death penalty could be ‘lawfully applied’, rather 
than the mere fact that the death penalty is existing in the requesting state. For instance, 
whether the crime upon which the extraditee is suspected or convicted of falls into the 
most serious crime category for the death penalty; whether the methods of execution 
and conditions of detention in the requesting state are humane and not contrary to the 




Turkey,850 the applicant, who had committed adultery in Iran that is punishable by 
stoning to death under Islamic law, was arrested in Turkey for illegally entering with a 
forged passport and subjected to deportation. She complained the deportation would 
put her into risk being stone to death upon return to Iran, which contrary to Article 3.851 
Her complaint was endorsed by the Court as her deportation to Iran, if executed, would 
violate Turkey’s obligation under Article 3.852 In light of the discussion in Chapter 3, 
the death penalty upon the applicant’ case would not qualify as ‘lawful application’ as 
adultery does not meet the ‘most serious crime’ requirement and stoning to death can 
never be taken as a legitimate and humane method of execution. For such reasons, the 
potential death penalty would add no merit to the suggested test of proportionality, 
irrespective of the reason for expulsion (via deportation or extradition).      
 
Thirdly, deriving from the terminology clarified in Chapter 1, in theory, there should be 
some differences in the cases where different kinds of subjects are requested, namely, 
the people charged with a capital crime and the people who has already been convicted 
of a crime subjected to the death penalty. For the latter, they know the exact penalty 
they face upon extradition. In contrast, for those people who are requested for 
prosecution, strictly speaking, they are not criminals based on the principle of 
presumption of innocence, and there would be more uncertainties regarding the result 
of the trial especially the penalty. For such reasons, there might be a different level of 
 
850 Jabari v. Turkey App no 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000). 
851 ibid, paras. 34-5.  




risk calculation about the death penalty upon return to the retentionist state. Admittedly, 
in the current framework, it seems that whether or not the requested person is convicted 
does not matter in the abolitionist state’s assessment. This means, the existence of the 
death penalty or whether the assurance is available is the predominant issue. 
 
Lastly, it is possible to say that while we are talking about the protection of the 
individuals’ Convention rights, the conflicting general interests of a wider scope of 
people should also be concerned as a reconciliation is supposed to be struck. 
Nonetheless, it is not saying that the individual’s human rights would be restricted on 
all occasions, but at least, from the legal perspective, having the possibility to consider. 
In light of the purpose of this thesis, the argument proposed in this section is not saying 
that the European states are obliged to or should unconditionally agree to extradite to 
retentionist states. Providing a certain degree of flexibility within the margin of 
appreciation does not means excluding the supervisory role of the ECtHR partly or 
completely. As a matter of fact, the margin of appreciation has never been taken as 
unlimited or discretionary, even a wide margin is applicable. In contrast,  
 
‘goes hand in hand with supervision under the Convention system. In this respect, the role 
of the Court is to review whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible 
with the Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of appreciation.’853  
 
853 Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 15 ECHR, para. 9. See also, Brighton Declaration, para. 11. ‘The domestic 
margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim 
of the measure challenged and its ‘‘necessity’’…’ See Council of Europe, ‘Margin of Appreciation’ 
<https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp> accessed 23 June 2018. See 





In fact, there were many cases in which the state was deferred with a wide margin of 
appreciation, but it was still found violated the Convention obligation.854 As Janneke 
Gerards concludes, ‘the main function of the margin of appreciation doctrine is to allow 
the Court to vary the intensity of its review of the States’ compliance with the negative 
and positive obligations following from the Convention.’855 Against this background, 
extradition of people to face the death penalty would have to be very carefully 
scrutinised. This argument was backed by the judgment of McCann and Others v. The 
United Kingdom case where the Court affirmed 
 
the use of the term ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article 2 para. 2 indicates that a stricter and 
more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when 
determining whether State action is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under paragraph 
2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly 
proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) 
of Article 2.856 
 
For the above reasons, while interpreting Article 2 and making relevant assessments 
upon the exceptions to it, the Court must ‘subject deprivations of life to the most careful 
 
unlimited…the Court must supervise whether the interference constitutes a proportionate balancing of competing 
interests involved.’ Nevertheless, it is advised that the Court should show self-constraint especially where there are 
national security concerns about the extraditee.   
854 McGoldrick (n 737) 26. 
855 Gerards, General Principles of the ECHR (n 754) 165. For further discussion of the flexibility and variation 
under the doctrine, see 165-8.  




scrutiny’.857 It may well be the case that very strong reasons would need to be put 
forward regarding extradition to face a trial that could result in the death penalty, it is 
not to say that there could never be such reasons.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Based on the examinations and outcomes of the previous chapters, this chapter has 
conducted a research on the evolving European standard on extradition to retentionist 
states where the extraditee is facing the death penalty. The Standard has become highly 
prohibitive and is regarded as exporting its own extreme abolitionist values, particularly 
against the international lawfulness discussion in Chapter 3. Having re-examined states’ 
conflicting obligations (or interests) in those extradition (or expulsion) cases involving 
the death penalty, it has found that the current method is problematic and cannot 
properly address the emerging difficulties the states, including the States Parties of the 
ECtHR, confront in the context of transnational criminality. This explains not only the 
reason that states are continuing to challenge the absolute standard that the ECtHR has 
always employed, but also the necessity and possibilities of main argument raised in 
this thesis for a certain degree of variable flexibilities in dealing with extradition to 
retentionist states.   
 
Under such circumstances, an alternative approach was proposed. This means, arguing 
for the application of the margin of appreciation under Article 2 of the ECHR, 
 




recognising its applicability in relation to the death penalty in extradition cases. The 
suggested change is based on the inherent rationales of the margin of appreciation itself, 
in particular expressing and accommodating a certain extend of proportionality. The 
proportionality calculation affords precedence of the greatest interests of the greatest 
number that is served by extradition over the human rights of the individual, so far as 
the proposed proportionality test is met. This subsection just briefly highlights some 





















5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis is mainly about why the European Court of Human Rights should permit 
extradition to face the death penalty under tightly controlled circumstances; and how 
within the existing interpretative techniques of the Court that objective could be 
accommodated. The core argument advanced in this thesis is that the ECtHR should 
loosen its approach to extradition and allow proportionality when considering the 
extradition requests from states in which the applicant may be subject to a risk of the 
death penalty. There is a need for considerable legal justification for this argument given 
that it runs contrary to established and deep-rooted legal principles, approaches and 
fundamental rights thinking on this area of law. This thesis was attempting to 
demonstrate that, in theory, there are reasons and possibilities to reconsider the 
application of the margin of appreciation under Article 2 so as to circumvent the death 
penalty—extradition dilemma. However, considering the practical reality, it has to 
admit that the ECtHR might be unwilling to accept the suggested change that this thesis 
proposed.  
 
Nevertheless, the difficulties of being adopted by the Court or most of the States Parties 
do not undermine the theoretical validity of the argument in legal terms. In other words, 
this thesis is not about whether the Court would do in regard to the change that has been 
presented, but in theory, the Court’s approach should change, and the change could be 




in pursuit of the reconciliation, this thesis does not seek to simply support abolitionist 
states or retentionist states in the death penalty debate. In contrast, a balanced and more 
proportionate approach is needed for the ultimate purpose of strengthening the use of 
extradition to eliminate the safe haven and enhancing states’ competence to combating 
transnational crimes. 
 
5.1 Extradition and transnational criminality 
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that the relationship between 
human rights and extradition needs to be reassessed in the context of ever-greater 
transnational criminality. The ongoing changes in the international environment has 
bought about unremitting attempts to recalibrate the relationship between extradition 
and human rights, with a particular focus on the death penalty. As Neil Boister states, 
‘criminals have long fled across borders to escape justice, or used borders as shields for 
the commission of crime in other states.’858 In the meantime, states are confronted with 
various transnational crimes which threaten not merely its national security, but also the 
public interests of all people. However, according to the principle of sovereignty and 
equality, states’ enforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorial. It should be admitted that 
in the previous experience, the national border has undoubtedly blocked states to 
enforce their criminal law abroad. The criminals who are lucky enough to flee out of 
state have got a big change to escape from justice. Under such circumstances, it is 
claimed that both the globalised criminality and the limitation of states’ extraterritorial 
 




enforcement necessitate the international judicial cooperation to a greater extent so as 
to efficiently combat transnational crimes. 
 
Extradition is expected to serve as a legal framework for addressing the states’ 
enforcement of their substantive criminal law, either prosecution or enforcing a 
sentence. Although states are not under obligation to extradite, they are supposed to be 
responsible for the suppression of criminality, especially those threaten the interests of 
the international community. In spite of its importance, it should be noted that 
extradition has never been a designation without weakness. It is often criticised for the 
complicated and uncertain procedures which involve miscellaneous case-specific 
factors; for its over-politicalised or extra-legal applications; and its numerous 
impediments. Simply put, the effective operation of extradition is actually obstructed 
by a wide scope of factors. Among which international human rights law has brought it 
into a new level of debate.   
 
5.2 The death penalty—extradition dilemma 
In history, extradition is a purely state-to-state process where the extraditee and his 
human rights were less concerned.859 However, along with the remarkably increasing 
recognition of human rights over the past decades, the rights and interests of the 
extraditee have been a significant, if not the primary, factor in the operation of 
extradition. In Chapter 2.4 we have examined that the conflict between extradition and 
 




human rights was put into the forefront particularly since Soering case, which opened 
the door for academic and practical attempts to reconcile extradition with human rights. 
Namely, to balance the need to bring international fugitives to justice and guarantee 
their fundamental human rights. However, we can still easily find out that in many cases 
where the interests served by extradition were not properly treated. Those extradition 
requests were ‘overwhelmingly’ refused on human rights grounds, in particular, the 
death penalty. Notably, the factors that were often overlooked was whether and to what 
extent the wanted fugitives’ accusation or conviction was true and abhorrent, and to 
what extent the unavailability of putting them to trial or sentence is harmful to not only 
the criminal justice, but also the interests of all people involved. In other words, there 
have not been sufficient remedial measures to bring the fugitive to justice when they 
‘survive’ from extradition based on human rights grounds. 
 
The essence of the conflict between extradition and human rights, inter alia, the death 
penalty reflects the human rights law’s influence upon criminal justice policy. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the death penalty is a subject with enormous complexities and 
controversies, and it is interesting to find that the debate on either the death penalty per 
se or other related issues has always given rise to opposite results. In reality, the death 
penalty exists more than a kind of punishment, which involves a variety of concerns 
from different fields—judicial, political, cultural and religious. Arguably, either being 
an issue of purely criminal justice or one subjected to human rights concerns, those 




The abolitionists have totally opposite opinions against the retentionists. Those 
divergences imply the death penalty cannot be indisputable in either political or legal 
level. More importantly, the debate and discrepancy upon the death penalty have also 
stretched into international criminal cooperation, inter alia, extradition.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights regulates the extradition process among its States 
Parties and the extradition relation between its States Parties and other non-State Parties. 
The Court conducts a quite strict criterion on both human rights in general and the 
prohibition of the death penalty in specific. This criterion is reflected not only from the 
European Convention on Human Rights with a series of Protocols, but also from its 
abundant case law. Nevertheless, as analysed in Chapter 4.1.2, the European human 
rights law did ban the death penalty from the outset. The standard on the death penalty 
has evolved to become very prohibitive, including in extradition cases. The high 
standard inevitably influences its States Parties to negotiate extradition treaties with 
retentionist states and to fulfil extradition request from a retentionist state where the 
death penalty is foreseeable. In current legal framework, it seems to be a normative 
approach that abolitionist states would not extradite or by other means to transfer people 
to a retentionist state where they are at risk of the death penalty, unless sufficiently 
credible assurance is provided against the imposition of the death penalty or execution. 
However, the ‘extradition or execution’ has never been an undisputable issue, and the 






The overall aim of this thesis was to facilitate international judicial cooperation in the 
suppression of transnational crimes, by justifying a different relationship between 
extradition and the death penalty. To be precise, European states are supposed to be 
provided with more flexibilities, via the margin of appreciation, to extradite people to 
a state where is the death penalty is lawfully carried out and the test of proportionality 
is met. It is necessary to propose this argument based on a number of reasons. To begin 
with, the death penalty—extradition dilemma is inherently problematic. As extensively 
explored in Chapter 3, several issues about the debate on the death penalty, including 
its controversies as a punishment in criminal justice; the alleged ‘universal abolition 
movement’ backed by international human rights law; and its lawfulness in 
international law, should be recalibrated and reclarified. Firstly, while an ever-greater 
number of states are abolishing the death penalty, a majority of the world’s population 
is potentially subject to it. Even for those states have already abolished the death penalty, 
although resumption of the death penalty is prohibited, there has always been 
continuing attempts to reintroduce it. The public support is not only behind those 
attempts of reintroduction, but also embedded in the culture and value system of many 
retentionist states. Secondly, the death penalty is contentious from various aspects, 
especially with regard to deterrence, discriminatory execution, miscarriage of justice 
and public opinion. Although those discrepancies do not directly affect the status of the 
death penalty in international law, particularly customary international law, it provides 




penalty in human rights law, it comes to the fact that the death penalty has no longer 
been a purely criminal justice issue, albeit with distinctive objection. However, by 
establishing that there is neither universal treaty law nor rules of customary 
international law absolutely prohibiting the death penalty, it is arguable to say the 
ECtHR’s standard that prohibits extradition to retentionist states where the death 
penalty is foreseeable is actually exporting an absolute abolitionist policy, which is not 
universal and not required by international law. The cases have also indicated that it is 
a policy that not even all its own States Parties fully share, which have been 
convincingly demonstrated from the cases outlined in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, it does 
not equate that the use of the death penalty is legitimate in all cases. In fact, to a certain 
extent, the death penalty is regulated, and its use is significantly restricted. Simply put, 
the death penalty has to be lawfully carried out in according to those restrictions, 
including but not limited to those expressed in Section 3.4, particularly those deriving 
from customary international law.  
 
The lawfulness of the death penalty should not be examined without the considerations 
of its regulation. This means, the discussion on those restrictions or safeguards is 
equally or more important than that of the death penalty per se. To a large extent, the 
former is designated to protect the human rights of people facing the death penalty, 
ensure the death penalty is applied proportionately, effectively and legitimately. As can 
be seen, the details of some safeguards have not reached a universal consensus, for 




complied by retentionist states, irrespective of the status of them. The use of the death 
penalty would not be qualified as ‘lawfully carried out until those safeguards are 
guaranteed. Therefore, concerning the main argument of this thesis, what is required 
for the requested state to determine, is not whether it would subject the extraditee to the 
death penalty upon the extradition, but whether the extradition would give rise to a 
death sentence that is lawfully carried out in the requesting state.    
 
Secondly, the current response to the dilemma, namely, the ‘absolute’ reliance on the 
use of assurances is inherently problematic. As argued in Section 4.1.4, while 
extradition with assurances is at least better than the person going totally unpunished, 
it will interfere the retentionist state’s sovereignty and the integrity of its criminal justice. 
Moreover, it leads to different categories of criminals. These reasons account for why 
the use of assurances cause great dispute and discount; and also, some retentionist states 
do not comply with it at all. Thirdly, we acknowledge that there are not sufficient and 
satisfactory alternatives to extradition from the perspectives of combating transnational 
crime and protecting human rights. In addition to the above concerns, as established in 
Chapter 1.3, there are compelling political arguments in favour of loosening the 
ECtHR’s standard regarding this issue. In fact, there have already been signs indicating 
the change being adopted with the support from some European politicians in the 
political sphere. The driving force behind that is partly expressed by the suppression of 
transnational crime on behalf of many people, to some extent, prevails over the rights 





5.3 Proposing a different way out  
The mechanism established to meet the particular aim of this thesis is arguing for 
greater use of the margin of appreciation in relation to extradition, which recognising 
its application to the death penalty under Article 2 of the ECHR, where at present it 
does not seem to apply. This is significant because it has been observed that the scope 
of the margin of appreciation with respect to other rights tends to be quite wide in 
relation to states’ response to fight against criminality, safeguard the national security 
and uphold the collective’s interests. The importance of this mechanism and a deeper 
reason to adopt it has been demonstrated by the justifications of the margin of 
appreciation. It indeed underpins the argument that there needs to be greater 
international criminal cooperation against transnational crimes, rather than merely 
affording a higher priority to extradition in its conflicts with the individual’s human 
rights.  
 
Finding a way to circumvent the death penalty—extradition dilemma so as to bridge 
the gap between abolitionist states and retentionist states is especially needed in the 
new global context, which is characterised by the great availability of cross-border 
movement, the globalisation crime and states’ expanding interests in respond to 
transnational criminality and safeguarding the national security and public interests. 
There is little doubt that prioritising extradition is consistent with the interests of both 




which meets the needs of both participating countries. Although there might be a 
qualitative difference between someone whose extradition is sought for a transnational 
crime; and one where the person sought also poses a threat to the national security and 
public interests of the requested state. Generally speaking, in cases where the extraditee 
is wanted by the requesting state and the host state wants to comply, the public interests 
or the interests of the greatest number of people are served. To be more precise, on the 
one hand, extradition is definitely for the interests of the requesting state, to guarantee 
the integrity of its criminal justice and to uphold justice and the rule of law, which also 
constitute the rationale for extradition law. On the other hand, for the requested state, 
except for the reciprocity interests manifested in Section 2.2.2.2, there are quite a lot of 
incentives for it to engage in extradition and other kinds of international judicial 
cooperation. Firstly, it is a ‘display’ of the state’s value and commitment to the 
suppression of transnational crime. This would boost the state’s international reputation 
in criminal justice, prevent not only states from being labelled as a safe haven for 
criminals, but also an influx of potential fugitives to escape justice. Secondly, fulfiling 
the extradition request may also bring about extra benefits for the requested state, for 
example, in trade and business areas. Thirdly, assisting the requesting state in bringing 
fugitives to justice also serves the interests for the requested state itself. The custody of 
the accused or convicted people in its territory poses potential and unpredictable threats 
to its national interests, and the host state is always willing to get those undesirable and 





Based on the conclusion on the lawfulness of the death penalty, it is claimed that 
extradition to retentionist states itself is not unlawful, although extradition to states that 
carry out the death penalty without regulating it might be resisted. The concept of 
‘lawful application of the death penalty’ is put forward to describe those applications 
of the death penalty in accordance with the international regulation discussed in Chapter 
3.4. For such reasons, there could be possibilities to look into the mechanism of 
introducing the margin of appreciation into this field. This means, the risk of the death 
penalty should be taken into consideration within the test of proportionality, not just 
about the existence of the death penalty in the requesting state, but about how the death 
penalty is applied by that state in specific cases. 
  
The doctrine of margin of appreciation, although subjected to criticisms, has been 
extensively applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It has 
been observed that the applicability or role of the margin of appreciation in relation to 
Article 2 of the ECHR was not clear. However, as we have seen in Vo case and Lambert 
case, it was indeed relevant with respect to the start of life and the end of life 
respectively. These cases denote that there is potential for limited flexibility regarding 
the death penalty under Article 2, which provides us with the foundation for maintaining 
the presented approach. That is to say, the requested state should be conferred with the 
margin of appreciation to assess and determine whether extraditing people to facing the 
death penalty is proportionate or not. If the margin of appreciation was allowed and it 




to extradite people to a retentionist state where it carefully regulates the imposition of 
the death penalty and its execution. In the meantime, conducting the proportionality 
tests means it does not preclude the result of prohibiting extradition to places where the 
death penalty is not lawfully carried out. For example, the offence punishable for the 
death penalty goes against the ‘most serious crime’ standard; the death penalty is 
imposed on children or pregnant women; or the death sentence is followed by a fair 
trial. It needs to stress that not just how the death penalty would be carried out in the 
requesting state is relevant in the test of proportionality, as presented in Chapter 4.3.5, 
factors such as the interests (of both participating states) served via extradition and 
whether there is an effective alternative.  
 
Furthermore, as advocated in Chapter 4.3, considering the main argument in this thesis, 
what matters in the death penalty—extradition dilemma is not just the use of the death 
penalty. More importantly, it involves both participating states’ interests that realised 
by successful extradition, in particular the suppression of transnational crime on behalf 
of the public or the collective community. For example, those detrimental effects 
resulting from the unavailability of bringing the fugitive to justice should be regarded 
as one of the factors in the suggested mechanism, which has been discussed on Chapter 
4.3.5. 
 
To conclude, the main argument in this thesis is that the prohibition of extraditing 




universal abolitionist values. States should be conferred with a certain degree of margin 
of appreciation to flexibly make its own decision regarding whether the extradition 
would be proportionate or not in specific cases. This is particularly necessary in this 
global context of transnational criminality where greater international criminal 
cooperation is needed. To a certain degree, combating transnational crime and 
protecting the interests of the collective community are expected to enjoy a higher 
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